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Foreword
The Korea Economic Institute (KEI) is pleased to issue the fifth volume of its 
“Special Studies” series. This series affords individual authors an opportunity 
to explore in depth a particular topic of current interest relating to Korea.
Completion of this study is timely. Its planning commenced well before the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and ensuing broadening of the turbulence in 
U.S. financial markets into a global financial crisis and then a severe economic 
slowdown. However, its comprehensive assessment of Korea’s international 
financial policies, with a foray into the feasibility of an Asian common cur-
rency, takes on greater relevance in light of these events and the early recov-
ery of Korea’s economy and financial markets. Dr. Thomas D. Willett, assist-
ed by a number of coauthors of individual chapters and sections, provides not 
only a comprehensive assessment of Korea’s policies but also considerable 
insight into issues such as the adequacy of foreign exchange reserves that are 
part of the debate on reform of the international financial architecture.
KEI is dedicated to objective, informative analysis. We welcome comments 
on this and our other publications. We seek to expand contacts with academic 
and research organizations across the country and would be pleased to enter-
tain proposals for other “Special Studies.”
Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard
President
October 2009
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Preface
I have accumulated many debts in the preparation of this study. Chapter 2 
draws heavily on a paper with Kim Yongbok, “Assessing Korea’s Post Crisis 
Managed Float,” that was prepared for a Bank of Korea workshop in 2004. 
A shortened version of that paper written with Kim Yongbok was published 
by the Korea Economic Institute in Korea’s Economy 2006, with the title 
“Korea’s Postcrisis Exchange Rate Policy.” Chapter 2 has been substantially 
revised and updated with the assistance of coauthor Kenneth S. Kim, current 
Claremont Graduate University dissertation student. After completing his 
dissertation at Claremont, Kim Yongbok returned to the Bank of Korea, and 
neither he nor the Bank has responsibility for the policy views expressed. 
Chapter 2 as well as portions of Chapters 9 and 10 benefited from helpful 
comments by participants in the 2009 annual meetings of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Association and Western Economic Association International.
Chapter 4 on the subject of demand for international reserves was cowritten 
with recent Claremont graduate Ozan Sula and draws on earlier research 
of Jung Sik Kim et al. (2004) for the Claremont-KIEP Conference on 
Monetary and Exchange Rate Arrangements in East Asia. Chapter 5 on 
financial liberalization and international capital flows is coauthored with 
current Claremont doctoral students Yoonmin Kim and Thana Sompornserm. 
Professor Nancy N. Auerbach of Scripps College is coauthor of the first 
section of Chapter 5, which draws heavily on our joint paper, “The Political 
Economy of Perverse Financial Liberalization,” presented at a conference on 
the Korean economy at the University of Washington. Yoonmin Kim is also 
coauthor of section 2 of Chapter 10. Chapter 6 on international dimensions of 
Korean monetary policy was cowritten with recent Claremont graduate Alice 
Ouyang, who is now on the faculty at the Central University of Finance and 
Economics in Beijing. She is the primary author of Appendix A and Appendix 
B on the estimation of sterilization and offset coefficients. Chapters 7 and 8 
draw heavily on the research for my joint paper, entitled “Asian Monetary 
Cooperation: Perspectives from the European Experience and Optimum 
Currency Area Analysis,” written with recent Claremont graduate Orawan 
Permpoon, now with the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and current 
Claremont dissertation student Lalana Srisorn. This was first presented in 
November 2007 at a joint Claremont-KEI-KIEP workshop on the subject 
of Asian monetary cooperation at which many highly useful comments 
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were received. Orawan is coauthor of Chapter 7 of this study, and Lalana is 
coauthor of Chapter 8.
This study draws more broadly on the ongoing research projects of the 
Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies on Asian economic 
cooperation, on currency and financial crises, and on reform of the 
international financial architecture. Financial support for this underlying 
research from the Freeman Foundation, KEI, and the National Science 
Foundation is gratefully acknowledged, as are the skills of the Institute’s able 
administrator, Lynda Marquez, and my assistant, Lalana Srisorn. Extremely 
valuable comments by M. K. Kang, James Lister, Kwanho Shin, and Ted 
Truman on the entire manuscript and by Helen Popper on Chapter 2 are also 
gratefully acknowledged.
Thomas D. Willett
Director, Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies
and Horton Professor of Economics
Claremont Graduate University and Claremont McKenna College
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11
Introduction and Overview
The global crisis that was ignited by the meltdown in the U.S. subprime 
mortgage market is a dramatic illustration of just how interdependent our 
economic and financial systems have become. The spread of the crisis from a 
downturn in a major real sector of the U.S. economy to the financial market 
most connected to it was to be expected. What caught many people, includ-
ing experts, by surprise was how the crisis kept spreading to a much wider 
set of financial and credit markets in the United States and other industrial 
countries, then to a much broader set of countries around the globe—and then 
from the financial to the real sectors. The resulting recessions in the indus-
trial countries spread the damage to many developing and emerging-market 
countries that had little direct financial connection with the fancy derivatives 
products that contributed so much to the initial spread of the crisis. In this 
process, Korea was in an intermediate position. It had little direct exposure to 
securities based on the U.S. subprime market, but its high level of financial 
interdependence made it the Asian country hardest hit when global financial 
markets seized up.
While less dramatic, economic and financial interdependence is also impor-
tant in more ordinary times. International developments frequently have an 
important impact on an economy as open as Korea’s. Witness the large inter-
national capital flows, both into and out of the Korean economy, in the years 
between the Asian crisis of 1997–98 and this one. These capital flows were 
strongly affected by policies in Korea as well as external developments, and, 
in turn, these flows had substantial effects on the exchange rate of the won. 
Such flows can have important implications for a wide range of domestic and 
international policies such as domestic monetary policies and the manage-
ment of international reserves; and the flows have fueled debates about such 
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issues as whether Korea has lost much of its control over its domestic mone-
tary policy, whether Korea should rethink its strategy of progressive financial 
liberalization, and whether Korea should revise its exchange-rate policies. 
For many of these issues the best policy choices depend on the policies that 
are being adopted by one’s trading and financial partners. Thus, concern with 
the broad scope of Korea’s international financial policies involves issues 
such as the debates over Asian monetary and financial cooperation, the pros 
and cons of trying to establish a common currency in Asia, and reform of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the global financial system. In the 
midst of the crisis, some of these issues have become more urgent and others 
have been put on the back burner, but all of them remain important over the 
medium term.
Most of these issues are too complex to evaluate adequately on the basis of 
one’s economic philosophy alone. The debate over fixed versus flexible ex-
change rates, for example, cuts across traditional ideological divides. Indeed, 
modern international monetary analysis concludes that there is simply no one 
best type of exchange rate regime for all countries. Fixed rates are better for 
some countries; flexible rates for others. Thus, to discuss such issues sensibly, 
we need to know a good deal of international monetary analysis—and a lot 
about the specific conditions facing a country. Likewise, how much interna-
tional financial interdependence affects a country’s ability to conduct national 
monetary policies effectively requires careful empirical research. The answer 
will vary greatly from one country to another. Thus, this overview of the key 
issues facing Korea’s international financial policies has required a lengthy 
effort. Indeed, in some cases it has even been necessary to assess substantial 
debates about what Korea’s policies are. Some experts have argued, for ex-
ample, that Korea’s exchange rate policy has been a free float, while others 
have gone to almost the opposite extreme and argued that Korea is still on a 
soft-dollar standard. 
For those primarily concerned with the global crisis and how it has affected 
middle-income countries like Korea, this issue is not of major importance, 
but for economists and officials concerned with Korea’s exchange rate policy 
it is crucial. Because of the wide range of likely interests of potential readers, 
we have paid considerable attention to presenting our analysis in a way that 
can be used for a number of different purposes. For example, those interested 
only in a broad overview of the crisis and how it has affected Korea need 
read only this introduction and the last three chapters, while a specialist inter-
ested in only a particular aspect of Korea’s international financial policy can 
read only the chapter that covers that aspect. Although some of the chapters 
include rather technical original research, we have included sections in each 
chapter that can be read by those without strong expertise in economics and 
finance. In Chapter 2, for example, someone interested only in the broad is-
20335_SpcStd_Willett-N1-R1.indd   2 11/11/2009   4:02:03 PM
  Introduction and Overview  3
sues involving Korean exchange rate policy should be able to read the first 
and last sections while skipping the more technical analysis in the middle.
The following section offers a broad overview of today’s global crisis and 
highlights key similarities and differences between it and the Asia crisis of 
1997–98 and their effects on the Korean economy. The final section offers a 
brief chapter-by-chapter overview of the study.
Korea in Crisis
The summer of 2007 saw the appearance of the first public signs that the 
downturn in the U.S. housing market might have broader ramifications in 
financial markets. This was exactly 10 years after the crisis in Thailand set off 
the Asian currency and financial crises. Psychologists tell us that we are much 
more likely to learn from our own tragedies than from those of others, and 
that certainly appears to be the case with the current crisis. As the Thai crisis 
went regional and resulted in economic devastation throughout much of Asia, 
the U.S. crisis has gone global. Compared with the situation in 1997, most 
Asian economies, including Korea’s, were in far stronger positions today to 
deal with the present financial debacle, but this didn’t mean they could fully 
escape its impact.
Careful diagnosis of the Asian crisis of a decade ago suggests that it was due 
less to the bad exchange rate policies and irrational contagion than was origi-
nally thought and more to a wide range of financial excesses.1 While many of 
the specifics of the causes of the current global crisis differ considerably from 
those of the Asian crisis, a central thesis of this study is that the fundamental 
causes are actually quite similar. They lie in perverse incentive structures 
and a lack of sound prudential supervision combined with a degree of lazi-
ness in doing due diligence, herd behavior by investors, and overconfidence 
in sophisticated but fundamentally flawed risk management systems (which 
led banks and financial-market participants to take on far more risk than they 
realized). The result of such widespread excesses in both investment and bor-
rowing decisions was that, when a crisis hit in one country, it served as a 
wake-up call that led to much broader reevaluations of risk positions and a 
repricing of risks. The result both a decade ago in the Asian crisis and today 
was a spread of crisis conditions far beyond those implied by direct economic 
interdependence. In other words, much of the spread of both crises was due 
to belated recognition of widespread financial excesses. And, as occurs in 
1.  See the analysis and references in Agenor et al. (1999); Desai (2003), Dooley and Frankel 
(2004), Edwards and Frankel (2002, 11–30), Eichengreen (1999, 2002), Furman and Stiglitz 
(1998), Goldstein (2002), Haggard (2000), Horowitz and Heo (2001), Mishkin (2006), Noble 
and Ravenhill (2000), Pempel (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998), Rakshit (2002), and Willett et 
al. (2005).
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such situations, the huge increase in risk aversion causes collateral damage to 
many who had not themselves engaged in the excesses.
The Asian crisis hit Korea so hard because Korea had been subject to many 
of the same kinds of bad investments and financial excesses that contributed 
to Thailand’s problems. Thailand’s overvalued pegged exchange rate was 
another major cause of its crisis. Korea’s exchange rate was not similarly 
obviously overvalued before the crisis hit, but, as with Thailand and the other 
crisis countries, widespread beliefs that there was little risk of substantial 
depreciation contributed to massive unhedged foreign borrowing. When the 
Thai depreciation exploded this assumption, there was a quite rational rush 
for the exits, and efforts to cover open positions led in turn to a worsening 
of the crisis in a downward spiral quite similar to what we are seeing today 
on a global scale.2 Since the AAA ratings on mortgage-backed securities be-
came suspect and the short-term credit markets began to dry up, a wide range 
of overleveraged institutions have had to scramble for cash and sell assets, 
which in turn drives down prices further. Although such responses are often 
rational at the individual level, the macro implications can be devastating.
This fundamental difference between individual or micro and macro level 
incentives and effects is at the heart of one of the most fundamental prob-
lems with standard private sector risk management systems and national and 
international prudent regulatory schemes such as Basel I and Basel II. These 
all fail to recognize sufficiently that financial markets and credit relationships 
often operate quite differently during crisis than during normal periods.
Although these problems with risk management systems became clearly 
evident during the Asian crisis, they made little impact on investors and 
regulators in the industrial countries. Private investors did not repeat their 
specific mistake of overinvestment in Asia, but the period of extreme risk 
aversion that followed the Asian and Russian crises and the fall of Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM) soon gave way to new overenthusiasms 
for a wide range of so-called new investment opportunities, including the 
rapid spread of a wide range of mortgage and other types of asset-backed 
securities. The global economy became awash with liquidity, and leverage 
soared. And, while the development of new derivatives markets such as credit 
default swaps offered many beneficial opportunities for firms and individuals 
to hedge risks, they also offered opportunities for others to take on greater 
speculative risks.
2.  Some financial institutions and other investors had anticipated the crisis and moved funds or 
covered positions before the depreciation of the baht, but the depreciation came as an unantici-
pated shock to a large portion of the market. The Mexican peso crisis in 1994 was similar.
20335_SpcStd_Willett-N1-R1.indd   4 11/11/2009   4:02:03 PM
  Introduction and Overview  5
Those Asian countries that had borne the brunt of the crisis in 1997–98 gener-
ally followed much more prudent policies. It seems to be one of the attributes 
of the human condition that we have to learn mainly from our own mistakes. 
Learning from the mistakes of others appears to be much more difficult. While 
in the industrial countries many financial-market participants deluded them-
selves that they had conquered risk through the marvels of financial engineering, 
Korea and other Asian countries rightly strengthened their domestic financial 
systems substantially. A recent summary in the IMF Survey by the IMF’s Asia 
and Pacific Department (2008, 10) of the 2007 annual review of Korea says:
Korea has done a lot in recent years to strengthen its fi-
nancial sector. The payoff has been increased asset quality, 
profitability, and capital adequacy (that is, banks’ capital is 
adequate to protect depositors and counterparties from bal-
ance sheet risks). At the same time, risk assessment prac-
tices and credit information have improved.
Substandard loans of the commercial banking sector fell from 3.3 percent in 
2001 to less than 1 percent in 2006, while the corporate debt-equity ratio fell 
from more than 200 percent in 2000 to a much safer level of a little below 100 
percent in 2006. Unlike in Europe, the exposure of the Korean banking sys-
tem to mortgage-backed securities in the United States was quite low. And, 
instead of the deteriorating quality of mortgage lending that occurred in the 
United States, the structure of financing for the Korean housing market has 
improved, with a decline in the proportion of balloon payments or bullet-type 
mortgages in which the repayment of principal takes place in a lump sum at 
the end of the loan term.
This is not to say that Korea has completely avoided financial excesses since 
the 1997–98 crisis. Poor quality bank lending to firms before the crisis was 
replaced with an excessive expansion of credit card debt after the crisis. This 
binge was brought under control, albeit not before a minor crisis was gener-
ated. But the delinquency rate on credit card debt that had risen from 7.5 per-
cent in 2000 to almost 12 percent in 2002 fell to below 3 percent by 2006.
Financial institutions in Korea have also carried out some highly question-
able practices, perhaps the most bilateral being the so-called KIKO scandal, 
in which several banks took advantage of small- and medium-sized Korean 
exporters that were seeking to hedge their future export proceeds against the 
continuing appreciation of the won. As explained in Chapter 10, instead of 
offering these firms standard forward contracts, several banks took advan-
tage of the lack of financial expertise of many of these small firms to sell 
them complicated options contracts that protected them against only a limited 
range of appreciation of the won and exposed them to unlimited potential 
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losses if the won began to depreciate. When the won unexpectedly reversed 
course, the large resulting losses threatened many of these firms with bank-
ruptcy. These contracts were so blatantly biased that they were declared il-
legal by the courts.
A major source of concern to many observers was the explosion of bank 
borrowing from abroad that began in 2006. Although this was monitored by 
the authorities and judged to be safe because the borrowing was undertaken 
mainly by Korean branches of international banks or was “covered” by fu-
ture export receipts, such borrowing was viewed as a source of concern by 
many market participants after the crisis began. Analysts also focused on the 
withdrawal of foreign funds from the Korean stock market and the recently 
developed dependence of the Korean banking system on wholesale financing 
from the capital markets, not just customer deposits. Concerns have also been 
expressed about speculation in the market for forward exchange.
As a result of such factors, Korea was hit by the financial fallout from the cri-
sis much harder than any other Asian economy. Thanks in part to the strong 
international reserve position that had been developed, Korea has pulled 
through that phase of the crisis rather successfully. It has shared with the 
other export-oriented Asian economies the next phase of the global crisis, 
the substantial slowdown in international trade. Unlike in 1997–98, however, 
Korea was in a position to adopt strong monetary and financial stimulus and 
thus has been able to cushion the effects of the world trade downturn to a 
substantial degree. Thus, the effects of the crisis on Korea, while certainly 
negative, have been far less disastrous than many had feared.
Outline and Overview of the Study
In the wake of the 1997–98 crisis, Korea initiated a number of important 
changes in policy. These included the adoption of a managed float for the 
won, inflation targeting as the primary objective of monetary policy, sub-
stantial additional domestic and international financial liberalization and 
strengthening of prudential regulation and supervision, and the accumulation 
of a strong international reserve position. These developments are analyzed 
in Chapters 2 through 6.
Chapter 2 reviews Korea’s post–Asian crisis exchange rate policies. While 
Korea’s policy is often described by officials—and some independent studies 
have concurred—as a freely floating rate, it is shown that it has in fact been 
a managed float as evidenced by Korea’s large accumulation of reserves. It is 
argued that this is indeed a very appropriate type of policy strategy for a me-
dium-sized economy, such as Korea’s, that is heavily engaged in international 
trade and investment. Although one can always second-guess exactly how a 
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regime is managed, in general Korean exchange rate management receives 
good marks. During the long period of upward pressure on the won, too much 
emphasis likely was placed on limiting appreciation, resulting in reserve ac-
cumulations that were excessive by many standards of reserve adequacy; but 
the high levels of reserve accumulation that resulted from this policy look 
much more desirable in light of the strains of the current crisis.
In Chapter 3, it is argued that the combination of a managed float and infla-
tion targeting that Korea adopted after the crisis is a much superior approach 
to monetary stability than the strategy of exchange rate pegging advocated 
by some. It is more robust to a wide range of shocks and is better at dealing 
with the problems of time inconsistency, where policies that bring short-run 
benefits lead to longer-run costs.
In Chapter 4 we review new developments in the analysis of international 
reserve adequacy in a world of substantial international capital mobility and 
apply these to Korea. We make the somewhat controversial argument that, 
despite the large inflows of foreign capital into the Korean stock market, Ko-
rea had reached quite adequate international reserve levels by the first year or 
two of this decade, and the continued large reserve accumulations were not 
justified on these grounds. The large capital outflows during the current crisis 
have fallen within the range we projected for a future crisis and are consistent 
with our argument that Korea had accumulated more than adequate reserve 
levels.
In Chapter 5 we look more closely at the post-1997 financial liberalization 
and the behavior of international financial flows. In Chapter 6 we evaluate 
the argument that such capital mobility has undermined the ability of the 
Bank of Korea (BOK) to carry out domestic monetary policy effectively. We 
conclude that large capital flows do complicate the task of monetary officials, 
but that they have not undercut the ability of the BOK to implement its infla-
tion targeting.
A major thesis of this study is that, although it is quite important for Korea 
to play a strong role in pursuing increased Asian monetary and financial co-
operation, it is also important that substantive progress not be sidetracked by 
excessive focus on grandiose schemes such as creation of a common Asian 
currency to mimic the creation of the euro in Europe.
Chapter 7 argues that a number of recent research studies have focused on 
too narrow a range of economic criteria and as a result have tended to over-
emphasize the prospective benefits relative to the costs of creating a com-
mon Asian currency in the near future. It argues that monetary integration 
is fundamentally different from trade and financial integration. All countries 
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should be able to have net gains from the latter types of integration. However, 
monetary union implied by a common currency provides rules for the con-
duct of monetary policy that would not necessarily always be in the interests 
of all the members.
The major factors that influence the costs and benefits of adopting a common 
currency are delineated in the literature on the theory of optimal currency 
areas. From this perspective, some countries would likely gain in aggregate 
from a common Asian currency, but Korea is highly unlikely to be one of 
these any time in the near future.
Chapter 8 turns to geopolitical concerns and the lessons to be drawn from 
the European integration process. It is argued that much can be learned from 
the European experience about ways to build up mutually beneficial coop-
eration over time, especially with respect to the need to build up strong re-
gional institutions. The European experience can easily be misread, however. 
Contrary to the superficial interpretation that functional linkages cause trade 
integration to inevitably generate spillovers that lead eventually to monetary 
integration, the process toward European monetary union was due largely to 
a particular set of geopolitical conditions and beliefs that are absent in Asia. 
Indeed, if the euro did not already exist, it probably could not be negotiated 
today under current European political conditions. In our interpretation, the 
most important geopolitical lesson from Europe is not that monetary union 
is inevitable but that economic integration played a powerful role in creating 
a peaceful Germany and healing the wounds from World War II. There is of 
course a strong analogy today with the prospective benefits from encouraging 
the peaceful integration of China into the Asian and global economies. Korea 
is in a strong position to help with this process.
A careful look at the European experience also calls into question two other 
beliefs that are popular in some quarters. One is that the development of 
endogenous optimal currency area analysis shows that the traditional path 
of the sequencing of regional integration from trade to financial to monetary 
integration can be bypassed and that trade and financial integration will auto-
matically be stimulated by formation of a monetary union.
A second questionable interpretation is that a regime of adjustable exchange 
rate parities such as was incorporated into the European Monetary System 
(EMS) that preceded the creation of the euro is a desirable way to provide 
both exchange rate stability and monetary cooperation and should be a blue-
print for the evolution of Asian monetary cooperation. It is frequently argued 
that this exchange rate–based approach led to substantial coordination of 
monetary policy in Europe. In some cases this was true, but in many others it 
was not. The result was serious currency crisis in 1992 and 1993.
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The attractiveness of such exchange rate–based approaches is that in the short 
run close coordination between exchange rate and monetary policies is gener-
ally not needed. Sterilized intervention allows a degree of short-run indepen-
dence between these two policy instruments. Thus, governments can get the 
short-run benefits of establishing exchange rate stability with little cost. The 
cost comes later when policies must be adjusted or the risk of currency crisis 
mounts. There are many advantages of international coordination of mon-
etary and exchange rate policies among highly interdependent economies. 
To date, however, Asian countries have shown little willingness to engage in 
monetary policy coordination. Hopes that this can be brought about indirectly 
by the need to deepen exchange rate commitments are understandable, and 
this strategy has sometimes worked. History shows, however, that it also of-
ten fails and is thus a high-risk strategy. Although there is no strong presump-
tion from pure economic theory about the optimal sequencing of exchange 
rate and monetary policy coordination, there are strong political-economy 
arguments for requiring that significant progress be made on monetary policy 
coordination before strong commitments on exchange rate policy are made.
Chapters 9 and 10 deal with crises. Chapter 9 discusses the major similarities 
and differences between the current crisis and the Asian crisis of 1997–98. 
This provides background for Chapter 10, which analyzes the effects of the 
crisis on Korea and the policy responses that have been taken. It is argued 
that Korea’s strong international reserve position has allowed the government 
to take strong actions that have substantially reduced the potential negative 
impact of the crisis on Korea.
Chapter 11 summarizes the major conclusions of the discussion and discusses 
strategies for global financial reforms to make future crises less likely. As this 
study goes to press at the end of October 2009, it appears that the worst of the 
crisis is past, although the pain is far from over. It is crucial that fundamental 
reforms be undertaken. We will likely never be able to completely eliminate 
financial crises, but there is much that can be done to make them less frequent 
and less costly. Chapter 11 does not attempt to lay out a full blueprint for 
reform, but it does draw a number of lessons that should help guide reform. 
Fortunately the general tenor of the reform proposals coming from the U.S. 
government and its G-20 partners is consistent with this analysis. While there 
is considerable room to dispute specific features of any of the blueprints for 
reform that have been offered, it is important that reformers not become so 
caught up in the search for perfection that we play into the hands of the strong 
political forces that would like to maintain as much of the status quo as pos-
sible. Let us hope that this crisis will lead to as productive domestic financial 
reforms in the advanced economies as the Asian crisis of 1997–98 did for 
Asia and that this time we will do a better job of dealing with the interna-
tional dimensions of financial system supervision. With its chairmanship of 
20335_SpcStd_Willett-N1-R1.indd   9 11/11/2009   4:02:03 PM
10  The Global Crisis and Korea’s International Financial Policies
the G-20 for the coming year, Korea is in a strong position to help this come 
about.
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2
Korea’s Exchange Rate Policies 
between the Crises
This section is coauthored by Kenneth S. Kim.
Debate has been vigorous about how best to characterize countries’ exchange 
rate policies; it has been stimulated in part by the high correlation between 
pegged exchange rates and currency crises in Europe in the early 1990s and 
in emerging-market countries since. These developments have generated 
great interest in propositions such as the unstable middle hypothesis that ar-
gues that adjustably pegged exchange rates are inherently unstable in a world 
of substantial international capital mobility as well as the stronger and more 
controversial two-corners or bipolar hypothesis that argues that countries 
must move all the way to one end of the spectrum of flexibility of exchange 
rate regimes, that is, to hard fixes or floating rates. Critics of this latter view 
argue that neither of these extreme options is desirable for many countries 
because a hard fix requires giving up national monetary independence and 
floating rates can be highly volatile and disruptive. From this perspective, 
less extreme options like crawling bands or managed floats can provide a 
more effective solution. These issues are discussed in Chapter 3.
It is perhaps a surprise that the boundary lines between different types of 
exchange rate regimes are sometimes far from clear-cut. Considerable evi-
dence shows that substantial differences often exist between the exchange 
rate regimes countries announce they are following and their actual behavior 
in practice. Furthermore, despite several major research projects that develop 
classification based on measures of actual practice, leading researchers have 
come to substantially different judgments about the policies being followed 
by particular countries. The concept of “fear of floating” popularized by Cal-
vo and Reinhart (2002) is based on the observation that many countries with 
official floating rates in practice manage these rates quite a bit. Although 
some have argued for going all the way to fixed exchange rates, as will be 
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discussed in Chapter 7, this conclusion does not logically follow, and for 
many countries the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) suggests that 
the economic costs of hard fixes would substantially exceed the benefits.
More common are soft pegs that can be adjusted to avoid imposing costly in-
flation or recession on domestic economies. Most of the countries hardest hit 
by the Asian crisis initially floated their exchange rates, but fear-of-floating 
behavior was soon observed for many countries. This led McKinnon and 
Schnabl (2004) to argue that Asia had returned to a soft dollar standard or 
peg. This was certainly true for China for a number of years after the crisis 
(as well as before), and Malaysia did adopt a peg for several years; but for 
countries like Korea this is not a correct description of exchange rate policy.
Officials frequently describe Korea’s policy as free floating. As this chapter 
will show, this description goes too far in the opposite direction because Ko-
rea has intervened heavily at times in the foreign exchange market. Officials 
argue that this is a free float because there is no set exchange rate target. This 
statement is an accurate description of Korea’s exchange rate policy, but, ac-
cording to the standard economic definition, such behavior is described as a 
managed float rather than a free float.
In the following section, we review the debate about what kind of exchange 
rate policy Korea has actually been following since the 1997 crisis and con-
clude that it is definitely most appropriately described as a managed float. 
This leaves open, however, how best to characterize how the float has been 
managed. Drawing on the concept that the degree of a country’s exchange 
rate policy is best measured by how heavily it intervenes in the foreign ex-
change market to limit exchange rate movements, we analyze the behavior of 
Korea’s exchange rate and intervention actions (as proxied by changes in in-
ternational reserves) and show that such policy has gone through a number of 
distinct phases corresponding in considerable part to changes in the direction 
and strength of pressures in the foreign exchange market. In the last section 
of this chapter, we discuss various principles that have been offered for the 
management of flexible exchange rates and conclude that, on the whole, the 
won has been well managed.
Debate over Characterizing Korea’s Exchange Rate Policies
The question of how we should characterize Korea’s exchange rate policy 
might seem quite easy, but this is not the case. Korean officials have often 
referred to post–Asian crisis policy as a freely floating exchange rate, and 
this characterization meets the definitions that have been offered by some 
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classifiers of exchange rate regimes (Reinhart and Rogoff 2004).3 In contrast, 
some experts such as Dooley, Dornbusch, and Park (2002) have characterized 
Korea, even post crisis, as having an “intermediate” exchange rate regime.
This was clearly the case prior to the Asian crisis, when a de facto slowly 
crawling band against the dollar had characterized Korea’s exchange rate 
policy. Although some have argued that such limited flexibility of the won 
was a major contributor to the 1997–98 crisis, the won had not become as 
clearly overvalued prior to the crisis as had the Thai baht. Indeed, some even 
argued that it was a little undervalued. The sharply limited flexibility had 
encouraged excessive unhedged foreign currency borrowing, however, and 
increased the Korean economic vulnerability after the crisis had begun. As 
the crisis worsened, efforts to maintain the crawling band became increas-
ingly futile and were soon abandoned. During a crisis, a temporary move to a 
floating rate is standard operating procedure. Malaysia returned to a pegged 
rate after the crisis, but Korea and most of the other crisis countries stayed 
with a flexible rate.
Within this broad category are many varieties of regimes, however, and 
where within this range Korean policy should be placed has been the subject 
of some controversy. Recent research on exchange rate regimes has taught 
us that official classifications can often be misleading. China argued, for ex-
ample, that it had a managed float even though its currency had remained 
pegged to the dollar within a narrow range from the mid-1990s until 2005. 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have labeled such heavy management of officially 
flexible rates as “fear of floating” and argue convincingly that the shifts in 
recent years in official classifications of floating rates have greatly overstated 
the true increase in flexibility. Indeed, some experts such as McKinnon and 
Schnabl (2004) have argued that Asia showed little real increase in flexibility 
after the crisis and that most of Asia can be best described as still being on a 
de facto dollar standard. This contention is overstated.
Korea officially maintains that it is practicing a free float but notes that of-
ficial intervention is sometimes used. This terminology is not consistent with 
the standard textbook definition of freely floating. As Jeffrey Frankel (2004, 
5) puts it, “With a free float, the central bank does not intervene in the for-
eign-exchange market.” Ito and Park (2004) refer to this “nonexistence of 
official intervention” as the “fundamentalist” definition of free floating.
3.  Although Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) categorize the Korean exchange rate regime as 
freely floating (July 1998–December 2001), the updated survey, Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff 
(2008), lists the regime as managed floating (July 1998–November 2004) and the regime dur-
ing the subsequent period as de facto crawling band (December 2004–December 2007).
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Seldom is such a pure free float followed in practice. As Reinhart and Rog-
off (2004) argue, “In reality, ‘pure’ floating exchange rates are an artifact 
of economics textbooks. Even in countries where the exchange rate is not 
an explicit target of policy, there are typically occasional (relatively rare) 
instances where there is unilateral or coordinated intervention in the foreign 
exchange market.” The United States, Canada, and, in recent periods, Mexico 
would be examples of countries practicing only occasional foreign exchange 
market intervention. For years, New Zealand has been an exception and has 
practiced a complete free float although the central bank reserved the right to 
intervene if foreign exchange markets should become disorderly.
The Reinhart and Rogoff study makes valuable contributions to the literature 
on the classifications and analyses of exchange rate regimes, but its treat-
ment of freely floating rates is open to the serious criticism that it is based 
solely on the behavior of exchange rates. Analytically, however, the degree 
of flexibility of an exchange rate regime should depend on the degree of ex-
change market pressure that it takes in the form of changes in reserves versus 
changes in exchange rates. In a pure float all change comes in the exchange 
rate, and in a pure fix all of it is taken as a change in reserves. (Of course, 
other policies such as monetary policy and controls can also be varied to deal 
with exchange market pressure and, as will be discussed below, this needs 
to be taken into account in the full description of a country’s monetary poli-
cy–cum–exchange rate regime.) Where exchange market pressure is strong, 
there can be both a lot of exchange rate movement and a lot of intervention. 
Failure to take this into account led Reinhart and Rogoff to erroneously clas-
sify Japan as a free-floating regime despite the record amount of intervention 
that was undertaken.
In their original study, Reinhart and Rogoff similarly classify Korea’s post-
crisis regime as freely floating. However, the huge increase in Korea’s inter-
national reserves indicates that it, like Japan, while clearly following a float-
ing as opposed to a pegged-rate regime, is practicing substantially heavier 
management of its exchange rate than countries such as Canada, Mexico, 
New Zealand, and the United States. Of course, changes in reserves are far 
from a perfect proxy for official intervention, but, with reserve accumulations 
so large, this seems like a safe conclusion.
It is something of a surprise that the new behavioral IMF classifications of 
exchange rate regimes based on the judgments of IMF staff place Korea in its 
most flexible category, which they label “independent” floating. Such inde-
pendent floating is described as follows (Bubula and Ötker-Robe 2003, 15): 
“The exchange rate is market determined; any foreign exchange intervention 
aims at moderating the rate of change and preventing undue fluctuations that 
are not justified by the fundamentals, rather than establishing a level for the 
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exchange rate.” This they contrast with “tightly or other managed floating” 
where (Bubula and Ötker-Robe 2003, 15): “The authorities influence ex-
change rate movements through interventions to counter the long-term trend 
of the exchange rate, without specifying a predetermined exchange rate path, 
or without having a specific exchange rate target (‘dirty floating’).” Their 
distinction between “tightly” and “other managed floating” is not entirely 
clear, but for the latter “the exchange rate is influenced in a more ad hoc 
manner.” Even the distinction between independent and managed floating 
does not seem clear, however, since “moderating the rate of change” and 
“countering the long-term trend” can both be forms of “leaning against the 
wind” intervention.
In other words, under both of the IMF’s categories of managed and indepen-
dent floating, heavy or light exchange rate management could take place. This 
distinction (albeit subject to a fuzzy dividing line) is more relevant for policy 
analysis. Likewise, Reinhart and Rogoff’s distinction between managed and 
free floating is based purely on the amount of exchange rate movement using 
a measure based on the mean absolute monthly percentage change in the ex-
change rate over a rolling five-year period. For some purposes such classifi-
cations based on the variability of the exchange rate alone may be useful, but, 
for issues of the stability of exchange rate regimes and questions of possible 
exchange rate manipulation and beggar-thy-neighbor policies, the amount of 
official intervention is of crucial importance. The latter considerations em-
phasize that exchange rate policy needs to be evaluated from the standpoint 
of both the country in question and also its trading partners.
The most blatant forms of beggar-thy-neighbor policies involve government-
induced devaluations when a country is running a balance of payments sur-
plus. The development of international monetary cooperation in the post–
World War II period has virtually eliminated such blatant practices as were 
implemented by some countries, including the United States, during the 
1930s. Today, manipulation usually is more passive and acts merely to reduce 
or halt appreciations, not actively force major depreciations. Such policies 
can still generate substantial disequilibrium, however, and thus may have an 
important influence on the international distribution of adjustment pressures. 
With the substantial increase in exchange rate flexibility since the 1970s, 
such issues have become considerably less contentious than during the days 
of the Bretton Woods adjustable peg system. They are not entirely eliminated, 
however, and the large reserve accumulations in Asia in recent years have 
become the subject of a great deal of commentary.
It is certainly wrong to suggest that the heavy exchange market intervention 
by Asia in the years after the crisis has been the only major cause of the huge 
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U.S. current account deficits.4 In the case of both China and Korea, a substan-
tial increase in reserves in the postcrisis period was extremely sensible from 
both national and international points of view. Recent crises have highlighted 
the strong contributions of inadequate reserve holdings to increased risk of 
crisis.5 As will be discussed in Chapter 4, however, Korea’s reserve accumu-
lations substantially exceeded most estimates of its reserve needs although 
the absolute size of such calculations of excess is relatively small compared 
with that of China.
Like most countries Korea does not publish data on its intervention activi-
ties. Thus, an outsider cannot be sure just how effective the government’s 
and central bank’s strategies for intervention are. Changes in international 
reserves are far from a perfect proxy for intervention, but the substantial in-
creases in reserve levels strongly suggest that direct and indirect intervention 
were substantial and went far beyond smoothing short-run fluctuations in the 
exchange rate. Park, Chung, and Wang (2001) argue that they also find strong 
evidence of intervention from the empirical relationships between stock pric-
es and exchange rates.
Note that, where surrender requirements for foreign currency proceeds are 
in place, reserves could be accumulated by the central bank without taking 
any active measures in the foreign exchange market. Much of Korea’s initial 
reserve accumulation after the Asian crisis came through this mechanism. In 
this sense, the central bank could say that it was not directly intervening in the 
foreign exchange market and thus had a free float. From an analytical point of 
view, however, the benchmark of no substantive intervention would require 
the government or central bank to place the surrendered foreign exchange 
in the market rather than use it to accumulate reserves. The accumulated re-
serves would place the same depressing influence on the value of the cur-
rency whether the reserves were acquired actively through direct intervention 
or passively through surrender requirements.
Other channels of indirect official influence on the exchange rate are also 
possible. For example, Dooley, Dornbusch, and Park (2002) suggest:
The Korean authorities, it appears, have not resorted to the 
use of reserves to moderate the movements of the nomi-
nal exchange rate. Instead, they have relied on a few state-
owned banks to intervene in the market, using their own 
holdings of foreign exchange, which are not counted as 
part of the central bank foreign reserves.
4.  For evidence on this point, see McKibbin, Lee, and Park (2004).
5.  For empirical studies of these relationships, see the analyses and references in Willett et al. 
(2005) and Li, Sula, and Willett (2008).
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Authorities can also intervene in the forward rather than the spot market. This 
approach was used heavily by the Thai central bank in the run-up to the 1997 
crisis. The forward interventions were used in part to disguise the extent of 
pressure against the currency in the foreign exchange market. By the time the 
Thai authorities decided that allowing the baht to depreciate was necessary, 
the level of reported reserves was still at roughly $30 billion, but forward 
sales had been so substantial that net reserves were almost zero.
In Korea, in recent years, the Ministry of Finance and Economy (currently 
known as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance) decided to intervene in the 
forward market to try to hold down the appreciation of the won. Most ex-
change market intervention in Korea and other countries is undertaken by the 
central bank, but authority for the Finance Ministry to also intervene on its 
own account is not unusual. This is the case in the United States, for example. 
The substantial losses believed to have been made on the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy’s forward intervention have made its actions a major subject of 
controversy, however; and this will be discussed later in this chapter.
In discussing government intervention, we have been following the standard 
convention of assuming sterilized intervention or its equivalent. How effec-
tive such intervention can be in influencing the exchange rate is a subject 
of considerable debate. Where capital mobility is perfect, such intervention 
could work only through signaling effects. There is substantial capital mobil-
ity for countries such as Korea, but it is far from perfect, and it is usually 
argued that the foreign exchange market for the won is relatively thin.6 Thus, 
sterilized intervention has at least some scope to be effective.
Where intervention is unsterilized, it in effect implies monetary policy ac-
tions, which without question can have powerful effects on exchange rates 
(although there is a debate about the possible existence of a Laffer curve 
with respect to the effects of interest rate increases). The question of how 
much weight should be given to exchange rate movements in setting national 
monetary policy is largely separate from issues of strategies for unsterilized 
intervention. The literature on optimal or, more realistically, sensible strate-
gies with respect to both will be discussed below.
As Rhee and Lee (2005) note in gauging potential instability in the foreign 
exchange market, the BOK looks at a number of factors, including the degree 
of exchange rate volatility, volume of transactions, and the width of the bid-
ask spread. Rhee and Lee (2005, 198) describe the intervention objectives of 
the BOK as “not to target a certain level but to smooth radical changes in the 
6.  On estimates of capital mobility for Korea, see the analyses and references in Keil et al. 
(2004), Keil, Rajan, and Willett (2009), Willett, Keil, and Ahn (2002), and the appendices to 
this study.
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exchange rate when there is transient external shock or bid-offer gaps due to 
one-sided exchange rate expectations.” Kim and Yang (2008) in their econo-
metric work find evidence that the BOK has been rather successful in limit-
ing the short-run effects of fluctuations in capital flows on the won. Korea 
certainly has allowed substantial longer-run movements in the exchange rate, 
and in this sense the evidence certainly supports Rhee and Lee’s judgment 
(2005, 198) that “the authorities in Korea have maintained the principle that 
the exchange rate should be determined by the interaction of the demand for 
and supply of foreign exchange.” Given the substantial magnitudes of Kore-
an intervention, however, and its strongly asymmetric nature until recently, it 
appears that the authorities have rather consistently underestimated the extent 
to which the upward pressures on the won were due to fundamentals rather 
than erratic fluctuations.
Statistical Description of Korea’s Postcrisis Exchange Rate 
Policy
It has become widely recognized that in analyzing exchange rate regimes we 
should not look at the behavior of the exchange rate alone. The variability 
of an exchange rate could be low because of heavy official intervention or 
because few shocks have taken place. Thus, at a minimum, we need to look 
at the relationship between exchange rate changes and intervention. In the ab-
sence of publicly available information on actual intervention, the imperfect 
proxy of changes in reserves is often used. Some studies go further and also 
examine relationships with monetary policy, usually measured by changes in 
interest rates.
These recent studies are all based directly or indirectly on the concept of ex-
change market pressure, and they consider how it is reflected in the behavior 
of its various components. Thus, such measures control for the size of shocks 
and focus on the extent to which such shocks are allowed to fall on various 
policy instruments. Although the degree of response of monetary or interest 
rate policy is crucial for descriptions of a country’s overall monetary–cum–
exchange rate policy regime, we focus here only on the exchange rate–inter-
vention dimension. Because Korea and most other countries do not publish 
data on their intervention, we follow the standard approach in the literature 
and use the changes in the reported levels of international reserves as a proxy. 
This is far from a perfect measure, but it does give a rough picture of actual 
intervention policies. Note that, where there is an upward trend in reserves, 
interest earnings could lead the increases in reserves to overstate the amount 
of intervention. Given the rapid growth in Korea’s reserves through 2007, 
however, such earnings can account for only a small fraction of the increase.
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Several studies have implemented this approach by looking at the ratio of 
variances. This has two serious problems, however. As discussed in Willett 
and Kim (2006) and Willett, Nitithanprapas, and Kim (2008), where trends 
are important, simple standard deviations and variances can give mislead-
ing results. Other important issues concern the time periods and exchange 
rate measures to be used. For purposes such as looking at effects on growth 
rates over long periods of time, Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) method of us-
ing five-year averages has much to commend it. In studying the details of 
strategy under a managed float, however, frequent changes in policy could 
occur. Rather than basing calculations on arbitrary time periods, we look for 
changes in relationships and thus identify a number of subperiods. We begin 
our analysis of postcrisis behavior in January of 1999 after the won had sub-
stantially completed its rebound from its overdepreciation.
A problem for many countries is that more than one foreign currency is im-
portant for their international trade and financial relations. This had led to 
many proposals for pegging to baskets of currencies and surely indicates that 
under managed exchange rate regimes focusing on just one currency can be 
less than optimal and in some cases quite dangerous. Although we present our 
main analysis with respect to the won-dollar exchange rates, we will discuss 
also the behavior of other important bilateral rates and the weighted average 
of exchange rates, termed the effective exchange rate.
In the framework in Willett and Kim (2006), the propensity to intervene indi-
cates the degree to which authorities allow pressures in the currency market 
to move the exchange rate versus intervening to damp down its movement.7 
This approach gives us a crude method of attempting to distinguish between 
reserve buildup and exchange rate smoothing motivations for intervention. 
Dooley, Dornbusch, and Park (2002) describe an early version of Hernández 
and Montiel (2003) as finding that Korea was not using reserves for smooth-
ing operations but was instead showing a systematic tendency to accumulate 
reserves over time. A country can be doing both, however, and our investiga-
tion shows that this has been the case for Korea.8
Our analysis supports the findings of Hernández and Montiel (2003) against 
those of McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) that Korea had adopted a soft dol-
lar peg. The won has indeed been more flexible since the crisis than before. 
Korea has displayed considerable evidence of fear of completely free float-
ing, but such fear appears to be much less strong than would be implied by 
7.  An updated version of the framework and critical analysis of alternative approaches is 
presented in Willett, Nitithanprapas, and Kim (2008).
8.  The published version of Hernández and Montiel (2003) makes only the milder argument 
that the behaviors of Korea’s reserves are not consistent with smoothing operations only. Thus, 
their analysis and ours are in qualitative agreement.
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a return to a de facto dollar standard. This can clearly be seen by the large 
movements in the exchange rate.9 This qualitative conclusion is robust with 
respect to different measures of the exchange rate and of calculating the in-
tervention coefficient.
Not all government intervention shows up immediately in changes in re-
serves. During the six-month period starting in February 2003, the Ministry 
of Finance and Economy traded approximately $40 billion of nondeliverable 
forwards (NDFs) in Hong Kong and Singapore. According to the Korean 
National Assembly Finance and Economics Committee and the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy, during September 2006, the Korean government is 
estimated to have lost around nine trillion won by investing the Foreign Ex-
change Equalization Fund10 in speculative derivatives to defend the exchange 
rate (Lee S. K. 2006). Such transactions take pressure off the spot market in 
the short run and would reduce the amount of appreciation without this show-
ing up immediately as increases in reserves. During the policy audit hearing 
in the Korean National Assembly on 17 October 2007, Lee Sang-kyung, a 
member of the National Assembly, estimated that during 2004 more than two 
trillion won was lost from the NDF transactions alone (Chung 2007). Lee 
Sang-kyung argued that the policy intervention had led to such large losses 
that the exchange rate defense should be considered a “failure” overall. With 
the turnaround of the won, however, the expected losses in 2007 turned into 
a positive net profit.
In November 2008 it was reported (Chosun Ilbo 2008) that an official of the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance announced that “unless there is an excep-
tional case of the exchange rate extremely sharply rising or falling, they have 
stopped intervening in the market.” This was soon followed, however, by the 
plunge in the won, and heavy intervention was resumed; intervention was 
now being used to hold up the won, not keep it down.
9.  In defense of McKinnon and Schnabl, it should be noted that their analysis was based on a 
much shorter span of data so that there was more room for differing interpretations. Subsequent 
behavior has made it much easier to draw a clear-cut conclusion. We note that another well-
known classification exercise by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) also classifies Korea 
as having a fixed rate for the years after the crisis. We view this as an indication of serious 
problems with the complicated methodology used in that study.
10.  The Foreign Exchange Equalization Fund was established by the Foreign Exchange 
Transaction Act, which was instituted after the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, that allowed the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy to manage the fund to mitigate the smooth operations of the 
foreign exchange market functioning. For details of the Foreign Exchange Equalization Fund, 
refer to the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act, Chap. 3, Art. 13: Foreign Exchange Equaliza-
tion Fund.
20335_SpcStd_Willett-N1-R1.indd   20 11/11/2009   4:02:04 PM
Korea’s Exchange Rate Policies between the Crises  21
Overview of the Behavior of the Won
Figure 2-1 plots changes in Korea’s foreign currency reserves against the 
won-dollar exchange rates from 1990 into June 2009. Higher values of the 
exchange rate imply depreciation of the won. Note that prior to the 1997 cri-
sis there was a mild trend toward depreciation of the won. Although months 
of reserve increases are more frequent than those of declines, intervention in 
the foreign exchange market as proxied by changes in reserves is much less 
asymmetric than during the postcrisis period in which months of declining 
reserves were quite rare up to 2008. We see the sharp drop in reserves and 
depreciation of the won associated with the 1997 crisis followed by the strong 
rebound of the won consistent with the hypothesis that there was a substantial 
overshooting of depreciation during the crisis. Korea sensibly made use of 
this postcrisis strengthening of the won to restock its depleted reserve posi-
tion by slowing the appreciation of the won by buying dollars. After a dip in 
the early part of this decade, the won began to appreciate again in 2002. This 
appreciation trend picked up speed in 2004 and continued into late 2007, by 
which time the won was almost back to its precrisis level.
Notice in Figure 2-1 a peak change of $14.2 billion in foreign currency re-
serves in November 2004. This coincides with a sharp appreciation of the 
won. It appears the BOK tried to defend the exchange rate from sharply ap-
preciating during the month by selling Korean won and accumulating foreign 
reserves aggressively. During 2005, efforts to reduce the rate of appreciation 
of the won appear to have been reduced and the rate of reserve accumulation 
slowed. Although we see evidence of substantial official management of the 
exchange rate, this was done in a way that also allowed substantial movement 
of the exchange rate. A reversal of the appreciation trend occurs in November 
2007, and then a sharp depreciation began in March 2008. This latter period 
will be discussed in Chapter 10.
Figure 2-1 shows a definite change in the pattern of intervention before and 
after the Asian crisis. Although limits on allowable exchange rate movements 
were much tighter before the crisis, the pattern of intervention was much 
more balanced, with a sizable number of months of both reserve increases 
and decreases. In the post–Asian crisis period, there were much larger ex-
change rate changes, but intervention was much more one-sided, with very 
few months of reserve declines being recorded before the turnaround of the 
won in 2008.
Korean officials (for example, Ahn 2008, 305–20) often describe their policies 
as exchange rate smoothing, but this is only partly accurate, as the smoothing 
was strongly in one direction. Smoothing intervention is supposedly aimed at 
countering erratic movements in the exchange rate caused by such failures as 
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temporarily disorderly or thin markets and destabilizing speculation. There 
is no reason that such episodes should exactly balance on the up or down 
side, but neither would they be expected to be predominantly in one direc-
tion over a long period of time. Thus, smoothing motivations appear to have 
been clearly complemented by leaning-against-the-wind behavior, and the 
latter behavior has clearly dominated the data on a monthly basis. Publicly 
available information does not allow us to determine how much intramonth 
smoothing takes place.
Figure 2-1: Changes in Foreign Currency Reserves Compared with 
Won-Dollar Exchange Rates in Korea, January 1990–June 2009
Source: International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund; author’s 
calculations.
When the wind keeps blowing in the same direction for a long period of 
time, economists’ traditional assumption has been that this is strong evidence 
that the pressures are due primarily to fundamentals rather than questionable 
speculation. The lengths of some of the stock market bubbles of recent de-
cades suggest that there may not be as strong a basis for such a presumption 
as many economists once thought, but still there are good reasons to believe 
that the strength of the won during the 1999–2007 period had a strong basis 
in the fundamentals, however inconvenient this was for export interests. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, there were initially also strong reasons to rebuild 
reserve levels after the crisis and to add additional precautionary reserves 
in the face of substantial inflows of financial capital. And the strength of the 
won made it easy for increased reserve levels to be accumulated. As is also 
discussed in Chapter 4, however, large reserve accumulations continued well 
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Figure 2-2: Changes in Foreign Currency Reserves Compared with 
Won-Dollar Exchange Rates in Korea, January 1999–June 2009
Sources: International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund; author’s 
calculations.
Figure 2-3: Changes in Foreign Currency Reserves Compared with 
Won-Dollar Exchange Rates, with Trend Lines for Subperiods, in Korea, 
January 1999—June 2009
 
Sources: International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund; author’s 
calculations.
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after most calculations suggested that quite adequate levels of reserves had 
been obtained. This suggests that concerns over competitiveness were also an 
important motivation.
Structural Breaks: Seven Subperiods
In their earlier study of Korea’s exchange rate policy, Willett and Kim (2006) 
divided the postcrisis period into four subperiods. In this study, we extend 
and update the time periods through June 2009, adding three new subperiods. 
We extend the fourth subperiod until October 2004 and divide the subsequent 
data into three additional subperiods, the first of continued gradual apprecia-
tion, the second of the turnaround and subsequent sharp depreciation, and the 
third beginning with the rebound of the won in 2009, a recovery period from 
the turbulent period of up and down after the extreme period of depreciation. 
These changes are illustrated in Figures 2-2 and 2-3 (Figure 2-3 adds trend 
lines for the whole period and the subperiods). Tables 2-1 and 2-2 provide 
a statistical summary of the changes in exchange rates and reserves and the 
annualized level changes for the seven subperiods
Figures 2-2 and 2-3 and Tables 2-1 and 2-2 show the quite substantial chang-
es over time in both the size of exchange rate movements and the changes 
in international reserves used to slow down these movements. To get a bet-
ter idea of the varying degrees of official management of the exchange rate, 
Table 2-3 and Figure 2-4 present estimates of the authorities’ propensities 
to intervene over the various time periods. This is proxied by the ratio of the 
change in reserves to the total of the change in reserves plus change in the 
exchange rate. Thus, a completely fixed rate has a coefficient of one and a 
pure float is zero.11 
The rapid accumulation of the reserves during the period implies that an in-
tervention of a given size would yield a much lower percentage change in 
reserves toward the end of the period than at the beginning. To correct for 
this, we calculate reserve changes as a percentage of the previous month’s 
M2.12 Without knowing the relevant elasticities of excess demand and supply 
in the Korean foreign exchange market, we cannot say at what level of the 
ratio more of the exchange market pressure is taken on the exchange rate or 
by intervention. As long as these elasticities do not change greatly from one 
11.  Because we have broken down the float into various subperiods based on changes in the 
behavior of the exchange rate, we do not here estimate separate propensities that account 
for trends versus movements around trends; instead we focus on the combined propensity to 
intervene. This is constructed by taking the ratio of the proxy for intervention, the change in 
reserves, to total exchange market pressure, the sum of changes in reserves and the exchange 
rate. Absolute values of percentage changes are used.
12.  Note that other scale variables such as GDP could be used, but the results would not vary 
a great deal.
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Table 2-1: Changes in Exchange Rates during Seven Subperiods in 
Korea, January 1999–June 2009
Sources: Bank of Korea data; author’s calculations.
Note: Exchange rates and changes in exchange rates are in Korean won per U.S. dollar, so a 
negative change implies appreciation of the won.
Table 2-2: Changes in Foreign Currency Reserves during Seven 
Subperiods in Korea, January 1999–June 2009
Sources: Bank of Korea data; author’s calculations.
Note: Foreign currency reserves and changes in foreign currency reserves are in billions of U.S. 
dollars.
period to another, we can use differences in the ratios to tell us whether the 
propensity to intervene has been higher in one period than another.
During the second period there was a substantial increase in reserves although 
there was little overall change in the exchange rate, suggesting that building 
up adequate levels of international reserves was still a major objective. In 
the third period, the rate of accumulation of reserves fell despite substantial 
appreciation, suggesting that reasonable reserve levels had been reached and 
the extent of leaning against the wind had been reduced. In period four, some-
what heavier intervention was resumed, consistent with a more mercantilist 
interpretation that the major motivation was to limit the loss of export com-
petitiveness owing to the substantial appreciation of the won. During the fifth 
period, the propensity to intervene fell to its lowest level to that point, per-
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haps reflecting recognition that the continuing pressure for appreciation of 
the won was caused primarily by fundamentals.
Table 2-3: Combined Propensities to Intervene (CPI) and Components of 
CPI during Seven Subperiods in Korea, January 1999–June 2009
Sources: Bank of Korea data; author’s calculations.
Note: Components of CPI = Changes in reserves as percentage of one-month lag of M2 and 
changes in exchange rates, respectively. 
† First month changes in reserves and exchange rates, not counted.
During the sixth period, from December 2007 to November 2008, these ap-
preciation pressures were sharply reversed, and the won depreciated from 
936.1 to 1,469 to the dollar. The value of the Korean won depreciated by 
more than 36 percent against the dollar during that period. This was the larg-
est one-year drop in the value of Korean won since the 1997 Asian currency 
crisis. Although the initial fall was engineered by the government, it got out 
of hand, and the government switched policies. This was followed by the 
large capital outflows associated with the global crisis. Although the absolute 
magnitude of intervention was quite large during this period, the propensity 
to intervene was quite low, raising the issue of whether intervention should 
have been much stronger during this period. This question will be discussed 
in Chapter 10. Period seven reflects the turnaround again of the won as the 
financial pressure from the crisis eased. The BOK began to recoup some of 
the reserve losses but quite sensibly allowed most of the exchange market 
pressure to be felt in the rebound of the won.
Effective and Other Bilateral Exchange Rates
The won’s exchange rate against the dollar is not the only one that is impor-
tant for the Korean economy and financial institutions. As shown in Figure 
2-5, however, the broad outlines of the won’s movements against various 
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weighted averages of the currencies of its major trading partners have been 
quite similar to those of its movements with respect to the dollar.
Figure 2-4: Combined Propensities to Intervene (CPI) for Seven 
Subperiods, for Korea
Sources: International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund; author’s 
calculations.
Notes: CPI = |DReserve/(-1)M2|/(|De|+|DReserve/Lag(-1)M2|); not counting first month changes. 
The subperiods are defined as follows: Period 1: January 1999–October 1999; Period 2: Decem-
ber 1999–October 2000; Period 3: March 2001–April 2002; Period 4: July 2002–October 2004; 
Period 5: December 2004–October 2007; Period 6: December 2007–November 2008; Period 7: 
March 2009–June 2009.
At a more fine-grained level, however, many economists would argue that, in 
deciding on the possible desirability of short-run intervention policy, Korean 
officials should also pay attention to developments in the won’s exchange 
rate against other currencies (Figure 2-6). In commentaries, the won-yen ex-
change rate is often a particular focus of attention because of Japanese-Kore-
an competition in many export markets. Since the unpegging of the Chinese 
renminbi from the dollar in 2005, the behavior of the won-renminbi exchange 
rate has taken on independent importance. The substantial fluctuations among 
the dollar, euro, and yen in recent years have further increased the need to 
look beyond just the dollar in considering Korean exchange rate policy. A
good deal of discussion has taken place about the possible creation of a com-
monly agreed weighting scheme for a basket of Asian currencies to be used 
as a focal point for exchange rate policy and perhaps eventually a common 
Asian currency. These issues will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.
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The similarity of the broad movements in the won-dollar effective exchange 
rates reflects broadly similar swings in the won against the dollar, euro, and 
yen despite the considerable fluctuations that have occurred in the euro-dollar 
and yen-dollar rates. Figure 2-6 shows these rates from 1995 through June of 
2009. The won began its turnaround against the euro considerably before it 
did versus the yen, which in turn led the turnaround against the dollar.
Figure 2-7 shows movements of the won against the dollar, the Chinese yuan, 
the Indonesian rupiah, and the Thai baht from the beginning of 1998 through 
June of 2009. (The yuan was pegged to the dollar until 2005.) Again we see 
a broad similarity of movements. Some differences in behavior are observ-
able, reflecting developments such as the volatility of the Thai baht from late 
2006 through 2007 owing to political instability and controversial economic 
policies, but overall the fluctuations of the won against other major Asian cur-
rencies were not a great deal less than those against the dollar. From March 
of 2006 up until September 2008, the won-rupiah rates move very closely to 
the won-dollar rates. Then, starting in October 2008, the Indonesian rupiah 
began to move independently from other currencies.
Figure 2-8 shows the movements of the won against the currencies of four 
selected ASEAN countries, namely, the Singapore dollar, Malaysian ring-
git, the Thai baht, and the Indonesian rupiah, from the beginning of 1998 
through June of 2009. We can see that the exchange rate movements against 
these currencies seem to be highly synchronized throughout much of the 
current decade. Notice in Figures 2-7 and 2-8 the considerable similarity in 
the behavior of the Chinese yuan and Malaysian ringgit, particularly until 
2005. The Singapore dollar also moved very closely with these two curren-
cies throughout this period. These figures show that Malaysia and China were 
basically pegging their currencies to the U.S. dollar until 2005. Since July 
of 2005, when Malaysia’s official stance became a managed float against 
some basket of currencies, its exchange rate regime in fact seems to be more 
accurately described as a band around the U.S. dollar. China’s official man-
aged float during this period was in fact a narrow band peg to the dollar. For 
Singapore, which claimed to have a band adjusted on the basis of a basket of 
currencies, the actual behavior seems to be a de facto band around the U.S. 
dollar. If these countries are truly basing their policies on a basket of curren-
cies, their baskets seem to be predominantly filled with the U.S. dollar.
How Should Flexible Rates Be Managed?
Recent research (Willett 2003a) has suggested that the theory of optimal cur-
rency areas, which will be discussed in Chapter 7, can be reinterpreted more 
broadly in terms of the weight given to exchange market developments in the 
setting of monetary policy. Genuinely fixed rates imply 100 percent weight is 
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given to the exchange rate, while a completely freely floating rate implies a 
zero weight. We can carefully classify monetary–cum–exchange rate regimes 
from this perspective as well as in terms of exchange rate behavior and the 
amount of sterilized interventions. From this perspective, a small, fairly open 
economy should certainly give greater attention to exchange market develop-
ments than a large, relatively closed one. Thus, Canada, Mexico, and New 
Zealand should all give more weight to the exchange rate in setting monetary 
policy than should the United States.13
This would occur automatically for countries following inflation targeting. 
For some economies, it may be optimal to go beyond this and give direct 
weight to the exchange rate over and above its influence on domestic prices. 
Up to a point this could be consistent with flexible inflation targeting that al-
lows for some concern with short-run employment and output effects as long 
as this does not compromise longer-term inflation goals.
In contrast, countries such as Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, and Singapore 
have all chosen not to give 100 percent to the exchange market (balance of 
payments) as would be necessary for a fixed-rate regime. (Of course, even 
with completely fixed rates, there could be some scope for independent mon-
etary policy in the short run if capital mobility were not high.) Thus, some 
types of intermediate regimes as defined in terms of the weight given to ex-
change market considerations in setting domestic monetary policy are quite 
consistent with a floating regime in the sense of no official intervention in the 
foreign exchange market.
It is not always recognized that it is this issue of the orientation of monetary 
policy to which most of the OCA literature is addressed. This is largely differ-
ent from the criteria for the desirability of sterilized intervention. These cri-
teria, which will be discussed in the following section, focus on the behavior 
of speculation and types of shocks.
There is a vast literature on criteria for exchange market intervention. The 
least controversial analytically is sterilized intervention to offset imperfec-
tions in private speculation. The easiest of such possible deficiencies of pri-
vate speculation to identify in practice is when markets become disorderly. 
Although complete agreement does not exist about precise criteria, one can 
usually identify a disorderly market when one encounters it: usually some 
event has generated great uncertainty, and the market has become temporar-
ily much more risk averse than normal (that is, risk tolerance has declined 
while perceptions of risk have increased). In consequence, relatively small 
transactions can often lead to large movements in the market price. Such 
market disorder, in the classic sense, generally does not last long.
13.  Just how much weight these countries have given is an issue of some dispute.
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More difficult to classify are episodes of high risk aversion that may last for 
a considerable period, such as occurred in Asia in 1997–98 and globally after 
the Russian default and LTCM crisis in 1998. Such market conditions are 
often described as being the result of destabilizing speculation based on herd 
behavior. In these crises, however, there was much less activity destabilizing 
speculation than is often assumed. More important was a sudden drying up of 
stabilizing speculation combined with capital outflows induced by borrowers 
attempting to cover their foreign currency exposure. Remember that the ana-
lytic distinction between stabilizing versus destabilizing speculation rests on 
whether speculative actions tend to move price (in this one case the exchange 
rate) toward or away from its equilibrium value. Judgments about equilib-
rium values often differ widely among experts, of course, so even where we 
have agreement about objectives there still may be considerable disagree-
ment about what should be done in particular situations. Still, it is useful to 
keep these analytic distinctions in mind.
Where speculation is actively destabilizing, it would normally be optimal to 
offset it with sterilized official intervention. With very high capital mobility, 
however, such sterilized intervention would be largely ineffective. Thus, such 
destabilizing speculation could force a serious dilemma on domestic mon-
etary policy—whether to adjust policy to reduce destabilizing movements 
of the exchange rate, or keep it aimed at domestic objectives and suffer large 
exchange rate changes.
Where the incipient exchange rate movements are instead due to a temporary 
increase in risk aversion that leads primarily not to destabilizing speculation 
but to insufficient stabilizing speculation, capital mobility in effect temporar-
ily falls, and sterilized intervention can become effective. This in turn could 
substantially lessen the dilemma forced on domestic monetary policy.
For a number of the Asian crisis countries, of which Korea is a prime ex-
ample, the substantial overshooting of exchange rates during the Asian crisis 
was due in considerable part not just to capital outflows but to a drop in capi-
tal inflows against the background of substantial current account deficits.14 To 
the extent that this occurred, an increase in the amount of sterilized interven-
tion during the crisis could have substantially reduced exchange rate over-
shooting. Unfortunately, data problems make it difficult for us to judge just 
how well this story fits Korea. The large current account deficit part certainly 
fits. For 1996, Korea’s current account deficit was approximately $23 billion. 
It is the size of capital outflows that is more difficult to measure, however.
Contrary to the common view that puts most of the blame for capital account 
instability on international portfolio investors, they were far from the major 
14.  See Willett (2000) and Willett et al. (2005).
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source of capital outflows from Korea. The dollar value of foreign holdings 
in Korean stock did fall dramatically, from more than $17 billion at the end of 
the third quarter of 1996 to barely more than $5 billion one year later. How-
ever, most of this drop was due to falls in stock prices and the depreciation of 
the won against the dollar, not capital outflows. Quarterly data on the dollar 
value of capital flows show actual portfolio equity outflows in only two quar-
ters, almost $2 billion in the fourth quarter of 1997 and less than $0.5 billion 
in the third quarter of 1998. Total portfolio flows including debt were nega-
tive in the fourth quarter of 1997, turned positive for the first half of 1998, 
and then turned negative again from the third quarter of 1998 through the end 
of the year. During the year from mid-1997 to mid-1998, total portfolio flows 
were $9 billion.
In contrast, during this period short-term international bank debt fell by $40 
billion, from approximately $72 to $32 billion, with the majority of the drop 
coming in the first half of 1998. Overall, the financial account in the balance 
of payments ran a negative $25 billion for this period and $29 billion for the 
period through the end of 1998. Although one should not have confidence 
in any precise estimate, overall the data suggest that a large but manageable 
scale of official intervention (had reserves been available) could have sub-
stantially reduced the amount of the huge overdepreciation of the won.
Note that such sterilized intervention would not have been able to save the 
precrisis peg. There is disagreement among experts over whether prior to the 
crisis the won was a little overvalued or a little undervalued or just right, but 
there is no question that the recognition of substantial problems in Korea’s 
financial sector implied a sizable fall in the equilibrium value of the won. 
There can be little question that a major depreciation was needed. We have 
seen no convincing analysis, however, that argues that the won needed to fall 
all the way from 849.88 in January 1997 to 1,701.53 in January 1998. The 
amount of exchange rate overshooting could have been substantially reduced 
through greater sterilized intervention.
Despite former IMF deputy managing director Stan Fischer’s call for the IMF 
to seriously consider substantially increasing its capacity to operate as a quasi 
lender of last resort during capital account crises, there was no indication 
of support for a major movement in this direction by either the IMF or its 
principal shareholders until the current crisis erupted. Thus, Korea’s policy 
of substantial reserve accumulation to make it better prepared to handle pos-
sible future crises has been quite wise.15 We show in Chapter 4, however, that 
reserves reached levels that are more than adequate.
15.  See the discussions and references in Eichengreen (2004) and Willett (2003a).
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Other criteria for intervention focus on effects on the domestic economy. 
Even with strict inflation targeting, in open economies, central banks need 
to pay attention to the implications of exchange market developments for 
future inflation. It is now well understood that because of adjustment lags 
monetary policy should respond more to expected future inflation than to past 
inflation, otherwise dynamic instability may result. In this context, exchange 
rate developments are likely to be a component of central banks’ operating 
strategies, although this need not involve direct intervention in the foreign 
exchange market. Beyond strict inflation targeting, central banks and govern-
ments may want to give consideration to the economic benefits of price level 
versus exchange rate stability where there is a conflict between the two. As 
Keynes once put it: What is the relative importance of internal versus exter-
nal price stability? Obviously the more open the economy, the greater is the 
weight that should be given to the latter, but beyond this qualitative judgment 
we are far from a professional consensus on how these should be weighted or 
even how inflation targeting is best implemented in open economies. These 
are important areas for further research.
Concluding Remarks
This review of Korea’s postcrisis exchange rate policy suggests that Korea’s 
broad strategy of a managed float combined with an inflation target—what 
Morris Goldstein (2002) labeled managed floating plus—is the right one. 
Within this strategy, however, there appears to have been excessive reserve 
accumulation. In the wake of the almost complete depletion of reserves dur-
ing the 1997 crisis, a substantial rebuilding of reserves was certainly called 
for. It would make a major contribution to international financial stability if 
more countries outside of Asia would follow Korea’s example on this score. 
There is no one exact scientific way to judge reserve adequacy in today’s 
world of substantial capital mobility, but a review of a number of benchmarks 
suggests that these accumulations substantially exceeded prudent levels 
(Kim, Kim, and Wang 2004) and raises concerns that the continued increases 
were motivated more by mercantilist concerns, or by short-run stabilization 
policy objectives, or both, than by prudent reserve rebuilding and short-run 
smoothing intervention.
In their recent paper proposing a framework for Korean exchange rate policy, 
Dooley, Dornbusch, and Park (2002) advocate the combination of inflation 
targeting with managed floating and suggest specific guidelines for manage-
ment. Dooley, Dornbusch, and Park (2002, 497) are skeptical of John Wil-
liamson’s BBC proposal (basket, band, and crawl) largely on the grounds 
that “We do not believe that it will be possible to identify an equilibrium 
exchange rate. . . .” We concur in that judgment.
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Dooley, Dornbusch, and Park (2002, 495) specifically propose that sterilized 
intervention be used to moderate fluctuations in excess of 3 percent a day 
and 6 percent a week against a basket of the dollar, euro, and yen. They note, 
however, that “there is no scientific basis to determine a good band width.” 
The same applies with respect to setting daily or weekly limits. No clear theo-
retical rationale can determine what such limits should be, but Korea appears 
to have followed a policy of greater short-run smoothing than recommended 
by Dooley, Dornbusch, and Park (2002, 511) perhaps because, as they sug-
gest, “in . . . Korea where hedging facilities are expensive and limited to a few 
firms in the trade sector, the authorities have been under constant pressure to 
moderate fluctuations in the won-dollar exchange rate.”
A major part of the justification for heavy short-run management of the Kore-
an exchange rate has been that the foreign exchange market was thin and un-
derdeveloped. In recent years, however, the size of Korea’s foreign exchange 
market has expanded rapidly. From 2002 to 2007, the average daily turnover 
in the spot foreign exchange market rose more than threefold, from $5.0 bil-
lion to $18.8 billion, and the forward market and swaps increased even more 
from $3.2 billion to $19.4 billion (Ahn 2008). Furthermore, as Dooley, Dorn-
busch, and Park (2002) note, some degree of variability is needed to make 
private speculation profitable.16 Thus, to the extent that the problem is insuf-
ficiently stabilizing speculation rather than actively destabilizing speculation, 
it might be wise to allow some degree of excessive variability in the short run 
to help facilitate the development of a broader and better-functioning private 
market for the longer term. Furthermore, artificially suppressing the market 
signals of underlying risk can lead to too little hedging of international trans-
actions. Large, unhedged positions were, of course, a major cause of the se-
verity of the Asian crisis.
Dooley, Dornbusch, and Park (2002) indicate concerns about the possibility 
of excessive intervention and argue for strong rules in this area. They pro-
pose that a specific target for net reserves be set and that, if reserves deviate 
from this by more than 25 percent, the imbalance should be corrected over 
a six-month period. As Kim Jun-il (2002) notes in his comments on Dooley, 
Dornbusch, and Park, this specific formulation may be too rigid and could 
generate wide swings in the exchange rate.
Such issues were investigated in the discussion of the Committee of 20 on 
possible reforms of the international monetary system following the break-
down of the Bretton Woods exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in the early 
1970s. There was considerable interest in the development of a reserve indi-
cator system to limit payments imbalances by both surplus and deficit coun-
tries. A general conclusion is that, if officials do not begin to make adjust-
16.  See also the comments by Krueger (2002).
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ments until stock limits are hit, this is likely to generate dynamic instability 
in flows much as strict backward-looking inflation targeting could lead to 
greater variability in future inflation.17
 
17.  On the Committee of 20 discussions, see Willett (1977) and Williamson (2000).
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3
Dangers of Pegged Exchange Rates and 
Advantages of Inflation Targeting
Given the substantial level of openness of many Asian economies, devel-
opments in their international sectors are of considerable importance to the 
overall economy. This makes national monetary and fiscal policymaking 
more complicated. Deciding on the best combination of monetary, fiscal, and 
exchange rate policies can often be quite difficult. It is much easier to adopt 
simple policy rates such as a fixed exchange rate. But, while this may make 
life easier for officials, it will often be worse for the economy.
Political Economy of Time Inconsistency Issues
Many economists over the years have argued the superiority of rules over 
discretion in setting domestic monetary policy. The problem is that they have 
usually supported their proposals with analysis in which one major type of 
shock predominates and for which their proposed policy rule implies an op-
timal or at least a good response.18 In the old debate between monetarists 
and Keynesians about whether monetary policy should focus more on inter-
est rates or monetary aggregates, Keynesians tended to talk about shifts in 
the demand for money, and in this case focusing on interest rates is indeed 
better. Monetarists, on the other hand, tended to focus on shifts in aggregate 
spending and inflationary expectations for which focus on the monetary ag-
gregates is superior. This tendency carried over to the external sector as well. 
Thus, global monetarists such as Ron McKinnon (1982) focused on interna-
tional currency substitution where his policy rule of fixed exchange rates and 
no sterilization would be optimal, while national monetarists such as Milton 
Friedman (1953) tended to focus on monetary disturbances abroad or spend-
18.  On these issues see the analysis and references in Willett (1988).
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ing shocks at home under which a domestic monetary growth rule with flex-
ible exchange rates would be a good policy regime.
The problem is that economies can be subjected to all of these various types 
of shocks. In such a world, ideal discretionary policy is clearly the best op-
tion. However, time asymmetries, that is, different time profiles of the positive 
and negative effects of policies, generate time inconsistencies that can lead 
policymakers subject to short-run political pressures to adopt policies that 
promote long-run instability. To be more concrete, where wages and prices 
are sticky in the short run, changes in monetary and fiscal policies have their 
primary initial effects on quantities and their longer-run effects primarily on 
prices. This means that expansionary effects have their good effects first and 
their bad effects later, while for tightening of macroeconomic policies it is 
just the opposite. As a result, short-run maximization generates a bias toward 
too much expansion relative to tightening and leads to higher inflation and 
greater instability in the longer run. As a consequence, unconstrained discre-
tionary policy can turn out to be bad for the economy. What is needed is some 
type of institutional arrangements to offset such biases.
One way of dealing with the problem is to adopt automatic rules, among 
which Friedman’s money growth rate and fixed exchange rates were initially 
the most popular. Financial innovation undermined the fairly stable relation-
ship between money growth and spending that Friedman had found for ear-
lier periods; thus, support for pure money growth rates has virtually disap-
peared today.
For much of the 1980s and 1990s, fixing the exchange rate became the most 
popular policy rule for promoting monetary discipline. Often described as 
using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor or as exchange-rate-based sta-
bilization, this approach was strongly supported by officials from many of 
the members of the EMS for their own political reasons as well as many 
economists and some of the top officials from the IMF, and it was adopted 
by a number of countries. Subsequent experience and theoretical and em-
pirical analyses showed that this approach had been greatly oversold. One of 
the basic problems was that the theoretical analysis supporting this approach 
was mostly based on the adoption of genuinely fixed exchange rates while in 
practice the type of fixed rates most frequently adopted was of the adjustable 
variety. It was frequently inappropriately assumed that the credibility benefits 
that would accrue from the adoption of a genuine fixed rate would carry over 
to more adjustable versions, but this would occur only if market participants 
were fooled into thinking that the soft pegs were in fact hard ones. This did 
indeed occur surprisingly often in the short run but often was not maintained 
over the longer run.
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Much of the attractiveness of this approach came because it often did provide 
a quick fix in the short run. Over the medium term such policies tended to 
work much less well. They did tend to reduce inflation rather rapidly, but usu-
ally by not enough to make a fixed rate sustainable. Currencies would often 
become gradually overvalued, and currency crises were the result. Convert-
ing an initial fix to a gradually depreciating crawling band often extended 
the life of such process, but over time the rate of depreciation tended to be 
too slow and crisis often eventually erupted, as in Brazil and Mexico. Not all 
such programs ended in failure, but enough did so that the initial support for 
this approach has waned substantially.19
The basic problem was that adjustably fixed rates were themselves subject 
to serious time asymmetries. With exchange rate changes, the time asym-
metries in the effects on prices and quantities are just the reverse of those 
for monetary policy. With depreciation, the bad effects of higher prices tend 
to show up fairly quickly while the good effects on output expansion tend to 
show up with a lag. Thus, where short-run political pressures are strong, there 
is a tendency to delay needed deprecations for too long. This is one of the 
most important reasons why adjustably pegged exchange rate regimes tend 
to be crisis prone. Combined with substantial international capital mobility, 
the resulting one-way speculative option presented by adjustably pegged ex-
change rates provides the rationale for the unstable middle hypothesis—that 
soft pegs are highly crisis prone.20
Inflation Targeting
Given these limitations of exchange rate discipline, the majority view among 
monetary economists today favors central bank independence as the best way 
for most countries to overcome time inconsistency problems. What is de-
sired, however, is to make central banks independent of the short-run politi-
cal pressures to follow policies that will generate longer-run instability, not 
to be independent to follow whatever whims might enter their heads. Thus, 
many economists today support inflation targeting to be implemented by in-
dependent central banks. The central banks’ range of discretion is limited by 
their obligations to meet agreed inflation targets, and accountability is thus 
provided. Such central bank independence must be real, not just nominal, and 
the conditions needed to make independence do not occur in all countries. In 
Korea it is important for the government to take a strong stand that it supports 
central bank independence.
19.  On the issues, see the analysis and references in Willett (1988), Martin, Westbrook, and 
Willett (1999), and Westbrook and Willett (1999).
20.  On these issues see the analyses and references in Angkinand, Chiu, and Willett (2009) and 
Willett (2007).
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Monetary authorities control inflation only indirectly, of course, and this con-
trol is imprecise. Thus, targets need to focus on average rates of inflation over 
a reasonable time period and need to take the form of an acceptable range, not 
a precise number. In the face of some type of shocks, attempts to meet short-
run inflation targets precisely could lead to the same types of instabilities as 
would money growth rate targets or exchange rate targets. A big advantage 
of using a medium inflation range as a target is that its desirability is robust 
to a much wider range of shocks than would be a comparable width of an 
exchange rate band or money growth range.
A natural question is: Does the adoption of inflation-targeting support a nor-
mative conservative anti-inflation agenda over more liberal concerns about 
unemployment and growth? The answer from a long-run perspective is no. 
Where wages and prices are sticky, there are short-run trade-offs among in-
flation and unemployment and growth—the Phillips curve. But over the me-
dium and longer run both theory and mounting empirical evidence suggest 
that the relationships are just the reverse.21 In the short run a little inflation 
can be good for growth, but, over the longer run, repeated efforts to maximize 
the short-run growth will lead to escalating inflation, which in turn will gen-
erate greater uncertainty and depress the economy. Thus, over the longer term 
higher inflation tends to retard rather than stimulate growth. This is another 
example of the basic time inconsistency problem.
Inflation targeting is a framework, not a simple rule.22 Support for inflation 
targeting does not necessarily imply that the monetary authorities should 
have no concern with unemployment and growth. Frequently the economy 
may face shocks where expansionary policies can be followed without a 
serious risk of escalating inflation. Indeed, many countries find themselves 
in that situation today in the face of the global financial crisis. While some 
economists favor strict inflation targeting that would pay no attention to the 
real economy, many economists favor flexible inflation targeting that allows 
concern about the real economy as long as this does not lead to the type of 
continuously escalating inflation that will hurt longer-run growth.
Although it is not clear just how flexible Korea has been in its inflation tar-
geting, it has certainly been quite successful in keeping inflation at modest 
levels. A look at the performance of the real economy during the inflation-
targeting period could suggest that the strategy has been costly in terms 
of growth because even before the current crisis recent growth rates have 
21.  See the analysis and references in Burdekin et al. (2004).
22.  For an overview of inflation targeting see Truman (2004). It is true as Choi (2007) argues 
that inflation targeting can be more difficult to implement in emerging-market economies, but 
Korea seems to have managed quite well. For more on these issues in emerging-market econo-
mies, see Genberg and He (2007) and Schaechter, Stone, and Zeimer (2000).
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averaged well below precrisis levels. This is not an appropriate comparison, 
however, since there are numerous reasons to believe that precrisis growth 
rates were not sustainable. In part this was due to Korea’s success in moving 
up to the technological frontier in many industries. Obviously growth can be 
much faster during catch-up periods. A second important factor is that, in the 
last years before the 1997 crisis, serious deficiencies in the financial system 
generated excessive investment in inefficient activities. In the short run this 
kept the growth rate high but led to the corporate and financial-sector prob-
lems that contributed so much to the 1997 crisis.
Indeed, a concern with growth and unemployment is embedded in most in-
flation targets that aim for low but positive rates of inflation. The empirical 
evidence suggests that low rates of inflation do not have a negative long-run 
effect on growth and employment. The results of our econometric estimates 
are not robust enough to allow us to pinpoint exact upper bounds for “safe” 
inflation in various economies, but average rates of up to 2 to 3 percent for 
most economies do seem to be quite safe. In contrast, where there is consid-
erable wage and price stickiness, actual deflation tends to have strong nega-
tive effects on the economy, and the Japanese experience during the 1990s 
suggests that these negative effects continue beyond the short run. Thus, for 
negative inflation and perhaps even for quite low positive rates of inflation 
there do appear to be longer-run Phillips curve–type effects. As a result, it is 
quite consistent to argue that it is desirable to constrain political inflationary 
biases and at the same time favor keeping national monetary sovereignty to 
avoid the effects of deflation.
In the current crisis, the BOK has been quite active in reducing interest rates, 
and the Korean economy has slowed. Thus, there is little reason to think that 
excessive concern with inflation targets has seriously hindered the BOK’s 
ability to engage in countercyclical policy. Note that inflation targeting auto-
matically takes into account the openness of the economy as long as its focus 
is on an economy-wide index, not just prices of nontraded goods. Good infla-
tion targeting requires careful study of the linkages between the exchange 
rate and domestic inflation. The more open the economy, the more impor-
tant are exchange rate developments for forecasting future inflation; and it is 
on expected future—not past—inflation that the monetary authorities need 
to concentrate. Focusing only on past inflation could also create dynamic 
instability. As noted above, setting appropriate monetary policy in an open 
economy is not an easy task, and adopting an inflation-targeting approach 
does not really make it much easier. We cannot expect even the best monetary 
officials to get it optimal all the time. The more realistic goal is to avoid big 
mistakes.
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It has been argued by some, for example Martin Wolf (2009), that the current 
crisis demonstrates the failure of inflation targeting. This is true of the view 
that if inflation is kept low the financial system will always take care of itself. 
But this was never a terribly sensible view. With a high degree of financial 
development, excessive credit creation can flow into bubbles in asset markets 
without a big pickup in inflation. Indeed, that was one of the lessons that 
should have been taken from the Asian crisis. Before the crisis there had been 
real estate and stock market bubbles combined with low inflation in a number 
of Asian economies. There is considerable debate whether monetary authori-
ties should pay attention to asset prices in setting monetary policy and, if so, 
how much. There is no question that prudential regulators should pay great 
attention. Low inflation is likely a necessary but is certainly not a sufficient 
condition to avoid financial instability.
Exchange Rate Issues
There is little question that less variability of exchange rates would make 
economic policymaking much easier. The biggest danger here is another as-
pect of the time inconsistency problem. For many types of shocks the interna-
tional coordination of policies is the optimal response. To date, however, both 
Asian governments and central banks have shown little willingness to give 
up their freedom of action to engage in such coordination. This is no different 
from nations in most regions and is unlikely to change drastically any time 
soon. As long as they did not have to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies 
first, governments have frequently agreed to coordinate their exchange rate 
policies through regimes of adjustably pegged or crawling exchange rates. 
The ERM of the EMS before the initiation of the euro is a prime example.
It has been recommended frequently that, just as for the euro, this would be 
a good way for Asia both to deal with the problem of short-run currency in-
stability and to provide a path to eventual monetary union. Such an approach 
does have some attractive features. It is also highly dangerous, however; and 
the danger lies in its very attractiveness. It holds out the promise of some-
thing for nothing: exchange rate stability without serious infringement of na-
tional monetary policies.
The magic comes from sterilized intervention. While capital mobility has 
grown substantially for most Asian economies, it is generally not yet so high 
that sterilized intervention has lost all of its effectiveness.23 Furthermore, 
many Asian countries are much more financially integrated with centers out-
side of Asia like the United States and the eurozone than they are with many 
of their fellow Asian countries. As a result, there is more scope for influenc-
23.  See, for example, Willett, Keil, and Ahn (2002), Ouyang, Rajan, and Willett (2008), and 
the appendices to this study.
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ing many of the bilateral exchange rates within Asia than for rates against the 
dollar and euro. (This holds much less for bilateral rates against the Japanese 
yen and Hong Kong dollar and Singapore dollar.) This scope for sterilized 
intervention allows exchange rate policy to be separated from domestic mon-
etary policy in the short run. Sometimes making use of this scope for separa-
tion will be optimal policy. An example is the case of financial capital inflows 
that are expected to be temporary. Sterilized intervention would cushion the 
effects of this temporary disturbance on the economy. Of course, the prob-
lem here is the difficulty of determining which capital flows are temporary 
and which are longer term. As will be analyzed in Chapter 6, despite facing 
considerable international capital mobility, the BOK has been able and has 
chosen to engage in substantial sterilization. To a considerable degree these 
sterilization policies have been wise and are an appropriate part of operating 
a managed float regime.
When one moves from managed floating to a regime of adjustable pegs or tar-
get zones, the time inconsistency problems, which are not entirely absent un-
der a float, are multiplied. The temptation is to wait too long to adjust either 
the exchange rate or monetary policy to restore the longer-run consistency 
between the two that is needed for stability. As Jeffrey Frankel (2004) has 
pointed out, there is no reason in economic logic why any type of interme-
diate exchange rate regime cannot be operated without generating frequent 
crisis. All that is needed is that exchange rate and monetary policy be kept 
mutually adjusted to each other, and this can be done by any combination of 
the amount of adjustment by one or the other. The problem that makes the 
adjustable peg regimes so unstable in the face of substantial capital mobility 
is a political economy, not a purely economic one (Willett 2007). Unless both 
policies are operated with a long time horizon in mind, there will be a ten-
dency under many circumstances to delay this adjustment. There is a range of 
capital mobility, into which many Asian economies fall, where capital mobil-
ity is high enough to make a sticky adjustable peg unstable but low enough to 
allow sufficient effective sterilization to allow a prolonged but not infinitely 
long separation between monetary and exchange rate policy.
Because both depreciation and monetary tightening often have greater costs 
than benefits in the short run, the tendency of officials facing short-run politi-
cal pressures is understandably to delay adjustment in hopes that the situa-
tion will reverse and adjustment will not become necessary after all. Market 
participants do not face this same political cost-benefit calculation so they 
are likely to decide that the situation is unsustainable before officials do. The 
results are speculative attacks and currency crises (Willett 2007).
Moving from adjustable pegs to crawling bands reduces but does not elimi-
nate this problem. Again the European experience is instructive. After the 
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Bretton Woods exchange rate regime broke down in the early 1970s, it be-
came widely accepted that a major cause had been the excessive stickiness of 
its adjustable pegs in a world where capital mobility had grown substantially 
and support for extensive capital controls had declined substantially. As a 
result, when the Europeans designed their new regional monetary system in 
the late 1970s, they were careful to not base it on the old narrow band adjust-
able peg regime of Bretton Woods. They adopted wider bands and called for 
more frequent parity adjustments so that the band could be moved up or down 
without necessarily affecting market rates. The idea was that, if an exchange 
rate was staying near the bottom of its band, the parity would be depreciated 
so that the market rate would be toward the top of a new lower rate. Initially 
this regime worked quite well, and parity adjustments were frequent. Over 
time, however, greater rigidity began to set in just as it had with the Bret-
ton Woods regime. It is hard to believe today, but the designers of Bretton 
Woods, like John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, were primarily 
concerned that parity adjustments would be too frequent rather than too de-
layed. But this had been the problem during the 1930s.
One sometimes sees glorified accounts of how the exchange rate commit-
ments of the EMS imposed substantial discipline and led to effective mon-
etary policy coordination among the member nations. In the same way some 
writers have expressed optimism that, by creating an Asian currency unit and 
developing a system of currency bands based around it, monetary and cur-
rency policy coordination in Asia could be substantially increased. The prob-
lem is that the view of the European experience on which such proposals are 
frequently based is a romantic fiction. Some countries such as France did use 
the ERM effectively to promote domestic monetary discipline, but this was 
far from the general rule. The system did make it through the 1980s without 
major crises. This was much longer than many economists, including this 
author, expected. It led to a false sense of security among officials and many 
market participants, but this was shattered by a series of major crises in the 
early 1990s. In some cases, such as Italy, the cause was a lack of sufficient 
domestic monetary and fiscal discipline. But the deathblow to the regime 
came from the shock of German reunification, where the combination of the 
huge fiscal deficits that resulted and the Bundesbank’s maintenance of tight 
monetary policies led to massive capital inflows into Germany.24 Efforts at 
fiscal and monetary policy coordination were unsuccessful, and the huge cap-
ital flows soon overwhelmed the system’s effective financing mechanisms.
The case against efforts to construct a looser target-zone approach in Asia 
with wide bands and soft edges is not as strong. Such a system might prove 
workable. It runs a risk, however, that it would follow the European example 
24.  Technically the regime did not die; the exchange rate bands were just widened to ±15 
percent, making the parities effectively meaningless.
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of hardening the exchange rate regime much more over time than the com-
mitment to coordinating monetary policy. At a minimum we can say with 
some confidence that it is highly dangerous to make strong exchange rate 
commitments on the assumption that this will force monetary policy coor-
dination. There is a high risk that the result would be crises rather than suf-
ficient monetary policy coordination.
Although starting with exchange rate commitments has the short-run politi-
cal advantage of starting the process on the cheap, it seems unlikely that this 
would actually prove to be the best way to get increased policy cooperation 
over the longer term. Much safer and more likely to provide long-run results 
is to begin with ad hoc efforts at coordination in the face of particular shocks 
where such coordination could be mutually beneficial. For example, when 
there is a substantial fall in the dollar, countries will worry about their curren-
cies’ appreciation not only against the dollar but also against their Asian com-
petitors. Completely decentralized decision making might lead most Asian 
countries to intervene too heavily and limit appreciation against the dollar too 
much. Group discussion could well lead to more collective appreciation.
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4
International Reserve Adequacy
This chapter is coauthored by Ozan Sula.
Korea has not been unusual among Asian countries in its large accumulation 
of international reserves since the Asian crisis of 1997–98. These huge area-
wide accumulations have attracted considerable interest by researchers and 
policy officials and have been a major element in the debates about global 
imbalances. During such research and debate there has been a fundamental 
preconception of how we should think about appropriate levels of interna-
tional reserves. (In most of the formal economics literature the focus is on 
determining optimal levels of reserves while in the policy community the 
focus is on adequate and excessive levels of reserves.)
New Views of Reserve Adequacy
Traditional rules of thumb about reserve adequacy focused primarily on how 
many months of imports could be financed with current reserve lends, with 
three months’ worth being a popular figure. In a world of low international 
capital mobility, this was a sensible approach. Balance of payments diffi-
culties tended to emerge gradually over time, and the primary functions of 
reserves were to allow countries to avoid unnecessary adjustments in the face 
of temporary deficits and to allow more time to undertake adjustments when 
they were necessary. Underlying these rationales were the ideas that adjust-
ments would frequently take the form of tightening macroeconomic policies 
and that the total costs of such adjustments could be reduced if they could be 
spread over time rather than occurring all at once through what has come to 
be known as “shock therapy.”
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In this world there was also generally perceived to be a trade-off between 
the degree of exchange rate flexibility and the need for reserves because the 
greater use of exchange rate adjustments would reduce the need for mac-
roeconomic adjustments. This led to predictions that, with shifts to flexible 
exchange rates, the demands for international reserves would fall drastically. 
In fact this did not occur, in large part because of the substantial increase in 
international capital mobility, which led to an offsetting increase in the de-
mand for international reserves.
With substantial international financial interdependence, both the size of bal-
ance of payments crises and the speed with which they can emerge increased 
dramatically. Furthermore, substantial levels of reserves would not only help 
cushion the effects of the crisis when they occurred but could also reduce 
the probabilities of crises occurring in the first place. This possibility has 
been captured in what are called second-generation crisis models. If the fun-
damentals of a country are excellent, it will have a crisis only if there is a 
bad shock; but if the fundamentals are terrible, a crisis is virtually inevitable 
and higher initial reserves can only postpone the timing of the crisis. These 
conditions correspond with the concepts of fundamental and nonfundamental 
disequilibrium enshrined in the Bretton Woods agreement. The dividing line 
between these two states is not always clear-cut, however. Indeed, there is 
often a fairly broad range of intermediate conditions where the fundamentals 
are neither very strong nor very weak. In this vulnerable zone a crisis is pos-
sible but not inevitable. With good luck and an absence of bad shocks the 
situation will remain stable, but with bad luck of a wide variety of types a 
crisis may be sparked.
Increases in international financial interdependence have both considerably 
broadened the width of this intermediate or vulnerable zone and increased the 
importance of adequate reserve levels in avoiding crises. Under substantial 
capital mobility, we need to look at a country’s international financial posi-
tion, not just from its traditional balance of payments perspective but also 
from a banking perspective emphasizing liquidity risk. Even if it is highly 
solvent, a bank needs to keep on hand or have the ability to quickly borrow 
reserves to meet customers’ demands for cash and to pay off maturing bor-
rowings. Normally, the needed reserve ratios can be fairly low. If negative 
events raise doubts about the soundness of the bank, however, the demands 
to convert the banks’ liabilities into cash can mount quickly, as we have seen 
in the current financial crisis. In such situations, much greater than normal 
reserves are needed. And the knowledge that reserves are high or can be bor-
rowed quickly tends to make customers less likely to ask for their money.
Internationally, the closest analogy is to a country’s international reserves 
relative to its short-term foreign debt. Of course, the size of a run on a coun-
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try could substantially exceed its short-term foreign debt. Foreign investors 
in the country’s stock market can flee, and, to the extent they are not effec-
tively inhibited by capital controls, domestic residents can move their money 
abroad, in the process further draining the country’s international reserves if 
efforts are made to keep the currency from depreciating.
As a result, the popular recommendation that countries facing substantial 
capital mobility should aim for reserves equal to three months’ worth of im-
ports plus 100 percent of short-term foreign debt may not provide adequate 
reserves. While the most appropriate ratio of reserves to short-term foreign 
debt is open to some question, empirical studies have found the ratio of re-
serves to short-term debt to be one of the more robust predictors of currency 
crises for emerging-market countries. To account for potential drains from 
internal funds, some studies have preferred to focus on ratios of reserves to 
countries’ broad money supplies or even GDP.
Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001), for example, recommend a reserve range 
equal to between 5 and 20 percent of M2. Another approach is to combine 
such ratio analysis with measures of vulnerability to crises. Thus, Bussiere 
(1999) recommends that countries should hold reserves equal to 100 percent 
of short-term foreign debt plus an additional 5 percent increase in reserves for 
each 1 percent of exchange rate overvaluation, and another 5 percent for each 
percentage point of the ratio of current account deficit to GDP. 
Potential Capital Flow Reversal Approach
The literature on capital flow surges (what Reinhart and Reinhart [2008] have 
labeled capital flow bonanzas) and their reversals or sudden stops suggests 
another approach. In traditional analysis, large capital inflows were gener-
ally interpreted as a sign of strong fundamentals, which would imply that 
the need for international reserves would be less. Although economists are 
still debating the reasons, recent experience has clearly demonstrated that 
large surges in financial capital inflows to emerging-market countries are fre-
quently dramatically reversed within a few years. As a result, it is wise for a 
country facing large capital inflows to channel a portion of these flows into 
increased reserves even when they take the form of purchases of stocks and 
long-term bonds rather than just short-term debt. Such considerations have 
led some researchers such as Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil (2008) to recommend 
that countries focus on increases in total external liabilities. This likely goes 
too far, however, because numerous empirical studies have found that some 
types of capital flows have displayed less reversibility than others. Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) displays the lowest variability. While the statistics 
understate the variability of capital flows associated with FDI because these 
flows can show up in other accounts, it seems doubtful that these would be 
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sufficiently large to change the rankings. The relative sizes of the reversals of 
portfolio and bank flows have varied across different crises.25
A number of writers have put particular emphasis on the perceived fickle-
ness of international stock market investors. In the Asian crisis of 1997–98, 
however, outflows from stock markets were quite modest, and by far the 
largest reversals were in bank loans.26 One cause of the excessive concerns 
about vulnerability to reversals for foreign stock market investments may be 
conceptual misconceptions about some of the frequently used data. In the 
1997–98 crisis the value of foreign holdings of Asian stocks fell drastically, 
but, as is documented in Kim, Kim, and Wang (2004), most of this was due 
to the fall in stock prices, not actual outflows. The same has occurred in the 
current crisis. According to data posted by the Bank of Korea as part of its 
Economic Statistics System (Ecos), the value of foreign holdings on the Ko-
rean stock market fell by $97 billion, from $230 billion to $133 billion. But 
during this period the stock market fell by 46 percent. Actual outflows were 
much smaller, $1.25 billion (from January to September 2008), a drop of 38 
percent, from the same period in 2007.
Another misconception is that what is relevant for determining reserves needs 
is the volatility of capital flows as commonly measured by the standard de-
viation or coefficient of variations of the flows. Portfolio flows do often tend 
to be fairly volatile by these definitions. A recent study on reserve adequacy 
that was prepared by IMF researchers (Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil 2008, 7) 
states, “portfolio flows have proven to be the most volatile form of capi-
tal flow.” As Sula and Willett (2009) have argued, however, the volatility of 
capital flows during inflow periods is of little policy relevance compared with 
the magnitudes of reversals during crises, and the former has little predictive 
power for explaining the latter. Much more relevant, we believe, is looking 
at the magnitude of capital flow reversals during crises. This approach was 
adopted in Kim, Kim, and Wang (2004). One serious problem is that during 
crises considerable capital outflows are often unrecorded. Thus, economists 
often treat large shifts in the errors and omission component of the balance of 
payments as reflecting primarily shifts in capital flows.
We consider several different methods of estimating the size of capital out-
flows during the Asian crisis (Kim, Kim, and Wang 2004). To be conservative 
we focused primarily on the measures that gave the largest numbers and then 
converted these to percentages of the most popular scale variables such as 
short-term foreign debt, broad money supply, and GDP. These are reproduced 
25.  On these issues, see the analysis and references in Levechenko and Mauro (2007) and Sula 
and Willett (2009).
26.  In the Mexican crisis of 1994–95, however, portfolio outflows were much larger than bank 
outflows. On this issue, see Sula and Willett (2009).
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in Table 4-1 for the countries with the largest net outflows during the crisis: 
Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. In Table 4-2 we use these ratios to scale up 
through 2007 the sizes of the capital outflows that would be implied by re-
peats of the high and low values of the crisis.
Table 4-1: Ratios of Net Capital Outflow during 1997–98 Asian Crisis 
percentage
Source: S. Kim, S. H. Kim, and Y. Wang, “Macroeconomic Effects of Capital Account Liberal-
ization: The Case of Korea,” Review of Development Economics 8 (2004): 624–39.
Table 4-2: Reserve Adequacy in Korea, 1993–2008, in billions of dollars
Source: Bank of Korea data; author’s calculations.
Notes: GDP = gross domestic product; STD = short-term debt.
There is, of course, no presumption that future crises would follow the same 
pattern as past ones, and indeed the magnitude of outflows in the Asian crisis 
varied considerably from country to country. Our range of estimates of out-
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flows as a percentage of GDP varied from as low as 0 to 5 percent for Ma-
laysia and 1 to 4 percent for the Philippines, to 17 to 23 percent for Thailand. 
Korea and Indonesia fell in the middle, with estimates of 7 to 10 percent.
One would not want to have to run down one’s reserves to zero to cushion 
the effects of capital outflows in a crisis since knowledge of such low lev-
els of reserves would itself be likely to stimulate further capital outflows. 
Thus, countries with little or no access to emergency international borrowing 
should aim for a comfortable margin of reserves above generous estimates of 
maximum likely capital outflows for a high level of safety. Experiences with 
the IMF during the Asian crisis unfortunately have made it quite difficult po-
litically for some countries, such as Korea, to undertake new IMF programs, 
and this in turn increases the demand for costly self-insurance.
The IMF certainly made some mistakes in its handling of the Asian crisis, but 
in our judgment its performance was not nearly as poor as is often charged, 
and there is considerable evidence that it has learned from this experience. 
Although it is legitimate to question whether this learning and resulting 
changes in policy strategies have been sufficient, it is quite unfortunate that 
attitudes toward future involvement with the IMF are generally so negative 
that substantive discussion of how IMF programs could be improved appears 
to be quite rare. This makes it difficult to evaluate which aspects of the IMF’s 
policies during the Asian crisis were of most concern. It is thus difficult to 
probe beyond the widespread attitude that there should be no future involve-
ment with IMF programs. It is symptomatic that in Korea the 1997 crisis is 
frequently referred to as the IMF crisis.
Several recent studies have emphasized that this precautionary motive for 
reserve accumulation in the wake of the crisis of the late 1990s was quite 
prudent, and that the large reserve increases by most Asian countries during 
the early part of this decade were quite justified. With the prominent excep-
tion of the recent study by IMF researchers Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil (2008) 
that will be critiqued below, almost all estimates of optimal reserve holdings 
have suggested that in recent years the reserve accumulations by Korea and 
a number of other Asian countries had begun to exceed levels justified by 
prudent concerns with reserve adequacy.
Reserve Accumulations to Promote Exports and Reduce 
Adjustment Costs
A popular alternative explanation offered for these continued accumulations 
was mercantilism. Countries wanting to maintain large export surpluses 
were holding down their currencies to enhance export competitiveness. In 
the minds of many commentators, mercantilism is a deeply embedded char-
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acteristic of many Asian countries, with Japan long having been the prime 
example. It is certainly true that the “Asian development model” has been 
outward oriented while for many years Latin American countries tended to 
follow more inward-looking strategies of import substitution rather than ex-
port promotion. Furthermore, all countries practice some degree of mercan-
tilism in the form of protectionism with respect to some politically sensitive 
industries.
For export-led growth it is important that overvalued currencies be avoided, 
but undervalued currencies and large trade and current account surpluses are 
not required. Thus, it is quite important to distinguish between the sensible 
strategies of export-led growth that many Asian countries including Korea 
have followed and the traditional mercantilist objective of seeking large trade 
and current account surpluses. While Japan could be labeled mercantilist on 
these criteria for many decades, many Asian countries including Korea can-
not. Indeed, one of the most common characteristics of the countries hardest 
hit by the Asian crisis was large current account deficits. As Aizenman and 
Lee (2007) have argued, it is hard to believe that there was a spontaneous 
outbreak of mercantilism across Asia following the 1997–98 crisis. Thus, 
in explaining the shift toward rapid reserve accumulation in this decade, a 
much more convincing explanation lies in precautionary motives based on 
the recognition, stimulated by the rash of crises, that in a world of increased 
financial interdependence the thresholds for reserve adequacy have increased 
substantially.
This explanation does not work as well for recent years, however, as sub-
stantial reserve accumulation continued for Korea and a number of other 
Asian economies, most notably China, well beyond sensible precaution-
ary needs. Li, Sula, and Willett (2008) suggest that many of the continuing 
reserve increases until the current crisis were motivated by concerns with 
reducing adjustment costs that led to leaning-against-the-wind intervention 
in the foreign exchange market as documented in Chapter 2. In the face of 
pressures for appreciation, behavior based on this view and on old-fashioned 
mercantilism cannot be distinguished, but over the longer run they can differ 
considerably.
In our interpretation, Korea’s reserve increases after 2002 or 2003, when re-
serve levels had risen to around 20 percent of GDP (see Table 4-2), were 
primarily the result of neither the precautionary motive nor of old-fashioned 
mercantilism but rather short-run considerations aimed at reducing the dislo-
cation effects that can be caused by substantial short-run changes in exchange 
rates. This is a sensible strategy that is consistent with the interests of both 
Korea and the global economy as long as such efforts are combined with 
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policy efforts to stimulate domestic demand to help offset the effects of less 
favorable conditions for exports.
As Eichengreen (2007a) has argued, while a strategy of export-led growth 
has served Korea and other Asian countries well in the past, as income levels 
have risen it is wise to begin to place more emphasis on domestic sources of 
growth. As Noland (2005, 2) argued, “the de-linking of domestic and interna-
tional financial markets was an essential component of the country’s state-led 
development strategy” and emphasized growth for firms rather than profit-
ability. As Korea caught up to the technological frontier, the case for more 
decentralized allocation of resources increased, and with financial liberaliza-
tion a new model for development with less focus on exports needed to be 
developed. At the same time, trade liberalization and general trends toward 
globalization led to increasing ratios of international trade to GDP.
The argument is not that increasing ratios of trade are harmful, but that spe-
cial efforts should no longer be made to encourage production for export over 
that for domestic consumption. Thus, efforts to create and maintain a large 
trade surplus and a large current account surplus are not a desirable develop-
ment strategy for Korea. Of course, avoiding large current account deficits 
is necessary. As domestic and international conditions shift, it is difficult to 
know what would be the optimal mix of short-run policy responses, but it 
seems clear that, for a country like Korea, initial responses should include 
substantial doses of both changes in exchange rates and changes in reserves 
through intervention that reduces the magnitudes of the exchange rate chang-
es that would otherwise have occurred.
In this view, reserves are best viewed as a buffer stock with rather wide 
boundaries. Efforts to develop models of optimal reserve levels will never be 
definitive because full optimization involves a complex set of variables with 
relationships among them often being nonlinear and there being consider-
able uncertainty about the values of some of the most relevant parameters.27 
In this respect it is much like the estimation of equilibrium exchange rates. 
Such efforts can be quite useful, but we cannot expect full agreement among 
researchers.
A Look at Korean Reserve Adequacy
Thus, it should not be surprising that one recent study by Ruiz-Arranz and 
Zavadjil (2008) has challenged the widespread perception that reserve levels 
had grown too high in most emerging Asian countries. (They grant that China 
is well above their estimates of optimal levels.) By their calculations, before 
27.  For recent efforts and discussions of these issues see Jeanne and Ranciere (2006), Jadresic 
(2007), McCauley (2007), and Li, Sula, and Willett (2008).
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the current crisis began Korea’s reserves were only slightly above optimal. 
They present ratios relative to a number of the standard benchmarks. Perhaps 
most surprising is their conclusion that reserves should not just exceed short-
term foreign debt but should do so by a factor of three. It is interesting to 
compare this with our estimates of capital outflows during the Asian crisis in 
J. S. Kim et al. (2004). Our maximum estimate of outflows as a proportion 
of short-term debt was 86 percent for Thailand. The high for Korea was 78 
percent. Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil rightly note that in recent years short-term 
debt has become a declining proportion of emerging-market international 
finance and, as we discussed, that this is not the only potential source of 
outflows. Thus, holding reserves greater than 100 percent of short-term debt 
may be quite sensible. A 300 percent benchmark seems unreasonably high, 
however, unless short-term debt has fallen to dramatically low levels.
Just the opposite has occurred with Korea. After a drop of more than $30 bil-
lion or almost 50 percent between 1996 and 1998, short-term debt remained 
fairly stable at approximately $40 billion through 2002. Short-term debt then 
began a gradual increase up to almost $66 billion by the end of 2005. Chang-
es in regulations, heavy demands for financing increased exports—especially 
in shipbuilding—and hedging activities, and changing interest differentials 
led to an explosion of short-term external debt in 2006, with year-end totals 
jumping to more than $113 billion in 2006 and almost $160 billion in 2007. 
Thus, while Korean reserves were continuing to increase as a percentage of 
GDP, exceeding 30 percent in 2006, the ratio of reserves to short-term debt 
peaked in 2004. By 2006, reserves, while still increasing, had fallen below 
200 percent of short-term debt. It is interesting to note, however, that during 
2008 short-term debt fell by less than $10 billion, less than one-third of the 
fall during the 1997–98 crisis, even though the precrisis level had been twice 
as high. In contrast, as will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 10, the outflow of 
portfolio investment during the current crisis was substantial. Overall, how-
ever, the total capital outflows during the crisis appear to have been well 
below 10 percent of GDP while initial reserve levels were more than twice 
that figure.
We conclude our discussion of the Ruiz-Arranz and Zavadjil estimates by 
considering their estimates of optimal reserves for Korea as a proportion of 
the broad money supply. Their estimate for Korea is slightly over 40 percent. 
This is less out of line with the ratios of outflows during the Asian crisis but 
is still considerably largely than our highest estimates, which were 28 percent 
for Thailand and 25 percent for Korea. Before the current crisis, Korea’s ratio 
of reserves to broad money had risen to 33 percent, and total outflows during 
the current crisis appear to have been below 10 percent.
20335_SpcStd_Willett-N1-R1.indd   56 11/11/2009   4:02:12 PM
International Reserve Adequacy  57
Furthermore, several improvements in access for Korea to official interna-
tional borrowing reduce at least somewhat the need for owned reserves. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 8, the IMF has made important strides in im-
proving access to short-term borrowing for countries such as Korea that are 
following generally sensible economic policies; and, in addition to the funds 
potentially available on a regional basis through the Chiang Mai Initiative, 
Korea now has large swap lines with the U.S. Federal Reserve and the central 
banks of China and Japan. As noted above, Korea is extremely reluctant to 
borrow from the IMF, and it is disappointing that all countries have shown a 
great hesitancy to make use of the Chiang Mai Initiative. Even without these, 
unlike the situation in 1997, Korea’s reserve position was strong when the 
latest crisis hit.
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5
Financial Liberalization and 
International Capital Flows
The first section of this chapter is coauthored by Nancy Auerbach. The rest of the chapter is 
coauthored by Yoonmin Kim and Thana Sompornserm.
It is interesting that domestic and international financial liberalization are 
among the most often cited causes of the 1997–98 crisis. Liberalization in 
the Asian crisis countries took place prior to the crisis as did large capital in-
flows, many of which reversed during the crisis in the classic pattern of capi-
tal flow bonanzas ending in sudden stops (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía 2008; 
Reinhart and Reinhart 2008; Sula and Willett 2009). Furthermore, China and 
India, with much less general financial liberalization and a continuing array 
of capital controls, were little hit by the crisis. Malaysia’s experiment with 
increasing capital controls during the crisis, while not the resounding success 
that some enthusiasts suggested, was certainly not the catastrophe that many 
critics predicted. As a result, in many quarters support for financial liberaliza-
tion suffered a strong blow.
The free-market euphoria that followed the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union had burst. The massive reversal toward greater financial controls that 
was predicted with glee by some and with fear by others did not come to 
pass, however. The IMF became more circumspect in its preaching for lib-
eralization.28 Controls in some countries were increased, but in many others, 
such as Korea, the crisis spurred further and more balanced liberalization 
but combined with efforts to improve prudential regulation and financial 
supervision.
This was a wise response. A careful look at the previous financial liberaliza-
tion in Korea and many other countries suggests that the major problems 
28.  In actuality, the IMF had generally been more nuanced in its advocacy of liberalization 
than many of its critics charged; see IEO (2005; 2007).
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were not caused by financial liberalization per se, but by the perverse ways in 
which it was done. It was more their strong economic fundamentals than their 
capital controls that protected China and India from the 1997–98 crisis (Wil-
lett et al. 2005). Furthermore several studies have found positive rather than 
negative correlations between measures of capital controls and the frequency 
of currency crises (Potchamanawong et al. 2008). There are sufficient dif-
ficulties with the various quantitative measures of capital controls currently 
available (Potchamanawong et al. 2008)29 to keep one from being confident 
that capital controls are a strong cause of crises, but the evidence certainly 
supports caution about the belief that capital controls provide strong protec-
tion against crises.
Perverse Liberalization before 1997
When we look at the Korean experience we see that the liberalization that 
preceded the 1997–98 crisis was quite partial and frequently violated stan-
dard economic advice about how liberalization should proceed. A large litera-
ture has been developed by economic theorists and practitioners alike about 
the necessary preconditions and sequencing needed for liberalization to work 
well. Not surprisingly considerable disagreement about optimal sequencing 
still exists, but experts have arrived at a considerable degree of consensus that 
some paths work much better than others. What has become much clearer 
from the rash of crises during the past decade is that not only do some paths 
work less well, but that they can be disastrous.
The total amount of domestic and international financial liberalization un-
dertaken by Korea before the 1997–98 crisis was much less than is often 
assumed, and most of the qualitative measures of the level of international 
capital controls in Korea and several of the other Asian crisis countries were 
still fairly high (Willett et al. 2005). This may help explain the positive as-
sociation that some studies have found between capital controls and crises. A 
nontrivial amount of financial liberalization did begin in Korea in the early 
1990s and was accelerated by the program agreed to as part of Korea’s entry 
into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
but Marcus Noland (2005, 17) in his study of Korea’s experience with liber-
alization and international capital flows concluded that, even with the com-
pletion of the OECD application plan, “the South Korean financial system 
would have remained among the most repressed in Asia.”
29.  Using a more detailed new measure of capital control developed by Potchamanawong 
(2007) that distinguishes between controls on inflows and outflows, Potchamanawong et al. 
(2008) find that crises are associated more strongly with controls on outflows than on inflows. 
An example of the problems with the quantitative measures of capital controls is that the 
widely used measure of Chinn and Ito (2006) shows an increase in controls for Korea before 
the 1997 crisis, while qualitative discussions indicate there was a reduction. The measures 
developed by Potchamanawong (2007) and Schindler (2009) do show a decrease.
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The liberalization did not result primarily from a conversion of Korean poli-
cymakers to neoliberal ideas. As Noland (2005, 38) puts it, “the liberaliza-
tion undertaken in the early 1990s was less a product of textbook economic 
analysis than of parochial politicking. . . . Neither South Korean government 
officials nor the intelligentsia evidenced much ideological commitment to 
the notion of freer financial markets. . . .” This helps explain why, from the 
standpoint of standard economic analysis, a number of basic mistakes were 
made.
The state of the Korean financial system was not strong as the liberalization 
process began. Noland (2005, 20) describes it as “bureaucratized, bloated, 
and backwards.” Under the old system of government support and directed 
credit, there was little incentive for Korean financial institutions to invest 
substantial resources to develop strong capabilities in credit analysis and risk 
management. As Frederic Mishkin (2006, 87) comments in his analysis of 
Korea’s precrisis financial system, “Because of the government safety net for 
the chaebols [which were generally considered to be too big to fail], banks 
had little need to develop a credit culture.”
These capabilities cannot be developed overnight, so strong regulatory over-
sight is particularly important in early stages of liberalization. And, as we 
have discovered from the U.S. subprime crisis, even in mature financial sys-
tems this is true with respect to the development of new types of financial 
arrangements. As has been true in many other countries, Korea’s initial fi-
nancial liberalization was not accompanied by a strong boost to regulatory 
oversight. Mishkin (2006, 87) offers a likely reason for this failure: “Just as 
in Mexico, lax banking regulation and supervision [in Korea] were no ac-
cidents. It was in the interests of both the banks and the firms that borrowed 
from them that they be allowed . . . to do their business . . . unfettered by 
bothersome regulations and inspections.”
In Korea, lax prudential regulation allowed heavy concentration of lending 
and the disproportionate growth between Korean banks and nonbank indus-
tries. In the three-year period leading up to the crisis, merchant banks acquired 
$20 billion in foreign debt (Chang, Park, and Yoo 1998, 738). Regulation was 
especially lax for newly licensed merchant banks whose capital requirements 
in proportion to loans were woefully inadequate. The same can be said for 
Thailand. This fact alone significantly further increased the vulnerability of 
the banks to business failure. But the lack of prudential regulation, an act of 
omission, also interacted with the removal of various government restrictions 
on foreign borrowing, an act of commission, to exacerbate banking-sector 
weaknesses. Financial liberalization and tight money kept domestic interest 
rates above world rates, which encouraged domestic banks to rely on for-
eign credit. The pegged exchange rate also encouraged the perception that 
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foreign capital was relatively cheap, contributing to the wave of excessive 
short-term foreign borrowing that was intensified by ineffective prudential 
supervision. And, because private actors considered the pegged exchange 
rate system quite credible, they made borrowing decisions under a false sense 
of security (Demetriades and Fattouh 1999, 788). But the concentration of 
bad loans leading up to the crisis may not have been due only to the govern-
ment’s encouragement to lend short term through the unintentional creation 
of perverse incentives. There is evidence that government officials supported 
lending to the chaebol by Korean banks even after chaebol profitability had 
fallen sharply (Krueger and Yoo 2002, 602).
One contributor to the financial weakness of the private banking sector has to 
do with the incentives behind bank ownership. Privatization of state-owned 
banks constitutes an important component of the financial reform process. 
Yet the privatization process itself can fall prey to perverse incentives. This 
can be viewed as an incompatibility between political motivations and eco-
nomic incentives, or as political capture of the reform process. Privatization 
in theory should lead to greater overall efficiency as, for example, the private 
sector possesses some comparative advantage over government in making 
profit-maximizing economic decisions. Given the stakes involved, however, 
the privatization process is particularly susceptible to political capture and 
rent seeking, as with the charter of new merchant banks in Korea. The gov-
ernment converted 24 financially weak short-term financing companies into 
merchant banks in two separate rounds: 9 in 1994 and 15 in 1996. The mer-
chant banks then proceeded to engage in risky foreign exchange transactions. 
Among the banks whose licenses were revoked in 1998, 5 were new entrants 
from 1994, and 10 were from 1996. Thus, government reforms seem to have 
encouraged greater debt exposure in an already overexposed financial system 
(Auerbach 2001, 208).
In Korea, moreover, as part of financial reform banks were allowed to open 
and expand operations overseas. As a result, banks expanded their foreign 
currency–denominated business as aggressively as they did their domestic 
loan portfolios. The net result was an increase in foreign currency liabili-
ties of overseas branches that was almost as large as the external debts of 
domestic branches (Dooley and Shin 2000, 9). Nor did this happen only in 
Korea. The number of nonbank financial institutions expanded dramatically 
in Thailand as well prior to the crisis (Furman and Stiglitz 1998, 7). In fact, 
throughout East Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, there had been a proliferation of 
new banking and quasi-banking institutions with little equity capital and less 
experience, nearly all engaged directly or indirectly in intermediating foreign 
capital (Katz 1999, 428).
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Obviously the buildup of short-term debt severely weakened the domestic 
banking sectors of crisis countries in Asia. And clearly the governments had 
a lot to do with encouraging short-term debt buildup (Fischer 1999). One way 
to understand why short-term debt skyrocketed with financial deregulation is 
to look at the incentive structures created by state regulation of the financial 
sector before liberalization and to understand that before liberalization those 
perverse incentives might have been held in check by government oversight. 
For example, continued government control over the long-term capital mar-
ket, in the form of window guidance or direct controls over interest rates, cre-
ated a shortage of long-term capital during the earlier rapid growth period in 
most Asian countries. This shortage encouraged the use of short-term credit 
to finance long-term investments. This perverse incentive ultimately led to 
a perverse outcome in the form of a mismatch of borrowing and lending 
terms, which is widely acknowledged to be one of the main ingredients of the 
Asian financial crisis (Katz 1999, 429). Under these conditions, reform may 
encourage market actors to take advantage of pre-existing incentives because 
oversight has diminished.
The starkest example of this kind of perverse incentive is the liberalization 
of the short-term loan market in the context of an already weakened banking 
sector (Demetriades and Fattouh 1999, 788). When governments in East Asia 
liberalized their banking sectors and capital markets, they began by opening 
up only the short-term maturity end of these markets. Unfortunately, this seg-
ment of the market tends to be characterized not only by short-term horizons 
on the part of investors but also by short-term rent seeking for quick profits 
by banks taking advantage of close ties with government (Katz 1999, 429). 
Some Korean banks actually had a negative net worth when the loan market 
was liberalized. The fact that banks with negative net worth could continue 
to operate obviously is more a function of inadequate prudential regulation in 
the preliberalization period than of liberalization per se. In this context of in-
solvency, however, liberalization may have actually exacerbated the problem 
because banks with negative net worth do face strong (perverse) incentives 
to load up on short-term debt as a means of gambling for redemption in a 
liberalized short-term loan market. That is, if the banking system is unsound 
owing to a large debt overhang or a large percentage of nonperforming loans 
that have not yet been written off, these banks have very little to lose by 
loading up on more risky but potentially highly profitable new loans made 
accessible as a result of liberalization. This is especially true when viewed 
in conjunction with the too-big-to-fail form of moral hazard. In both cases, 
the downside risks of taking on more short-term loan risk are considerably 
discounted in comparison with the upside of redeeming a failing business 
enterprise with the infusion of fresh capital.
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Governments further encouraged the buildup of short-term debt by liberal-
izing the loan market while implicitly lowering the perceived costs of foreign 
borrowing through the pegged exchange rate (Demetriades and Fattouh 1999, 
788; Dooley and Shin 2000, 5). Most of the crisis country governments sharply 
limited the size of exchange rate fluctuations and fostered the impression that 
the private sector need not worry about the possibility of a large depreciation. 
The substantial differential between high domestic interest rates in the crisis 
countries and low rates in Europe, Japan, and the United States was seen as a 
source of arbitrage profits or low borrowing costs rather than as an indicator 
of differentials in risk (Krueger and Yoo 2002, 603). As a consequence, much 
of the crisis country foreign borrowing went unhedged. Thus, financial-sector 
liberalization and exchange rate policies interacted perversely. In many coun-
tries, often with explicit government encouragement, the private sector came 
to believe that large exchange rate depreciations would not be allowed, or, if 
such changes did occur, nationals would be compensated by the government 
(Krueger and Yoo 2002, 603). This both encouraged foreign borrowing and 
discouraged the purchase of forward cover as an insurance against the risk of 
major exchange rate changes (Krueger and Yoo 2002, 606).
Korean state managers came under significant pressure by 1993 from the 
chaebol to liberalize short-term finance (Lee, Lee, and Lee 2000, 1). There 
is no question the move toward liberalized financial markets fit in with the 
Kim Young-sam government’s globalization priority and therefore served a 
political function. But this does not explain why both short-term and long-
term credit markets were not liberalized. Ironically, policymakers suggested 
that one of the strongest reasons for introducing competition in the market for 
bank loans was to mitigate the considerable economic power and influence 
of the chaebol. Indeed, controlling the excesses of big business throughout 
the liberalization process was an explicit goal for Korean policymakers (Au-
erbach 2001, 85–87).
The state first embarked upon financial liberalization in 1980 not with the 
idea of giving market forces free rein, but rather with the idea of building new 
institutions between the state and big business that would serve to ensure eco-
nomic control over big business irregularities and to prevent its dominance 
in the market. Korean officials saw liberalization as redefining the rules in 
order to continue meeting prudential objectives and prevent the exercise of 
cartel-like private market power. Part of the long-term liberalization plan was 
to restrict the privileged access of big business to policy loans and these busi-
nesses’ oligopolized production in the market (Rhee 1994, 154). Reform-
oriented officials firmly believed that economic liberalization would not be 
successful without preventing further business concentration. State control 
over big business served not only the state’s economic goals but also its polit-
ical goals. The Chun government (1981–88) put an emphasis on the political 
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goal of the welfare and justice society against the previous regime’s collusive 
state–big business ruling coalition, thus pinning the new regime’s legitimacy 
on its ability to control big business (Rhee 1994, 193).
Despite rather explicit state goals to avoid such outcomes, there is consider-
able evidence that the content and sequence of Korean liberalization ulti-
mately allowed the chaebol to take advantage of perverse incentives. That 
is, the rather unbalanced form that financial opening took was partially a 
result of the unyielding pressure from the chaebol, which saw short-term 
borrowing as a way to get around government restrictions on borrowing and 
investment decisions as well as the capitalization restrictions. Some observ-
ers have described the government strategy of liberalizing short-term bor-
rowing while leaving long-term borrowing regulated as government officials 
giving in where pressures were strong and holding back where it was not. 
Given the short-term nature of borrowing by nonbank financial institutions, 
the liberalization of the short-term market prior to the long-term market was 
an understandable outcome of interest politics. Between 1994 and 1996, for-
eign bank lending to Korea went from $52 to $108 billion. About $60 bil-
lion of debt outstanding in 1997 was used by the chaebol to finance direct 
investments abroad. Korean banks invested in foreign assets with funds bor-
rowed from foreign banks in the range of $23 billion (Haggard and Mo 2000, 
204). The reliance of the chaebol on bank borrowing—as opposed to equity 
or bond financing—increased leverage ratios and made the chaebol highly 
susceptible to bankruptcies when hit with shocks. In turn, the health of the 
banking sector became heavily dependent on the viability of the chaebol be-
cause such a high fraction of bank assets are in the form of lending to these 
enterprises (Dekle and Ubide 1998, 18). Korean financial institutions were 
overexposed to foreign exchange risk, and a high proportion of foreign li-
abilities had relatively short maturities. So, at the very least, deregulation of 
the financial sector in the early 1990s, together with ongoing features of the 
government-banking-chaebol relationship, increased Korea’s vulnerability to 
outside capital flows by creating the incentive for short-term indebtedness 
(Haggard and Mo 2000, 215).
Finally, large business groups throughout Asia benefited from the process of 
bank privatization. As many scholars have pointed out, privatization because 
of the large stakes involved is particularly prone to rent seeking and cap-
ture. In countries like Korea, government relaxation of controls over entry 
and ownership has led to the largest business groups’ domination of both 
the ownership of commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions (Tan 
and Schneider, forthcoming). One result in Korea was that credit became 
concentrated, with the largest 30 business groups receiving more than 70 per-
cent of total short-term credit (Rhee 1994, 203). One potential sticking point 
for Korean officials was that, in order to strengthen banks, it was necessary 
20335_SpcStd_Willett-N1-R1.indd   64 11/11/2009   4:02:12 PM
Financial Liberalization and International Capital Flows  65
to end the ban on chaebol ownership of them. But bank privatization only 
strengthened the already powerful chaebol. In short, the privatization process 
allowed big business groups to capture an ever-increasing proportion of the 
banking sector, thereby fortifying the large business groups’ position in rela-
tion to government control.
Not all the pressures for liberalization were domestic. International pressures 
were also important. These can operate through a number of channels. One 
is through impersonal market forces; that is, the degree of international capi-
tal mobility can influence the costs and benefits of a wide array of financial 
strategies. Actions by other emerging-market governments may also have im-
portant effects through this channel. Liberalization of competitors raises the 
costs of continued restrictions in the home country.
A second is through influence on actors’ mental models. Although the extent 
of influence is open to debate, there can be little question that attitudes to-
ward financial liberalization had become much more favorable by the 1990s 
compared with the 1970s, and that the international transmission of ideas has 
a good deal to do with these changed attitudes.
A third channel is through direct pressure. This can come from the interna-
tional financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank and via direct 
lobbying on emerging-market governments by international financial inter-
ests, but such pressures are perhaps more commonly intermediated by nation-
al governments in the industrialized countries (Bhagwati’s Wall Street–Trea-
sury complex). Lobbying, persuasion, and arm-twisting by industrial-country 
governments and the international financial institutions can come of course 
from the sincere belief that liberalization is in the best interests of the emerg-
ing-market countries. The relative influence of interests and ideas or ideology 
in this context will often be difficult if not impossible to tease out. Assum-
ing that bureaucrats throughout Asia have been reluctant to cede discretion-
ary power to the private sector, one could interpret the decision to liberal-
ize short-term finance as the result of market pressure. That is, international 
finance brought the most market pressure to bear in the short-term credit 
market in part because the volume of short-term financial flows was so much 
greater. In other words, bureaucrats failed to liberalize long-term finance be-
cause they possessed the capability to resist, whereas they could not resist the 
tide of market forces in the short-term financial market.
External pressure for financial-market opening can be extremely powerful. 
This is an area in which unintended consequences are of major importance. 
Sometimes the effects on emerging markets are the result of industrial-
country policies. Fluctuations in credit conditions in the rich countries have 
been shown to have strong effects on the size of international financial flows 
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to emerging markets. Less inevitably, the efforts of the industrial countries 
to develop better standards for risk management by the major international 
banks resulted in incentives for the banks to shift from longer-term to short-
term lending (Goodman and Pauly 1993; Cohen 1996). The so-called Ba-
sel Accord on capital adequacy standards for banks reflected a substantial 
achievement of international cooperation, but few noticed at the time that 
this was followed quickly by a dramatic increase in the ratio of short-term to 
long-term bank loans going to emerging markets. This was the result of the 
much higher ratios of capital required to back bank loans of over one year.
The Czech Republic, Mexico, and Korea were hit by a double whammy. By 
achieving sufficient economic and political success to be allowed to join the 
industrial countries as members of the OECD, they automatically qualified 
under the Basel rules for a lower risk category with lower capital require-
ments on loans. While not all international banks were following these regu-
latory rules, enough were so that the admissions of these countries to the 
OECD were followed by surges of capital inflows (concentrated of course on 
the short-term end). We also cannot totally discount the more formal external 
pressures to liberalize. In Korea, President Kim Young-sam’s desire to join 
the OECD, combined with pressure from the IMF and the U.S. government, 
may have led to the liberalization of domestic financial markets before exist-
ing weaknesses in the banking system, including poor regulatory and super-
visory framework, could be addressed (Demetriades and Fattouh 1999, 791). 
So, although some liberalization would undoubtedly have taken place in the 
absence of foreign pressure, the nature and timing of liberalization may have 
been acutely affected.
Perhaps the strangest aspect of Korea’s liberalization sequencing was the de-
cision to liberalize short-term capital flows before long-term ones—the exact 
opposite of the normally recommended sequencing. As Mishkin (2006, 88, 
29) explains, however, allowing an “unlimited short-term foreign borrowing 
by financial institutions while maintaining quantity restrictions on long-term 
borrowing . . . made no economic sense, . . . however [it] made complete po-
litical sense.” “. . .[This] allowed the government to say that it was still redi-
recting foreign capital inflows, and to claim that it was opening up to foreign 
capital in a prudent manner.” Just the opposite was the case, of course.
At least one minor contribution to the excessive short-term foreign borrow-
ing that developed was due to the unconsidered consequences of the interna-
tional efforts to improve financial systems’ stability through the Basel I capi-
tal requirements. These crude risk control measures drew a sharp distinction 
between countries that were and were not members of the OECD, so when 
Korea was admitted the capital requirements for some loans to Korea were 
substantially lowered for banks in countries following Basel I, then leading 
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to greater incentives for banks to lend to Korea. Although the revised dec-
larations in the Basel II agreement appeared to be much more sophisticated, 
the current crisis has shown that much of this apparent sophistication was an 
illusion, as little if anything had been done to improve consideration of the 
possible effects on systemic risk that might be generated by following the 
regulations.
Perhaps the most serious weakness in financial system oversight came, how-
ever, not from issues with the behavior of the commercial banks but from 
the merchant-banking sector that Mishkin (2006, 89) describes as “virtu-
ally unregulated.” In 1990 Korea had only six merchant banks, all affiliates 
of foreign banks. Wanting greater access to foreign borrowing, the chaebol 
launched a lobbying campaign that “persuaded government officials, often 
through bribery and kickbacks, to permit many finance companies which 
were not allowed to borrow abroad, to be converted into merchant banks, 
which could.” The result was that by the time of the crisis the number of 
merchant banks in Korea had grown to 30, 16 of which were controlled by 
the chaebol.
The result was a domestic credit boom financed heavily by foreign borrowing. 
Not surprisingly, the rapid expansion of credit led to an increasing proportion 
of lending of a dubious nature. Regulators in Korea were no more successful 
in limiting this problem than were U.S. regulators in taking action to head off 
the subprime crisis. The major problem was not that the regulatory agencies 
could not pay enough to hire competent supervisors. The danger signs were 
not difficult to see if one was looking. Rather the biggest problem (Mishkin 
2006, 93) was that “political pressure on bank supervision led to ‘regulatory 
forbearance,’ the supervisors were not forcing banking institutions to reveal 
these bad loans and were allowing insolvent institutions to stay in business.”
Given these problems, it seems likely that a major financial crisis was in-
evitable. The financial system was in much too fragile a state to weather the 
spillover from the crisis that started in Thailand. The result was huge capital 
outflows, substantial overdepreciation of the won, and widespread financial 
distress and economic hardship.
Postcrisis Liberalization
Fortunately Korea drew the right lessons from the Asian crisis concerning the 
financial sector. Instead of pushing for re-regulation, the government saw that 
more and especially better liberalization was needed, accompanied by greatly 
strengthened prudential supervision in order to improve the soundness of the 
financial system (Kim, Kim, and Suh 2009; Kang 2009).
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A number of regulations on the banking sector and stock market, particu-
larly aimed at the foreign investors, were largely eased or eliminated. At the 
same time, incentives were created to induce foreign investors to return their 
investments or to attract new investors to Korea. In addition, after the Asian 
crisis, the Korean government nationalized many large domestic banks that 
were vulnerable to solvency risks, and Korean authorities also concurrently 
loosened some restrictions on the entry of foreign banks in order to attract 
foreign banks to purchase or merge those nationalized banks. In 1998, for 
example, the Emergency Economic Committee allowed foreigners to buy up 
to one-third of a company’s shares without prior approval of the target firm’s 
board of directors (Bekaert and Harvey 2004), foreign investors were allowed 
to directly participate in Korean banks through acquisition or through equity 
markets, and foreign banks were subject to the same restrictions as Korean 
banks. The Korean government also engaged in intensive financial reforms 
in order to strengthen its prudential regulation and supervision, increase its 
financial-market development, and improve corporate governance (Kim, 
Kim, and Suh 2009). An important aspect of this push was the creation of 
the Financial Supervisory Commission in 1999. The result has been a much 
sounder domestic financial system.
Korea has generally kept tighter restrictions on capital outflows than on capital 
inflows (Figure 5-1). During the crisis restrictions on inflows were reduced 
in order to moderate the downward pressure on the won; this was followed 
after the crisis by more liberalization of both capital inflows and outflows 
(Table 5-1). The regulations in several asset categories were lifted for both 
foreign and domestic investors; categories included securities, bonds, short-
term money market instruments, derivatives, collective investments, and real 
estate. In 1998, for example, foreigners were freed to purchase domestic col-
lective investment securities without restrictions; in 1998 domestic corpora-
tions were allowed to issue securities abroad with maturities of less than three 
years; in 1998 nonresidents were allowed to issue securities denominated in 
foreign currency (Bekaert and Harvey 2004); and in 2003 the government 
extended the range of foreign securities qualified for investment by residents 
(Ahn 2008). In 2007, restrictions on the investments by residents in overseas 
real estate were relaxed (Kim, Kim, and Suh 2009).
Recent empirical research by Sompornserm (2009) has found that domestic 
financial liberalization in emerging markets often plays an important role in 
attracting foreign investors over and above capital account liberalization. The 
process of liberalization not only affects prices and returns on assets directly, 
but it also leads to an improvement of investors’ expectations about further 
economic policy reforms or acts as a signal of an improvement of economic 
policies, making foreign investors more confident about investing in the lib-
eralized countries. In addition, financial liberalization has on average had 
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Figure 5-1: Potchamanawong and Schindler Capital Control Indexes 
1995–2004
Sources: P. Potchamanawong, “A New Measurement of Capital Controls and Its Relation to 
Currency Crises” (Ph.D. dissertation for Claremont Graduate University, 2007); M. Schindler, 
“Measuring Financial Integration: A New Data Set,” IMF Staff Papers 56 (2009): 222–38.
Note: The Potchamanawong and Schindler capital control indexes range between 0 and 1. The 
higher value represents a higher degree of capital control.
Figure 5-2: Patterns of Foreign Capital Flows into South Korea 
1980–2008 
Sources: International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund; author’s 
calculations. 
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Table 5-1: Financial Liberalization in Korea after the Asian Financial 
Crisis, 1997–2007
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Table 5-1: cont.
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Table 5-1: cont.
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a strong influence in changing the composition of capital flows within the 
short-term flows, by tilting the structure of capital flows toward portfolio in-
vestment flows. This result suggests that an increase in the degree of financial 
liberalization can translate into greater financial-market deepening. Korea’s 
experience fits this general pattern.
Postcrisis Capital Flows
After the Asian financial crisis, international capital inflows to Korea reap-
peared, particularly in the form of equity flows and FDI flows as a result 
of domestic financial liberalization, capital account openness, and favorable 
macroeconomic conditions. Several factors contributed to large changes 
in the composition of capital inflows in Korea during 1999–2000, shifting 
Korean capital flows away from foreign loans toward FDI flows and equity 
flows. An increase in risk perceptions by foreign creditors as a result of the 
loss of confidence in Korean borrowers’ ability to repay their debts was one. 
Another was the lessons learned by Korean borrowers from the sudden stops 
and the reversals of foreign loans during the crisis. After 2000, a continuing 
surplus in current and capital accounts, which would put upward pressure on 
foreign exchange rates, led Korean authorities to encourage capital outflows 
by relaxing restrictions on capital outflows to overseas real estate, portfolio 
investments, and direct investment abroad (Kim, Kim, and Suh 2009).
As we can see in Figure 5-2, by 1999 net capital flows had turned positive 
again, with especially large investments coming into the Korean stock market 
in 1999 and continuing on a large scale through 2004 with only the exception 
of 2002. Total net capital flows followed a similar pattern over these years. 
In 2005 total net inflows dropped, with inflows in the bond market and bank-
ing exceeding equity inflows. Bond sales and bank borrowing reached much 
higher levels in 2006 and 2007 while net foreign flows into the Korean stock 
market turned mildly negative in 2006, with net sales accelerating in 2007. At 
the same time, the loosening of restrictions on capital outflows led to a boom 
in purchases of foreign stocks and real estate by Korean residents. This led 
to sizable net portfolio equity outflows in 2006 and even larger ones in 2007 
(Figure 5-3). As a result, total net capital flows turned negative in 2007 (Fig-
ure 5-4). Note that this shift occurred before the effects of the U.S. subprime 
meltdown began to be felt in emerging markets.
The other especially notable feature of Korean capital flows between the cri-
ses was the rapid buildup of short-term foreign debt by the Korean bank-
ing sector beginning in 2006. The foreign borrowing by the Korean bank-
ing sector considerably increased from $1.1 billion in 2004 to $40 billion in 
2007, growing approximately 10-fold per year. In addition, during 2006–07, 
bank borrowing alone on average accounted for 45 percent of the capital 
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inflows. The substantial increase in foreign borrowing was in part a con-
sequence of the large portfolio outflows from Korean residents; Kim, Kim, 
and Suh (2009, 30) state that “capital outflows via overseas equity invest-
ment increased markedly, but at the same time investors (funds) sold forward 
exchange on a large scale to hedge against exchange rate risk, leading to a 
considerable increase in overseas foreign currency borrowing.” The increase 
was also caused in part by hedging against future export proceeds, especially 
from shipbuilding. This buildup in short-term foreign borrowing was gener-
ated largely by the Korean branches of international banks.
This rapid buildup illustrates how quickly international financial relations 
can change even in noncrisis periods. This accumulation of short-term for-
eign debt was carefully monitored by the Korean authorities, who judged 
that, because of the combination of the reasons for the borrowing, its con-
centration with Korean branches of international banks, and Korea’s ample 
supply of international reserves, this increase was not a major source of con-
cern despite its large size. As will be discussed in Chapter 10, this judgment 
was well founded in the sense that, during the current crisis, the decline in 
such debt has been fairly modest in contrast with the Asian crisis, but the 
large headline number helped contribute to considerable investor concerns 
during the crisis, which helped contribute to the dramatic plunge of the won.
Sizable portfolio outflows continued in 2008. In contrast, short-term bank 
debt, which had begun to surge in 2006, has remained at high levels. This is a 
substantial deviation from the pattern in the 1997–98 crisis, when reversals in 
the banking accounts were the major factor and the falloff in stock market in-
vestment was slight. To a substantial degree we can explain these differences 
in the patterns of capital flows by the differences in the nature of the crises. 
In 1997–98, the crisis was centered in Korea and focused on problems in the 
financial sector. Consequently, there was considerable risk to foreign lending 
to Korean banks, and it is not surprising that there were considerable outflows 
from the banking sector. The current crisis is centered in the United States, 
and the Korean banking sector is much sounder, although concerns have been 
expressed about the recent large accumulations of short-term foreign debt 
and the increasing reliance on wholesale funding. The behavior of capital 
flows during the current crisis will be discussed in Chapter 10.
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Figure 5-3: Patterns of South Korea’s Capital Outflow, 1980–2008
Sources: International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund; author’s 
calculations.
Figure 5-4: Patterns of Net Total Capital Flows for South Korea 
1980–2008 
Sources: International Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund; author’s 
calculations.
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6
International Aspects of 
Korea’s Monetary Policies
This chapter is coauthored by Alice Ouyang.
As was discussed in Chapter 5, considerable financial liberalization and capi-
tal opening was implemented by Korean authorities during the 1990s. The 
government conducted a series of interest rate deregulation plans beginning 
in 1991 and partially opened the domestic stock market to foreign investors 
in the following year.30 Despite the continuation of numerous restrictions, 
substantial capital inflows helped keep Korea’s overall balance of payments 
(BOP) in surplus during the early 1990s, even though the current account 
remained continuously in deficit because of strong domestic demand. How-
ever, the Asian currency crisis in 1997 led to huge flows of capital out of the 
country. The current account was improved by the substantial depreciation 
of the won in 1997 and early 1998, and it remained in surplus until into 2007 
when the run-up in prices of oil and raw materials caused it to turn negative 
again. The capital, or financial, account turned to surplus as well. As a result 
of these combined current and capital account surpluses, Korea accumulated 
international reserves rapidly until the recent crisis.
Governments and central banks have understandable concerns that substan-
tial international capital mobility and large swings in the BOP may harm a 
country’s ability to follow sound domestic monetary policy. Indeed, this ap-
pears to have been a major factor underlying the slowness with which Korea 
liberalized its capital account before the crisis (Noland 2005). This chapter 
investigates whether the substantial increase of capital account liberalization 
30.  The ceiling of overall foreign investment in any listed company was initially set at 10 
percent and then gradually raised, with by far the largest increase being implemented after the 
outbreak of the currency crisis in November 1997 (S. Kim and W. Kim 1999).
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that followed the crisis has undermined the BOK’s ability to carry out domes-
tic monetary policy.
Monetary Policy and the Balance of Payments in Korea
Korea’s postcrisis policy of intervening in the foreign exchange market to 
strongly lean against the wind, which was documented in Chapter 2, resulted 
in large changes in international reserves. To keep these changes in reserves 
from generating corresponding changes in the money supply, it was neces-
sary for the central bank to actively counter the automatic effects of these 
reserve changes on the monetary base. International reserves are an important 
component of the monetary base, and reserve increases expand the foreign 
component of the base. If reserve requirements and the money multiplier are 
constant, then it is necessary to take actions to reduce the domestic compo-
nent of the monetary base in order to keep money growth from accelerating.
Changes in the foreign and domestic components of the base are plotted in 
Figure 6-1. This is called sterilization. Of course, changes in volatility can be 
quite important in today’s world of liberalized financial markets; thus, chang-
es in the money supply are not necessarily a good indicator of the stance 
of monetary policy. Still, few economists believe that the money supply is 
totally inconsequential, and prolonged substantial increases in the monetary 
base would be likely to lead to excessive credit growth. Thus, many central 
banks routinely take actions to neutralize the effects of overall payments im-
balances, for example, changes in international reserves, on high-powered 
money.
A standard proposition in monetary analysis is that the higher the internation-
al capital mobility, the more difficult it is to carry out such sterilization effec-
tively. Indeed, in the limit of perfect international capital mobility, effective 
sterilization is impossible. It is clear that there has been a substantial increase 
in international capital mobility facing most emerging-market countries, in-
cluding Korea. Such capital mobility is still far less than perfect. Whether 
capital mobility is high enough to seriously undermine the ability of central 
banks to sterilize reserve changes and hence give them the ability to differ-
entiate monetary from exchange rate policy in the short run is an important 
issue on which leading economists have offered widely differing views. It is 
essentially an empirical issue. Our econometric estimates find that, despite 
the large scale of reserve flows and payments imbalances since the 1997–98 
crisis, the BOK has retained the ability to effectively sterilize these reserve 
flows and has actively pursued this practice.
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Figure 6-1: Monthly Annual Change in Net Foreign Assets, Net Domestic 
Assets, and Monetary Base in Korea, January 1985–October 2008
Source: CEIC data set.
Notes: MB = monetary base; NDA = net domestic assets; NFA = net foreign assets.
Monetary Sterilization Policies in Korea
Like central banks in most Asian countries, the BOK now takes price stabil-
ity as the most important objective of its monetary policy, and the BOK has 
full discretionary power in terms of deciding the sterilization policies and 
choosing monetary instruments. As is shown in Figure 6-2, it has been rather 
successful in this task, although as with many other Asian countries shortly 
before the current crisis stronger inflationary pressures were beginning to 
emerge again. A variety of monetary target policies have been set since the 
creation of the Financial Stabilization Program in 1957 (see Table 6-1). The 
earliest targets were M1, reserve money, and domestic credit. Over time the 
emphasis shifted toward broader monetary aggregates M2, MCT,31 and M3, 
and more recently Korea joined the widespread movement to inflation target-
ing with increased emphasis on interest rate adjustments as an operational 
policy instrument.
Although the BOK has not consistently hit its inflation target of 3 percent 
±0.5 percent, it has generally succeeded in keeping inflation fairly low. In 
2007, however, Korea joined the trend of accelerating inflation that had de-
veloped in a number of Asian economies and that some economists have 
argued reflected as much excessive liquidity generated globally as it did a 
31.  MCT includes M2, certificates of deposit, and money in trust.
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country’s own monetary policy. The importance of this global financial ease 
is a topic that is unlikely to be resolved soon. Our reading of the evidence 
suggests to us that many countries still have sufficient monetary autonomy 
to counter such global trends but that the existence of global monetary ease 
makes it less likely that sufficiently cautious national policies will be adopt-
ed. This is our interpretation of the major way in which the global monetary 
and credit ease and savings glut contributed to excessive credit growth in the 
United States. In this chapter we investigate some of the major channels of 
international influence on Korea’s monetary policies.
Figure 6-2: Inflation in Korea, January 1985–March 2009
Source: CEIC data set.
Notes: CPI = consumer price index; PPI = producer price index.
To keep inflation low, reserve requirements and lending policy have been 
used frequently to adjust the domestic liquidity since foreign reserves began 
to be accumulated in the mid-1980s. But, with the development of the domes-
tic bond market, open market operations (OMOs) have played a more impor-
tant role as a monetary instrument since the early 1990s.32 The BOK often 
changed reserve requirement policies during the 1970s and 1980s (Figure 
6-3). To ease the burden on banks’ earnings, the reserve requirement ratios 
have been lowered on several occasions since the beginning of 1980s, but 
they were then increased twice in November 1987 and December 1988 owing 
to the growing monetary expansion. Although a unified reserve requirement 
32.  However, the relationship between the BOK and commercial banks tends to be one-sided 
rather than coordinative because the BOK forcefully allocated the amount of bond purchases 
across financial institutions.
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ratio was applied to all deposits in July 1981, marginal reserve requirements 
were again put in place in 1989 to help control the money supply.
Table 6-1: Monetary Policy Targets in Korea, 1979–2009
Source: Annual Monetary Policy Report (Seoul: Bank of Korea).
Note: Figures in parentheses are revised target figures.
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In the 1990s, the implementation of interest rate deregulation gave financial 
institutions a much greater degree of autonomy managing their funds.33 The 
reserve requirement ratios were reduced in 1996 and 1997 and have been 
kept at an average of 3 percent in order to increase the banks’ competitiveness 
while open market operations have become the main instrument of monetary 
management. The surge in capital inflow and the high growth of money sup-
ply in 2006 caused the BOK to raise the reserve requirement, to 7 percent, for 
the first time since 1990.
To deal with the growing monetary expansion, the BOK in 1972 began to 
issue monetary stabilization bonds (MSBs) on the open market. In 1977 it 
allowed nonbank financial institutions to bid on the MSBs, and starting at the 
beginning of the 1980s it also opened MSB transactions to private investors. 
Figure 6-4 shows that the BOK issued a large amount of MSBs to steril-
ize the domestic liquidity on account of the growing pressure for monetary 
expansion coming through the foreign sector in the late 1980s. But the con-
sequence was that the government had to issue other kinds of medium- and 
long-term foreign exchange stabilization bonds (FSBs) to ease the burden 
of the redemption payments that resulted from the expansion of MSBs (see 
Figure 6-5).
Figure 6-3: Changes in Reserve Requirement Ratios in Korea 
1979–2008, percentage
Source: CEIC data set.
The MSB issuance and outstanding levels had a significant fall during 2007 
and 2008 because of the depreciation during this period. But, around the time 
33.  For more detailed discussion of the development of Korea’s money market, see Dwor-
Frécaut (2008).
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when the exchange rate began to appreciate again in 2009, the BOK started 
to increase the issuance of the MSBs as well. The level of outstanding MSBs 
built up quickly, and reached 156.8 trillion won by May 2009.
The BOK also used OMOs to provide funds to the institutions that were short 
of liquidity. The BOK, for example, provided a total of 1.5 trillion won of 
liquidity to the banks during the period from June to September in 2000, 
enabling them to provide financial support to the Korea Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. In the same year, the BOK also provided the same amount 
through repurchase agreements to the Kookmin Bank and the Housing and 
Commercial Bank of Korea, which faced a temporary outflow of deposits 
caused by strikes at the end of the previous year. In 2004, when a strike broke 
out at KorAm Bank, the BOK immediately formed a special task force to 
monitor the impact on the financial markets and conducted its daily OMOs 
to facilitate the stricken bank’s trouble-free borrowing of call funds so as to 
guard against possible liquidity problems owing to large-scale withdrawals 
of deposits.
By the late 1980s, OMOs had become the most important instrument that the 
BOK used to manage the money supply. With the development of domes-
tic bond markets, MSBs of different maturities (28, 91, 371, 392, and 546 
days) were introduced. In addition to government bonds and government-
guaranteed bonds, the BOK in 1998 added repurchased MSBs and land de-
velopment bonds, issued in connection with the redemption of corporate debt 
to financial companies, to the list of eligible OMO securities. The level of 
outstanding MSBs built up quickly and reached 127.8 trillion won as of the 
end of October 2008. The accumulating issuance of MSBs brought upward 
pressure on market interest rates. To reduce the issuance of MSBs, the BOK 
introduced currency swap transactions with the National Pension Fund, ab-
sorbing Korean won in exchange for foreign reserves to be repurchased at 
maturity in May 2005.
In addition to reserve requirements and OMOs, lending policy has been used 
often by the BOK as a monetary instrument since the 1950s. It has been 
used more as a means of policy financing than as a tool for liquidity adjust-
ment during the period of rapid economic growth. During the 1980s, lending 
policies mainly focused on financial support for export industries and small- 
and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). When the second oil shock occurred 
in the mid-1980s, the BOK created industrial restructuring funds to a total 
amount of 1,722.1 billion won to support the institutions that suffered from 
the shock.
In the 1990s, a total of 2.9 trillion won, in the form of funds for the manage-
rial stabilization of investment trust companies, was injected into three in-
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Figure 6-4: Issuance of Monetary Stabilization Bonds and Total 
Outstanding Monetry Stabilization Bonds in Korea 
January 1985–January 2009
Source: CEIC data set.
Note: MSB = monetary stabilization bond.
Figure 6-5: Issuance of Foreign Exchange Stabilization Bonds and Total 
Outstanding in Korea, January 1985–December 2008
Source: CEIC data set.
Note: FSB = foreign exchange stabilization bond.
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vestment trust companies, Hanguk, Daehan, and Kookmin, which were expe-
riencing difficulties because of increased beneficiary certificate redemptions 
and weakening earnings. The BOK even issued a large amount of MSBs and 
FSBs to sterilize the increasing monetary expansion that resulted from these 
loans. Because of growing criticism of the BOK for placing too much em-
phasis on policy financing, an aggregate credit ceiling system was introduced 
in March of 1994 to strengthen its function of management of the money 
supply. Since then, this system has been used to provide financial support for 
SMEs or some specified industries. Finally, several special loans were also 
introduced and extended by the BOK during the Asian currency crisis as part 
of the BOK’s role as lender of last resort.
In addition to the aggregate credit ceiling system, a liquidity adjustment loan 
system and an intraday overdraft system were introduced in 2000 to finance 
applicant banks that faced temporary shortages of liquidity. To strengthen the 
financial support for regionally based SMEs in the last two years, the quota 
under the aggregate credit ceiling system allocated to the Bank’s regional 
branches for the support of local SMEs was increased by 400 billion won. In 
addition, another 400 billion won was raised on the ceiling for trade finance 
to counter the SMEs’ weakening profitability owing to the increasing interna-
tional raw materials prices. Furthermore, a system of currency swaps linked 
to foreign currency loans was launched in July 2005 to make use of part of 
the foreign reserve as a resource for banks’ facilities investment lending.
As the effectiveness of monetary aggregates as an intermediate target contin-
ued to weaken, the operating target for monetary policy was switched from 
reserves to the overnight call rate target after the 1997 currency crisis. The 
BOK used interest rates as its official operating target for the first time in 
September 1998 after the foreign exchange market recovered from the cur-
rency crisis: it reduced the interest rate for OMOs from 8.1 percent to 7 per-
cent in order to initiate a more expansionary monetary policy. Because the 
overnight call rate moves closely with the rate applied in OMOs, this policy 
change consolidated the overnight call rate as the operating target of mon-
etary policy. Subsequent changes in target interest rates are reported in Table 
6-2. Because of considerable slippage in the effects of changes in the call 
rate on longer-term interest rates, the BOK grew concerned about the limited 
effectiveness of the overnight call rate on credit growth and hence has been 
reluctant to give up entirely the use of changes in reserve requirements. In 
2008 the Bank shifted its target interest rate to the seven-day repurchase rate 
in part to help stimulate further development of the money market.
As we see in Table 6-2, these interest rate changes were generally reductions 
from 2000 until 2005. Then, as inflationary concerns began to mount, all of 
the interest rate adjustments were upward until October 2008 when Korea 
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began to be hit hard by the global economic slowdown. Since then, and un-
like in the 1997–98 crisis, the BOK has moved aggressively to lower interest 
rates and stimulate the economy.
Empirics
In Appendix A, we estimate the extent of sterilization and the de facto extent of 
capital mobility in Korea. We estimate what the literature refers to as the “ster-
ilization coefficient,” that is, how much domestic credit changes in response to 
a change in international reserves. Theoretically, higher financial integration 
makes sterilization more difficult. The sale of government securities tends to 
raise interest rates, attracting further capital inflows. If capital mobility is very 
high, the central bank may not be able to neutralize such capital flows. To re-
duce the possibility of serious statistical bias, we follow modern practice and 
make use of an equation system that simultaneously estimates the sterilization 
coefficient and a measure of international capital mobility that the literature 
refers to as the “offset coefficient,” that is, how much BOP changes in response 
to a change in domestic monetary policy. Because the foreign exchange mar-
ket and the domestic monetary market are tightly interrelated, ignoring such 
interrelationships can lead to highly biased results. The theoretical absolute 
values of both the sterilization and offset coefficients run from zero to one. 
For the sterilization coefficient, zero implies no sterilization, and one implies 
full sterilization. Similarly, an offset coefficient of zero implies no interna-
tional capital mobility, while a value of one implies perfect capital mobility.
It is important to emphasize that looking directly at the amount of steril-
ization notes issued by the central bank does not give us direct information 
on the question we are investigating: To what extent do international capital 
flows undermine the ability of the central bank to conduct domestic monetary 
policy? Where the issuance of sterilization notes is the only method of ster-
ilization used, what their volume can tell us is how much international flows 
contributed to the growth of the money supply. But the relevant policy issue 
is to what extent international flows caused the money supply to grow more 
or less rapidly than was deserved by the central bank. To answer this question 
requires estimates of appropriate domestic money growth, which is what is in 
effect done by the simultaneous equations estimation presented in Appendix A.
We estimate separate regressions for before and after the 1997–98 crisis. 
Starting in 1985 we find a precrisis offset coefficient of approximately 0.5, in-
dicating considerable but far from complete capital mobility and substantial 
but less than complete sterilization on the order of 0.65. These are substan-
tially higher than the estimates of Fry (1996) for the earlier period of 1960 to 
1991 of about 0.25 for each, suggesting a substantial increase in both capital 
mobility and sterilization in the latter part of the precrisis period. 
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Table 6-2: Changes in the Bank of Korea Standard Target Interest Rate 
May 1999–February 2009 
Source: Bank of Korea; table modified by the author.
Note: Until February 2008 table shows overnight call rate target; beginning in March 2008 table 
shows Bank of Korea base rate target.
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Using a slightly earlier period than ours, 1980–1994, G. Kim (1995) finds a 
little lower offset coefficient and a modestly higher sterilization coefficient. 
Several other studies discussed in the appendix find broadly similar results 
for the precrisis period. For the postcrisis period we find a fairly substan-
tial increase in the offset coefficients to almost 0.7, suggesting that further 
capital account liberalization has more than offset the effects of increased 
exchange rate uncertainty.34 Our estimates of the sterilization coefficient rose 
even more, implying full sterilization in the postcrisis period.
Note that, although these estimates imply that international flows in the lib-
eralized postcrisis period have not undercut the BOK’s ability to conduct 
monetary policy, the estimates do not imply that the Bank pays no attention 
to international developments in setting monetary policy.
In a 2004 study, Barry Eichengreen (2004) estimates a policy reaction func-
tion for Korea’s overnight call rate from 1998 (when inflation targeting was 
initiated) through mid-2003 and finds that the call rate has responded to 
movements in the dollar-won exchange rate as well as to expected inflation 
and the output gap. He also finds a strong tendency to smooth interest rate 
variability. His statistical results suggest that in practice the BOK has paid 
more attention to the dollar-won exchange rate than would be suggested by 
its written reports and more than would be implied by the exchange rate ef-
fects on expected inflation alone. In a more recent study covering the period 
beginning in January 1999, Parsley and Popper (2009) use more advanced 
statistical techniques and also find that the exchange rate plays an important 
role in the setting of Korean monetary policy, but that it does not appear to 
have an independent influence over and above its effects on inflation; that is, 
they find no evidence that concerns with the behavior of the exchange rate 
have interfered with the BOK’s pursuit of inflation targeting.35
This result, combined with our findings of substantial official intervention in 
the foreign exchange market and heavy sterilization of this intervention, sug-
gests that the BOK has had independent concerns about the behavior of the 
exchange rate over and above its effect on inflation but that its strategy has 
34.  Further evidence of the less-than-complete capital mobility facing Korea are continuing 
deviations from covered interest rate parity that have been instrumental in stimulating the yen 
carry trade and estimates of the intermediate degree of interest rate interdependence between 
Korean interest rates and those in the United States and in other Asian countries (Keil, Rajan, 
and Willett 2009).
35.  With simple estimation techniques, Parsley and Popper (2009) find substantially the same 
result as Eichengreen. Using a broader range of data than Eichengreen (2004), they are able to 
better specify the relevant relationships and offer convincing evidence that in setting interest 
rates little if any weight has been given to the won-dollar exchange rate by the BOK beyond its 
expected effect on inflation.
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been to deal with those concerns through sterilized intervention rather than 
adjustments in domestic monetary policy.
As we argued in Chapter 2, given the substantial degree of openness of the 
Korean economy, it is quite appropriate that the BOK pay attention to ex-
change rate and other international developments in setting monetary policy. 
We concur, however, with the recommendation in Eichengreen (2004) that 
the BOK offer more clarity about the role the exchange rate plays in the for-
mulation of monetary policy.
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7
Creating a Common Asian Currency Is the 
Wrong Approach to Asian Monetary and 
Exchange Rate Cooperation
This chapter is coauthored by Orawan Permpoon.
Since the Asian currency and financial crises of 1997–98, Asian countries 
have begun to pay much greater attention to issues of regional monetary and 
financial cooperation. While earlier progress toward greater economic inte-
gration is usually described as having been primarily market led, the high 
costs of the crises and perceived failures of the help from the IMF and major 
industrial countries have led to a major increase in government-led coop-
eration in the monetary and financial areas. Regional initiatives such as the 
Asian bond funds and the Chiang Mai agreements on crisis financing have 
been accompanied by a substantial increase in the frequency and scope of 
regional meetings of central bankers and finance ministry officials.
Such progress is extremely encouraging. Less promising is the amount of 
attention being paid by a number of academics and some officials to calls for 
a common Asian currency as a solution to regional monetary, financial, and 
exchange rate issues. There would be many advantages to such a common 
Asian currency, and support for this approach can appear to put one on the 
side of the angels as a supporter of the strongest form of regional monetary 
cooperation. While calls for Asian monetary union can seem quite farsighted 
and statesmanlike, the true statesman seeks to lead toward the best feasi-
ble outcomes and does not forget to look at the costs as well as the benefits 
of alternative strategies. This is where proposals for creation of a common 
Asian currency meet their doom; although the economic benefits could be 
substantial, the costs would be likely to be greater still because such a venture 
would involve giving up a country’s ability to use national monetary policies 
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to offset major shocks to the economy. A common currency would imply a 
single monetary policy for all members. This would be little sacrifice if all the 
economies were similar and faced the same shocks, but this is far from being 
the case. It is essential not to confuse increases in economic integration and 
a high degree of similarity of shocks (which have been occurring) with the 
conclusion that a single monetary policy would be efficient for all of Asia.
Even if this were desirable on economic grounds, there are strong political 
obstacles to reaching agreement on a common currency in the medium-term 
future. Nothing is wrong with planning now for the longer-run future, but 
only if this does not deflect attention excessively from shorter-run opportuni-
ties to make real progress. If history is any guide, improving Asian monetary, 
financial, and exchange rate cooperation will be quite a long-term project that 
must overcome many obstacles. Thus, one can understand the attractions of 
theories that argue that this long, difficult path can be avoided by jumping 
immediately to monetary union. As we shall discuss, however, there is little 
empirical evidence to support such theories and a good deal that calls them 
into question.
It is now generally recognized by economists and most knowledgeable mon-
etary officials that there is no one ideal exchange rate regime for all countries 
at all times. Most early debates about fixed versus flexible exchange rates 
took place in the abstract. Today most analysis is more nuanced. There are 
both costs and benefits to all exchange rate regimes. The ratio of the costs to 
benefits may vary systematically across countries on the basis of their charac-
teristics. The major factors influencing these costs and benefits are delineated 
in the literature on the theory of optimum currency areas.
Although this may sound like just esoteric academic theorizing, it is in fact of 
quite practical importance. Just as with monetary policy and macroeconom-
ics more generally, not all economists agree on particular policy prescrip-
tions or even on the relative importance of different factors, but this approach 
gives us a valuable framework within which issues can be investigated. It 
illustrates, for example, that it can make perfect sense for a huge economy 
like that of the United States to adopt a flexible rate while a small, open 
economy like Estonia’s or Hong Kong’s may be much better off adopting a 
fixed exchange rate. As will be discussed later in the chapter, it is not always 
understood that monetary integration in the form of a common currency is 
fundamentally different from trade and financial integration. For the latter, 
while some individuals and groups may lose, there is a strong presumption 
that all countries that reduce artificial barriers to trade and financial flows will 
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gain in aggregate.36 Monetary integration, in contrast, is not about removing 
restrictions on trade but about determining the rules for monetary policy, and 
here there is no presumption from economic theory or empirical evidence 
that all countries will gain in aggregate.
Most research studies on issues of establishing fixed exchange rates and com-
mon currencies now draw on the optimum currency area (OCA) approach. 
Unfortunately, however, a number of these studies have placed questionable 
interpretations on their results, and, as a result, there has been a tendency for 
many of these studies to give overly optimistic pictures of how well various 
groupings of Asian countries meet the OCA criteria for making a common 
currency economically desirable.
This chapter begins with a brief exposition of the basic ideas of the OCA 
approach and then discusses problems with the technical studies that have 
purported to find evidence supporting the formation of a common currency 
in Asia. Although some of these studies are technically quite sophisticated, 
the basic problems with their interpretations can be explained in simple ways. 
Probably the most important of these is that most of the studies have focused 
on a quite limited range of criteria selected primarily for the ease of getting 
data and applying popular econometric techniques rather than their economic 
importance. In some cases there are serious questions about the stability of 
the resulting estimates. This problem is illustrated with respect to a new set of 
calculations on several of these criteria. It is argued that a broader overview 
of relevant criteria suggests that in general the economic case for a broad-
based common currency area in Asia is quite weak and that this is particularly 
true for Korea. Some Asian economies would likely gain from a common 
Asian currency, but Korea is not one of them.
Chapter 8 turns to analysis of the political conditions necessary for a success-
ful monetary union. Particular emphasis is placed on the European experi-
ence. Some have looked at the historical time line of regional economic inte-
gration in Europe and concluded that high levels of economic integration will 
also almost inevitably lead to monetary integration. The fact that economic 
integration in Asia has been growing rapidly has led some to believe that 
monetary integration should soon follow. It will be argued that such views 
are based on a serious misunderstanding of the history of European integra-
tion. The process was driven not primarily by economic objectives but by the 
use of economic means to promote geopolitical objectives. The geopolitical 
situation is quite different and at least for the near future is more likely to 
36.  As was discussed in Chapter 5, this presumption in favor of removal of restrictions on 
international capital flows is based on the assumption of adequate micro and macro prudential 
supervision. Where this is absent, there can be a strong second-best argument for some restric-
tions on capital flows.
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hinder than to promote monetary integration even if it were economically 
desirable.
The negative conclusions drawn on both the economic desirability and po-
litical feasibility of an Asian monetary union in the mid-term future do not 
imply, however, that there may not be substantial gains from other types of 
efforts to promote greater Asian monetary and financial cooperation. Chapter 
5 reviewed a number of aspects of such cooperation and recommended a 
positive program for increased short- and medium-term cooperation, includ-
ing the development of a stronger institutional framework. It is argued that it 
is in this area rather than in the more headline-catching proposals for a com-
mon Asian currency that the strongest prospect for mutual gain lies. And in 
this area the experience of European integration offers a number of important 
lessons, some positive and some negative.
OCA Approach
Some of the literature on OCA theory has become quite technical, and the 
number of criteria that can be relevant is now well into double figures. Some 
of the most important ideas can be explained quite simply, however.37 When 
economic or financial developments generate a conflict between internal 
and external balance, the basic issue becomes how to adjust with the lowest 
costs.38 With exchange rate adjustments, the major part of the adjustment falls 
on the external sector. With a fixed exchange rate, domestic macroeconomic 
policy adjustments are required, and these usually fall most heavily on the 
domestic sectors. Which approach to adjustment is better will then depend 
on the comparative effectiveness and costs of exchange rate versus domestic 
policy adjustments and the relative importance of the domestic and interna-
tional sectors.
All of these considerations suggest that the case for a fixed exchange rate 
or common currency is greater if the international sector is relatively more 
important than the domestic sector of a country’s economy. The importance 
of the external sector is greater depending on how much larger it is than the 
domestic sector. Thus, if adjustment costs in both sectors are equal, more of 
the adjustment should be done by the smaller sector to minimize the total 
costs of adjustment.
Furthermore, the relative sizes of the external and domestic sectors influence 
the relative effectiveness of exchange rate and macro policy adjustments in 
a manner that further increases the case for small, open economies to have 
37.  For overviews of the OCA literature see De Grauwe (2003) and Willett (2003b).
38.  In standard economics jargon, external balance refers to balance of payments equilibrium 
and internal balance refers to macroeconomic stability.
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fixed rates and large, relatively closed economies to have flexible rates. 
Where wages and prices are sufficiently sticky so that there are important 
Keynesian aspects to the macro economy in the short run, then large econo-
mies would have to generate bigger recessions for a given amount of trade 
balance correction than would small economies. This is because the smaller 
economies would have higher marginal propensities to import. A reduction 
in the rate of growth of real income for smaller economies would generate 
larger reductions in imports. For a large economy, however, the marginal pro-
pensity to import would be low, so greater lost income would be required to 
reduce imports by a given amount than would be necessary for a small, open 
economy. Thus, domestic income adjustments are a less costly mechanism 
for small economies.
For small economies, however, exchange rate adjustments are likely to be 
less effective. The more important that international trade is for the economy, 
the greater the feedback effect that a depreciation will have on domestic pric-
es. And the greater this feedback effect, the larger the change in the nominal 
exchange rate that would be required to bring about a given change in the real 
exchange rate; that is, the more the effects of a given depreciation would be 
offset by an increase in domestic prices. In the extreme of a tiny, highly open 
economy, exchange rate adjustments should almost completely lose their abil-
ity to affect the relative prices of traded versus nontraded goods and hence to 
promote adjustment through expenditure switching rather than expenditure 
reductions. And the recessions caused by large expenditure reductions are 
far more costly than the adjustments needed for switching consumption and 
production patterns to stimulate more exports and fewer imports.
Another key factor is the flexibility of the domestic economy. If adjustments 
were costless, there would be a strong presumption in favor of a common 
currency because this would be more conducive to international trade and 
investment and the efficient allocation of resources. Thus, in the 19th century 
when wages and prices were much more flexible, the widespread system of 
fixed exchange rates based on the gold standard worked rather well during 
the periods in which that system was in use. The monetary contractions re-
quired of countries in BOP deficit would result primarily in falling nominal 
wages and prices rather than rising unemployment. Substantial labor mobility 
similarly lowers the cost of the domestic adjustments that may be required 
to maintain fixed exchange rates. Thus, wage and price flexibility and factor 
mobility are also important OCA criteria.
A third important type of criteria concerns the nature of shocks to the econ-
omy. Recall that this discussion began with analysis of a case whether the 
internal and external balance requirements in the economy conflicted with 
each other. This need not always be the case, however. Depending on the na-
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ture of the shocks hitting an economy, the conditions for internal and external 
balance may coincide or conflict. In general, fixed exchange rates are more 
desirable when these requirements coincide, and exchange rate adjustments 
are more desirable when they conflict. The time dimension of shocks can also 
be relevant. As was discussed in Chapter 6, if a disturbance is temporary, a 
conflict between internal and external balance can be financed rather than re-
quiring adjustment. In general fixed exchange rates will work better if shocks 
are temporary instead of permanent. This is not always the case, however: 
depending on the degree of capital mobility and the nature of the shock, flex-
ible rates will sometimes be superior to fixed rates as an automatic stabilizer 
in the face of domestic shocks and as a mechanism of insulation against for-
eign shocks. The analysis of the various possibilities has been the subject of 
countless research papers.
When the formation of a common currency area is being considered, it is 
important to recognize that this type of analysis is of secondary importance. 
Such considerations are primarily relevant for the conduct of discretionary 
policy, where a government may decide to intervene to limit exchange rate 
fluctuations in the face of particular types of shocks. With a managed float, 
officials have the discretion to let some types of shocks affect mainly the ex-
change rate while another type might be largely buffered by the purchase or 
sale of international reserves. With a common currency, individual members 
lose their ability to conduct discretionary monetary and exchange rate policy. 
Indeed, this is the major cost of adopting genuinely fixed exchange rates.
OCA analysis has traditionally been framed in terms of fixed versus flexible 
exchange rates, but this can be misleading. The key issue to which most of the 
OCA literature is actually relevant is whether or not to allow exchange rate 
adjustments, that is, whether or not to adopt a genuinely fixed rate regime. 
There is a wide range of options for how exchange rate adjustments might 
be made if a hard fix is not adopted. Thus, fear of floating need not imply a 
preference for fixed exchange rates (Willett 2003a). There may be many good 
reasons why a country does not want to adopt a freely floating exchange rate 
that do not present a case for adopting a hard fix.
Some of the key considerations for the choice among regimes that allow for 
exchange rate adjustment were discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The key point 
here is that the adoption of a common currency or other forms of a hard fix 
implies that discretionary monetary and exchange rate policy can be under-
taken only collectively. In this context an important consideration is the ex-
tent to which optimal discretionary policy for a country considering joining 
a common currency area is likely to differ from that of the other members; 
or, phrased in more practical policy terms: How great are the likely costs of 
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giving up the independence of individual discretionary policy to follow the 
common policies of the group?
Clearly such a commitment is worth contemplating only if the group policies 
are expected to be sensible. A point that has been insufficiently emphasized 
in the OCA literature is that the standard OCA criteria assume that a country 
has the option of fixing to a stable country with which it has a high propor-
tion of its international trade. A country may meet the small, open economy 
criteria but still have much of its trade with an unstable partner. This situation 
faced the Baltic states right after the breakup of the Soviet Union. There was 
initially talk of forming a Baltic currency union because Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania were all small, open economies. They had relatively little trade 
with one another, however. Under the Soviet Union’s hub-and-spoke regime, 
most of the trade of each one had been with Russia, but, besides the political 
objections to fixing to the ruble, Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union 
was undergoing hyperinflation. Thus, there were initially no ideal candidates 
for the Baltic states to fix their currencies to. Over time this problem has 
been resolved with changing trade patterns and the creation of the euro. This 
example vividly illustrates the need to undertake OCA analysis in a multi-
country context.
European monetary integration after 1973 evolved with the large size and 
stability of the German economy providing a centerpiece. Initially several 
smaller countries began to fix their exchange rates to the deutsche mark. Al-
though these were technically adjustable pegs, they soon evolved into hard 
fixes. Asia does not have an equally strong candidate to play a similar role. 
Japan has come the closest, and numerous proposals have been put forward 
for a yen zone in Asia, but the geopolitical resentments in Asia toward Japan 
stemming from World War II (and before) have lingered much more strongly 
than did those in Europe toward Germany. The rapid rise of China further 
complicates the situation from this standpoint.
China has been rapidly overtaking Japan as the most important trading part-
ner for many Asian economies. The underdevelopment of China’s financial 
sector and its continued use of an array of capital controls make it unattract-
ive as a monetary center for the region. Thus, it appears unlikely that there 
would be a natural path toward a dominant national currency in Asia to which 
a common Asian currency would be a successor as the euro was viewed as the 
successor to the deutsche mark.
Because one of the greatest costs of joining a currency area is giving up 
independent monetary policy, a major focus of the empirical OCA literature 
has been on different desirable discretionary monetary policies for different 
countries. If countries face fairly similar shocks, then there should be fairly 
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similar desired responses of monetary policy, making the cost of giving up in-
dependent policy lower.39 But, where economies face quite different shocks, 
they would typically want to follow different monetary policies, and hence 
the costs of being in a monetary union would rise.
Similar considerations apply to exchange rate policy with respect to shocks to 
the equilibrium real exchange rate. For example, if the exports of most of the 
members of a currency union are booming while those of a particular country 
are slumping, the appreciation of the common currency would worsen that 
individual country’s export slump. With its own currency, however, deprecia-
tion would likely take place, which would help to dampen the slump. While 
Korea’s initial depreciation during the current crisis went further then was 
desirable, this did help protect the real economy.
Recent Empirical Studies
Because of such considerations, a number of empirical studies have inves-
tigated the behavior of countries’ real exchange rates, estimated patterns of 
demand and supply shocks, and looked at the degree of synchronization of 
countries’ business cycles to see whether they would be good partners for a 
currency union. Indeed, this type of analysis has become the most common 
form of recent empirical analyses of OCA issues.
To illustrate this approach and some of the difficulties in its application, we 
will focus in this section on measures of business cycle synchronization. The 
less divergent the business cycle conditions among a set of countries, the 
fewer the expected conflicts about the course of joint monetary policy.
Based on this type of analysis, a number of studies have reached optimistic 
conclusions about the feasibility of a common Asian currency. Studies have 
suggested that the degree of synchronization of business cycles in Asia has 
increased substantially in recent years and that, as a survey paper (Watanabe 
and Ogura 2006) puts it, “subsets of Asian currencies meet the optimal cur-
rency area criteria to the same degree as European countries did in their pre-
euro phase.”
This is a fair summary of the conclusions drawn by the authors of a number 
of studies, but these conclusions are themselves open to considerable ques-
tion. In the first place, it should be emphasized that these findings apply only 
to a small set of the OCA criteria, typically patterns of shocks or degree of 
business cycle synchronization. Although no general consensus exists about 
39.  Even with the same shock, differences in economic and institutional structures could gen-
erate some differences in optimal policy responses, as could different preferences.
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the exact relative importance of the various OCA criteria, it should be clear 
that, for a fixed exchange rate regime to work well, the member countries 
need to meet more than just one or two of the criteria. This point was viv-
idly albeit tragically illustrated by the experience of Argentina with its fixed 
exchange rate currency board. Argentina did meet some of the criteria of the 
OCA theory, such as having a high degree of currency substitution, but it was 
a rather closed and rigid economy, and trade with the United States, to which 
Argentina had fixed its exchange rate, represented only about 1 percent of 
Argentina’s economy. Thus, it is not surprising that various shocks led to 
a severe recession in Argentina and the ultimate abandonment of its fixed 
exchange rate regime.40
Not all experiences with fixed exchange rates are so devastating, and, as the 
European experience with the euro shows, a country need not meet com-
pletely all of the OCA criteria to have a reasonably satisfactory experience. 
As we will discuss below, joining a fixed rate regime may set in motion de-
velopments that make economies closer to being OCAs. Thus, recent devel-
opments in what is called endogenous OCA theory suggest that the ex ante 
requirements for successful currency areas are less stringent than had been 
previously thought. Argentina presents a strong counter example, however, to 
the exaggerated claims sometimes made that endogenous OCA theory shows 
that any group of countries can become an OCA ex post.
In evaluating the conclusion that most studies find that a subset of Asian 
countries meet the OCA criteria (as judged by the degree of business cycle 
synchronization compared with pre-euro Europe), it is crucial to recognize 
that different studies find different subgroups meeting the criteria. In part this 
reflects different methodologies and time periods used, but also quite impor-
tant is that we have no good reason to expect that the patterns of synchroni-
zation will remain constant over time, so the use of different time periods 
can sometimes yield quite different results. It is clear that economies that 
are more highly integrated with each other will generally tend to move more 
closely together,41 but the degree of business cycle synchronization is also 
heavily influenced by the patterns of shocks, and these may show consider-
able variability over time. For example, discussing the different groupings 
found by different studies on OCA analysis for Asia, Wyplosz (2001) argues 
“this difference reveals the limited reliance that one can put on historical 
shocks as a guide to the choice of an exchange rate regime.”
40.  On the Argentine case, see the analysis and references in Willett (2002).
41.  The exception is where greater integration generates more specialization. Thus, increases 
in intraindustry trade would cause economies to move more closely together at the macro level 
than would increases in interindustry trade.
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This critique also applies to the conclusion that increasing regional trade in-
tegration in Asia has led to a substantial increase in the degree of macroeco-
nomic synchronization. As Table 7-1 shows, this conclusion certainly applies 
to Korea’s degree of growth rate synchronization when the 1968–91 period is 
compared with the 1992–2005 period. The average one-year correlations of 
Korea with East Asia (China, Hong Kong, and Japan) increase from 0.228 to 
0.488 while the correlations with Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Phil-
ippines, Singapore, and Thailand) increase from –0.062 to 0.652.
Table 7-2 shows the increase in Korea’s trade with a number of its Asian 
partners. Some increase in business cycle synchronization was to be expect-
ed, but not by as much as these numbers suggest. Also interesting to note is 
that in the most recent period the correlations are lower with East Asia, with 
which Korea trades the most, than with the Southeast Asian countries, with 
which Korea’s trade is less.
Table 7-1: Unweighted Average Correlations of Real Output Growth 
Rates for Korea, Southeast Asian Countries, and East Asian Countries 
over Different Time Horizons and Different Periods
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; author’s calculations.
An alternative hypothesis is that much of the recent increase in correlations 
was due to the common shock of the Asian crisis. To the extent that this 
was the cause, the increased correlations would not be evidence of increased 
suitability for a common currency. This is easily checked by excluding the 
crisis years of 1997 and 1998 from the calculations. This is done in Part C 
of Table 7-1. Now we still find increased correlations, from -0.062 to 0.370 
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with Southeast Asia, and an actual decline in the correlations with East Asia 
from 0.228 to 0.17.
Table 7-2: Comparison of Trade Statistics of Korea with Selected 
Trading Partners, 1991 and 2005, percentage
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; International Monetary Fund, Direction of 
Trade Statistics; author’s calculations.
Notes: Asia = members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, Japan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore; GDP = gross domestic product.
Similar patterns are found using two- and three-year correlations. While most 
studies have focused on annual growth correlations, for the purpose of com-
paring the need for different monetary policies across countries, these two- or 
three-year growth correlations are likely more relevant. Given the imperfec-
tions of forecasting and the lags with which changes in monetary policy af-
fect the economy, it is likely beyond the technical power of discretionary 
monetary policy to do a great deal to smooth out very short-run fluctuations 
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in the macro economy. For evaluating countercyclical policies, a longer time 
horizon than just one year seems more relevant. In Table 7-1, however, we 
find that the differences between one-, two-, and three-year correlations are 
often small, especially with Southeast Asia. With East Asia, however, there 
is a sharp decline between the two- and three-year correlations that exclude 
the crisis years.
This conclusion of little difference across time horizons does not hold up 
across all time periods. Table 7-1 shows a decline rather than increase in 
the correlations with East Asia and larger differences between the one- and 
three-year correlations. For three of the cases, the longer-term correlations 
are lower, but in the later period the three-year correlations of Korea with the 
Southeast Asian countries are much higher.
This lack of stable results holds up when we look at Korea’s correlations 
with individual countries. Here we will just offer a few illustrations. For an-
nual correlations with China, extending the 1968–91 period to 1996 leads 
to a modest increase in correlations from 0.10 to 0.17, consistent with the 
increasing-integration thesis (Permpoon 2008). We get a roughly similar re-
sult of 0.24 when we use the 1992–2005 period excluding the crisis years, but 
if we take the shorter 1999–2005 period excluding the crisis years we find a 
high 0.51 correlation. For 1999–2005, however, the correlation turns nega-
tive. Correlations with Japan are low for both periods but also change sign. 
We could go on, but we believe these examples should be sufficient to es-
tablish that such correlations need to carry a warning sign: Danger—Highly 
Unstable—Handle with Care.
Broader Perspective
Such synchronization estimates sometimes place Korea in a grouping with 
Southeast Asia as the basis for a sub-Asia currency area (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen 1994; Loayza, Lopez, and Ubide 2001). Even if we believed 
that such correlations were stable, this conclusion should almost certainly be 
overridden by other criteria. As shown in Table 7-2, Korea’s trade with both 
Asia and the world has grown substantially, and it has become a large propor-
tion of Korea’s GDP. Between 1991 and 2005 Korea’s exports as a proportion 
of its GDP grew by more than 50 percent. Within Asia the rankings of Korea’s 
trade with other countries have remained fairly stable, with the exception of 
China, which has taken on a greatly increased importance. Korea’s trade with 
the economic giants of Northeast Asia—China and Japan—is much stronger 
than with the Southeast Asian countries. China and Japan are also of much 
greater geopolitical importance to Korea.
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Some economists have suggested that Asia begin with one or two subregional 
currency areas that might then combine over time. Apart from the economic 
merits and limitations of such an approach, this proposal would face huge 
hurdles from a political standpoint. The formation of several small currency 
areas might make sense with tiny open economies like Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore joining a currency area with a larger neighbor in the historical tradi-
tion of such countries adopting currency boards. This could likely be done 
without invoking seriously disruptive geopolitical pressures.
Singapore, however, has prospered with its managed float; Singapore’s expe-
rience as well as the experiences of New Zealand, Switzerland, and Sweden 
suggest that fairly small economic units can have viable national currencies 
if they are managed well. Hong Kong has likewise done rather well with its 
currency board based on the dollar. It has not been free of crises, but on the 
whole it has produced reasonably good economic results. Both Singapore 
and Hong Kong nicely illustrate the dilemmas that can face a small, open 
economy concerning which currency to fix to. With its diversified trade and 
financial activities, Singapore had good reasons not to fix to its closest neigh-
bor, Malaysia. Fortunately, despite its high level of openness, Singapore has 
been able to manage a flexible regime quite successfully.
With its strong role as a regional financial center, Hong Kong has found it 
makes considerable sense to base its choice of the currency on which to fix 
on financial flows, not trade flows. Thus, Hong Kong’s fix to the dollar was 
the obvious choice in the 1980s. Early in the past century the choice of the 
British pound would have been obvious. Today the situation is much more 
complicated. The declining (albeit still strong) international role of the dollar 
combined with the rapid economic rise of China have led to proposals that 
Hong Kong should adopt China’s renminbi. The underdevelopment of Chi-
na’s financial system creates strong arguments against such a switch. Thus, it 
seems unlikely that in the near future the small economies in Asia will start a 
move toward currency consolidation. Nor, even if this would occur, would it 
be likely to start a process of further consolidation, any more than Ecuador’s 
adoption a few years ago of a currency board based on the dollar or any more 
than Argentina’s earlier currency board started a movement for currency con-
solidation in Latin America.
Such a consolidation dynamic has clearly been at work in Europe, but this is 
because there is already a large euro bloc with which to fix. Despite the high 
level of openness of many Asian economies, the considerable diversification 
of trade and financial relationships makes it extremely unlikely that such a 
dynamic would result from a process of independent national decision mak-
ing. Such a dynamic did play a role in Europe in creating stronger pressures 
for the euro as the increasing number of small countries that adopted hard 
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fixes with the deutsche mark created a growing currency area that in turn in-
creased the attractiveness for others to join (Andrews 2008). Germany has no 
equivalent in Asia. Although at one time it looked like Japan might possibly 
take on that role, the combination of its economic stagnation in the 1990s 
and the rise of China has effectively destroyed any chance of Japan playing 
that role. Even apart from political considerations, the underdevelopment of 
China’s financial system would keep it from being able to play such a role 
for decades at least.
Some have recommended the formation of a Southeast Asian currency area, 
but this would have severe disadvantages from a geopolitical standpoint. 
ASEAN Plus Three (the ASEAN countries augmented with China, Japan, 
and Korea) has become by far the most effective regional grouping in Asia, 
and many of the Northeast Asian countries are becoming increasingly eco-
nomically and financially important for ASEAN. In geopolitical terms, only a 
large currency area including the East Asian countries would make sense.
ASEAN Plus Three is clearly a natural unit to form stronger economic and 
financial ties, and efforts to promote greater regional trade and investment 
integration make great sense as long as they do not come at the expense 
of creating barriers to trade with broader Asia and the rest of the world. In 
popular discussions of regional integration, it is often not recognized that 
the case for trade and investment integration is fundamentally different from 
monetary integration.
Economic analysis convincingly shows that with rare exceptions the reduc-
tion of barriers to trade and direct investment increases the aggregate eco-
nomic productivity of all the countries participating. This, of course, does 
not mean that all parties in every country gain. Some domestic firms and 
workers will lose from the increased competition, but in aggregate greater 
gains than losses will be generated. The fact that there may be a substantial 
number of losers in the short run and some even in the long run helps explain 
the political opposition to trade liberalization and suggests the need for such 
liberalization be combined with other policies such as adjustment assistance 
to reduce the unevenness of the distributional effects. But this does not un-
dercut the presumption that aggregate gains are generated for all participating 
countries.
Monetary integration, that is, monetary union or any other form of a genu-
inely fixed exchange rate, is fundamentally different. Although the effects of 
a common currency in stimulating trade and investment are similar to trade 
liberalization, this is as far as the similarity goes. Unlike trade integration, 
monetary integration also sets the course for national monetary policy, and 
here there is no presumption that there will be aggregate gains. With mon-
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etary union, a country loses control of its national monetary policy. It oper-
ates like the gold standard. If a country runs a payment deficit with the other 
members of the union, then its money supply will automatically contract. 
That will be fine if the domestic economy is overheated but not if it is already 
in recession. In this case the gains from increased trade with the currency 
area members may be swamped by the losses from the increased severity of 
the recession. If Korea had been in an Asian currency area when the current 
crisis hit, then, instead of its currency depreciating, it likely would be running 
a payments deficit with the currency union, its money supply would be forced 
to contract, and recessionary pressures could be much worse. This example 
is given in terms of the standard textbook exposition of the operation of the 
gold standard. Today monetary policies generally focus much more on inter-
est rates than money supplies, but the major conclusion of loss of control over 
national monetary policy still holds.
The balance of gains and losses is determined by the combination of con-
siderations delineated in OCA theory. As noted above, where the domestic 
economy is highly flexible, a payments deficit would result primarily in fall-
ing wages and prices, and the aggregate costs might be slight. To a consider-
able extent, this was true for the countries on the gold standard in the 1800s. 
Modern economics tends to be much less flexible, however, so the costs can 
be considerable. One clear example is the long, painful decade of stagnation 
in Japan after its financial bubble burst.
In new classical macro models, economies are assumed to be quite flexible, 
so the costs of giving up independent monetary policy are low. Indeed, it may 
even be positive if this allows a country to overcome the inflationary biases 
generated by short-run political pressures. This combination of discipline 
and low cost of deflation helps explain why many new classical and global 
monetarist-oriented economists such as Ron McKinnon (2005) and Robert 
Mundell (2003) are strong advocates of broad monetary unions. Their logic 
is impeccable, but their empirical assumptions are highly questionable. One 
of the most crucial questions for Koreans in evaluating whether an Asian cur-
rency union would be in Korea’s interest is whether the flexibility of Korea’s 
economy is closer to that of most advanced industrial nations that display 
considerable wage and price stickiness and limited labor mobility or closer 
to the highly flexible economies of the new classical and global monetarists’ 
macroeconomic models.
Some indirect evidence on the issue is found in the econometric studies that 
estimate speeds of adjustment to economic shocks. Such studies generally 
find the speeds of adjustment for Japan and Korea to be quite low. In a recent 
Claremont dissertation, Peter Han (2009) finds that for Korea only about 25 
percent of the adjustment to a demand shock takes place during the first two 
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years. This is similar to Han’s findings for Japan, but the adjustment is much 
slower than the averages for the rest of Asia and also less than for the average 
of the euro countries. Roughly similar results have been found in studies by 
Baek and Song (2001) and Ahn, Kim, and Chang (2006).
Such stickiness highlights an OCA criterion—differences in economic 
growth rates—for which data are easily available (see Table 7-3) but are not 
usually used in empirical OCA analysis; De Grauwe (2003) is an important 
exception. Synchronization studies focus on fluctuations around trend rates 
of growth, which is appropriate for considering countercyclical monetary 
policy. Substantial differences in trend rates of growth among participants 
can also generate considerable problems for the operation of a currency 
area, however. As is well known from the Balassa-Samuelson analysis of 
the effects on differential productivity growth on purchasing power parity, 
in an integrated area with constant prices of internationally traded goods, the 
higher the rate of productivity growth in a country, the greater the increases 
in the prices of the country’s domestic goods and services and hence the 
country’s overall rate of inflation. Thus, the greater the divergence in growth 
rates among countries in a currency area, the greater will be the divergence 
in national inflation rates. With highly flexible wages and prices such as are 
assumed in the strong form of the new classical macro models, this is not a 
problem because the monetary authority can pursue an appropriate inflation 
target for the group as a whole, with the result that some countries will have 
higher inflation and others may have declining prices.
There is considerable evidence, however, that, contrary to the new classi-
cal assumptions, deflation tends to reduce growth in many real economies 
(Burdekin et al. 2004; Burdekin and Siklos 2004). If costly deflation is to 
be avoided, then greater disparities in growth rates will force higher mon-
etary expansion and inflation for the group. Just as with growth correlations, 
growth trends can change over time, so historical statistics are no sure guide 
to what will happen in the future. Variations in trend rates of growth tend to be 
much less variable than synchronization correlations, however; and it seems 
pretty certain that for the coming decade China will have a much higher trend 
growth rate than Japan, with Korea likely being in between. Thus, it seems 
likely that a currency combining these key countries would face enormous 
pressures coming from differences in growth potential.
From the perspective just presented, the patterns of short-run shocks and de-
gree of business cycle synchronization emphasized in many empirical OCA 
studies are of secondary importance. Considerations of other important crite-
ria paint a much less positive picture for the desirability of adopting a com-
mon Asian currency in the medium-term future. Furthermore, Korea would 
likely be one of the countries for which a common Asian currency would be 
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most costly. There is, however, one powerful type of argument that could re-
verse this conclusion: the possibility of the changes that would be generated 
by joining a currency area to convert members’ economies to close approxi-
mations of OCA conditions.
Endogenous OCA Analysis
The endogenous OCA approach is unquestionably the correct theoretical per-
spective. What is relevant for the successful functioning of a currency area is 
the behavior of economies after they join, not what they were before. So the 
key question becomes how joining a currency area will change the behavior 
of economies. Although there are some conflicting theoretical considerations, 
there is a strong presumption that joining a currency area would induce en-
dogenous responses that would make the member economies more closely 
approximate OCA criteria (De Grauwe and Mongelli 2005; Willett, Perm-
poon, and Wihlborg 2008).
The case is strongest and most straightforward with respect to trade. Joining 
a currency area should expand trade among the members; and because trade 
openness with respect to other members of the group is an important OCA 
criterion this would make the case for a currency union stronger ex post than 
ex ante. Similarly many economists have argued that, because fixed rates 
would increase the cost of domestic rigidities, joining a currency area would 
induce structural reforms that would increase the flexibility of economies.
Such possibilities have led some economists to go so far as to suggest that the 
traditional OCA criteria are irrelevant and that any group of countries can be-
come an OCA ex post.42 Such views are also used to propose a reversal of the 
traditional sequencing of regional integration such as was followed in Europe 
when increased trade integration led to monetary integration. In this view, 
the long, slow journey through increasing trade integration can be skipped. A 
more efficient path, this view argues, is to go directly to monetary integration, 
and this will in turn generate trade integration, increased economic flexibility, 
and closer synchronization of business cycles.
This is certainly an attractive vision. But, for it to be relevant, it is necessary 
not just that developments move in the right direction; they must move suffi-
ciently to approximate the OCA conditions. Unless countries are already quite 
42.  As Watanabe and Ogura (2006, 16) write, “therefore, as this argument goes, there is little 
point in debating whether or not the optimal currency area conditions are satisfied ex ante.” 
Another example is the statement by Masahiro Kawai (2007, 111) that “once a group of coun-
tries permanently fixes its exchange rate, the degree of intra-area economic integration will rise 
and shocks will become more symmetric. One need not worry too much, then, about the OCA 
criteria since these will obtain endogenously. . . . Only political commitment is required.” This 
is much too strong. For a detailed critique, see Willett, Permpoon, and Srisorn (forthcoming).
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close to meeting these conditions, the endogenous responses, while likely to 
be in the right directions, are unlikely to be of sufficient magnitude to make 
a huge difference. It appears, for example, that the adoption of the currency 
board by Argentina did lead to some increase in labor market flexibility, but 
that the changes were clearly not sufficient to avoid a horrible recession.
In the euro area, there has been much talk of the need for structural reform to 
increase the flexibility of economies, and some actions toward this goal have 
taken place, but overall the degree of progress has been quite disappointing 
to most supporters of the euro.43 What was overlooked in the economic ef-
ficiency models that predicted large increases in flexibility were the political 
economy obstacles to change. Many if not most rigidities in economies are 
there because some group is gaining from them. Concern about aggregate 
efficiency may carry little sway with such interests. Of course, we would 
expect joining a currency area to tilt the balance of political pressures in the 
direction of more flexibility, but the strength of this movement will often 
be sharply damped by political economy considerations, including reform 
fatigue. Indeed, it appears from the euro experience that considerably more 
reform was generated during the process of meeting the conditions set for 
entry than have been stimulated endogenously after joining.
The effects of a common currency in stimulating trade should not face as 
strong a political economy damper, but the size of the effects to expect is 
open to considerable uncertainty. Some estimates have projected gains in 
trade volume of 100 to 200 percent, but it turns out that these were based on 
the experiences with very small economies, and we would expect that the 
smaller the economies involved, the greater the proportional effects. Thus, 
for good-sized economies like Korea’s we would expect considerably smaller 
effects. Many estimates of the expected effects of the euro on trade have run 
up to a 50 percent increase over perhaps 20 years. Based on the early evi-
dence, this appears overly optimistic. The creation of the euro was associated 
with a jump in trade, but trade also grew with non-euro Western European 
countries. Some put a positive spin on this development that the euro had 
generated trade creation without trade diversion. A more plausible interpreta-
tion is that something else besides the euro creation was increasing trade.44 
This interpretation is reinforced by business cycle correlations. These also 
rose substantially for the euro countries, consistent with a strong endogenous 
OCA effect. However, the correlations among non-euro western European 
countries and among the euro and non-euro countries rose as much or more. 
Thus, it is not easy to interpret this early euro experience. Perhaps the best 
judgment that we can render on the euro experience to date is that it has been 
43.  See the references in Willett, Permpoon, and Wihlborg (2008).
44.  On the issues, see the analysis and references in Willett, Permpoon, and Wihlborg (2008).
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neither as successful as expected by its strongest supporters nor as disastrous 
as predicted by its strongest critics. Although it has not provided the substan-
tial boost to growth predicted by supporters, neither has it generated the high 
unemployment in out-of-sync countries that was feared by opponents. Until 
the current financial crisis, the economic environment had been unusually 
benign so the euro area had not had a severe test. Perhaps the major danger 
sign has been the growing real exchange rate appreciation of several of the 
southern European members.45 These may generate serious deflationary pres-
sures on these countries during the next few years on top of the general reces-
sionary pressures that have been generated by the financial crisis. The euro’s 
second decade may give us clearer evidence on the strength of various endo-
geneities than did its first decade. In the meanwhile, risk-averse policymakers 
would be wise to not put their faith in expectations of enormous endogenous 
OCA effects. Given the evidence of reform fatigue in the eurozone, most 
needed policy harmonization and structural reforms should be undertaken 
before a common currency is adopted.
  
45.  See the analysis and references in Wihlborg, Willett, and Zhang (2009).
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Geopolitical Considerations and Lessons 
from Europe for Monetary and Financial 
Cooperation in Asia
This chapter is coauthored by Lalana Srisorn.
The previous section concluded that it was quite unlikely for it to be in Ko-
rea’s economic interest to support the creation of a common Asian currency, 
at least not in the near- or medium-term future. There is unlikely to be politi-
cal support for such a move in any event. The dynamic that led to monetary 
union in Europe was extremely unusual and stemmed largely from geopo-
litical considerations. Europe responded quite differently from Asia in the 
early postwar period. A number of European leaders came to adopt a common 
view that to avoid future devastating wars in Europe it was essential to bind 
Germany more closely to the rest of Europe through strong economic ties. 
This view was accepted as strongly in Germany as in the rest of western Eu-
rope. This approach was also strongly supported by the United States, both 
to reduce the probability of another war among European nations and also 
to counter the danger that one or more western European countries would 
embrace communism. The result of this strategy has been wildly success-
ful. While the process of European economic integration moved forward in 
fits and starts, it generated substantial economic prosperity; just as impor-
tant, or possibly more important, European economic integration cemented 
West Germany so strongly to the rest of western Europe that the prospect 
of a new round of warfare among these nations is widely viewed as an 
impossibility.46
This did not mean that other European countries, especially France, were 
unconcerned with Germany’s growing economic power. The prospect of 
the reunification of East and West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
46.  For histories of European integration, see Ungerer (1997) and Gros and Thygesen (1998).
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greatly increased such concerns in some quarters in Europe. While a strong 
case could be made that reunification would reduce West Germany’s effec-
tive external power because of the huge allocation of resources required to 
help integrate East Germany into West Germany’s economy, many European 
leaders reacted with fear at the prospect of a united Germany. This combined 
with beliefs that it was important to keep moving forward on European inte-
gration to generate greatly increased political interest in European monetary 
union. This also coincided with the last generation of German political lead-
ers who felt a strong need to bind Germany more strongly to Europe and who 
were willing to make major concessions to do so. The result was a German 
agreement to give up the deutsche mark and join a common European curren-
cy.47 Germany retained the power to heavily influence the terms on which the 
euro was created, including the strong independence of the European Central 
Bank, but it gave up the right to maintain its national currency, a move that 
was deeply unpopular with a large majority of the German people. France 
pushed hard for this agreement because it had already adopted a fairly hard 
peg to the deutsche mark and hence had already largely given up its effective 
monetary independence. From the French perspective, giving up monetary 
sovereignty to a European Central Bank was far preferable in geopolitical 
terms than giving up sovereignty to Germany.
The puzzle here was why France had been willing to give up its monetary 
sovereignty in the first place. The answer comes from the macroeconomic 
excesses of the early years of the government of François Mitterrand. Fol-
lowing its socialist agenda as it came into power in 1981, the Mitterrand 
government began a series of overly expansionary crises that resulted in a se-
ries of currency crises. A combination of misinterpreting the results of these 
crises as showing that flexible exchange rates were not workable for France 
and a belief that linking a fixed exchange rate for the franc to the European 
project could induce French voters to accept more austere macroeconomic 
policies were the key pieces that generated a complete turnaround in the Mit-
terrand government’s economic policies and the resulting surrender of mon-
etary sovereignty (Andrews and Willett 1997). Had this shift in French policy 
occurred a decade later, it is extremely unlikely that the new generation of 
German leaders, born after the end of World War II, would have been willing 
to give up the deutsche mark.
Drawing Lessons from Europe
This analysis suggests that, rather than being a historical inevitability, the 
creation of the euro was in fact a low-probability event that relied on a highly 
47.  Also important in securing agreement were changing beliefs about inflation-unemployment 
trade-offs; for more detailed discussions of the creation of the euro, see Marsh (2009) and 
McNamara (1998).
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unusual combination of circumstances and interpretations. From this perspec-
tive, if the euro had not already been created it is unlikely that under current 
circumstances it would be recreated.48 
The geopolitical configuration makes the prospects for political agreement to 
give up national monetary sovereignty and create a common currency in Asia 
even more remote than for Europe if it did not already have the euro. The 
United States adopted a very different postwar strategy toward Asia than it 
did toward Europe. In contrast with its support for a more integrated Europe, 
in Asia the United States followed a hub-and-spoke strategy based on em-
phasizing bilateral relations with the United States rather than a more group-
based approach. This was likely a sensible strategy for enhancing U.S. power 
and influence in Asia in the short run, but the result has been that geopolitical 
grievances among a number of Asian countries have remained much stronger 
than in Europe. This legacy makes the development of substantive economic 
cooperation in Asia considerably more difficult than in Europe.
It may not be too late, however, for Asia to adopt aspects of the European 
strategy of using economic integration to promote more harmonious political 
relations. Certainly one of the prime objectives of most countries should be to 
encourage the peaceful integration of China into the world economy.
We interpret the European experience as showing the wisdom of a gradualist 
approach based on taking a number of steps over time. Efforts to move too 
quickly run the serious risk of promoting more political conflict than coop-
eration. It is sensible to begin, as Asia has, with gathering the low-hanging 
fruit, concentrating on areas where the ratio of benefits to lost sovereignty is 
high. Such efforts may draw disdain from visionaries who favor a big-bang 
approach, but the prospects for both economic and political gains are much 
higher.
The judgment that the economic gains from creating a common Asian cur-
rency any time in the near future would be negative does not imply that there 
is not considerable prospect for gains from monetary and financial coopera-
tion as well as trade integration. Out of such cooperation the conditions for 
a common currency to be desirable might finally emerge, but making this an 
explicit objective would be a mistake. It would implicitly downgrade percep-
tions of the benefits of more modest (and feasible) advances.
48.  Note that this analysis does not imply a prediction that the euro area will break up. There 
is strong path dependence in such institutional arrangements, and the political and economic 
costs to a country that exited from the eurozone would be enormous. Although there has been 
anti-euro talk by some European political leaders from time to time, this is largely just talk. 
It would take a huge recession to make an exit from the euro worth contemplating seriously 
(Eichengreen 2007b).
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From both the European experience and that of monetary and financial coop-
eration among the United States, Japan, and the major European countries, it 
is clear that it is much easier to get cooperation on provisions for short-term 
financial help to one another than on coordination of monetary and fiscal 
policies. Considerable progress has been made since the Great Depression of 
the 1930s in averting the types of blatant beggar-thy-neighbor devaluations 
and increases in trade barriers that made the worldwide depression so much 
worse. As a result, the huge oil shocks of the 1970s and 1980s were handled 
without a repeat of such behavior, and it is encouraging that, although the 
November 2008 meeting of the Group of 20 heads of state to deal with the 
current global financial crisis did not agree on the coordinated expansion 
measures that some had urged, the leaders showed acute awareness of the 
danger of beggar-thy-neighbor policies and made a strong pledge to avoid 
them. While not the stuff of headlines, such negative cooperation is of great 
importance, likely even greater than the potential gains from more actively 
coordinated policies. The central banks of a number of major countries did 
undertake coordinated interest rate cuts in November 2008, but such actions 
are quite unusual.
A large literature has developed, primarily by political scientists (Haas 1958; 
Schmitter 2004; Sandholtz and Sweet 1998), discussing the process of Eu-
ropean integration. Clearly those in favor of European integration believed 
in the power of spillovers from one area of cooperation to another. This neo-
functionalist view has gone in and out of favor and back in again as the pro-
cess of integration sped up, slowed down, and sped up again.
Spillovers can operate through several different mechanisms (Schmitter 
2004).49 One is technical. Agreements in one area may create a need to coop-
erate in another area. For example, allowing greater movement of individuals 
and firms across national borders can greatly increase the need for harmoni-
zation of regulations and standards in a broad range of areas.
Likewise, limiting the variability of exchange rates increases the need for co-
ordination of monetary policies. Such technical spillovers are a double-edged 
sword. They increase the pressure for coordination, but this can result in ei-
ther greater cooperation or greater conflict. The European experience gives 
many examples of both, and interpretations about the mix often disagree. For 
example, the ERM of the EMS that provided substantial limits on exchange 
rate fluctuations has been hailed by some as an important contributor to mon-
etary policy coordination and is advocated as a model for Asian monetary 
cooperation. Others, however, view it as a major cause of the European cur-
rency crisis of 1992 and 1993, which was characterized by major policy con-
49.  On the similarities between spillovers and endogenous OCA analysis, see Srisorn and 
Willett (2009).
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flicts rather than cooperation. Perhaps the best way to think of such technical 
spillover is that, where the costs to national sovereignty are not viewed as 
great, then they are likely to promote increasing cooperation over time; that 
is, they can provide useful nudges. It is unwise, however, to adopt strategies 
that will require subsequent large increases in coordination for them to work. 
This runs the danger of leading to more conflict than cooperation and can set 
back the integration process.
There is considerable disagreement about how well such linkage strategies 
can be planned. It is clear, however, that unintended consequences abound, 
so that detailed blueprints for a long process of integration are of quite limited 
value. Path dependence plays a strong role, and various windows of oppor-
tunity for cooperation open and close. Thus, for supporters of increased co-
operation, perhaps the best strategy is to develop a sizable set of contingency 
plans that can be brought out quickly as opportunities present themselves.
Asia and Europe show substantial differences in legal and cultural traditions, 
so one should be careful in attempting to draw lessons for Asia from many of 
the specifics of the European integration process, but some insights are trans-
ferable.50 One is that the process will inevitably proceed in fits and starts, and 
one should become neither too ecstatic during periods of rapid progress nor 
too depressed during lulls.
Another key lesson is that we should not underrate the longer-run importance 
of developing forums for more frequent contact among officials. This can 
bring important benefits in developing shared perspectives and the buildup of 
trust. We should not expect to see huge results overnight. But recent efforts 
have resulted in substantial increase in contact and discussion among central 
bank and government officials. Over time the value of such increased discus-
sion can be immense, even when few dramatic actions result as demonstra-
tions of success. Experiences with the evolution of cooperation through the 
Bank for International Settlements, the OECD, and the EMS all suggest the 
importance of building up institutional structures to support such dialogue. 
International contacts should not be limited to the most senior officials. Fo-
rums for more technical-level analysts to get together are also quite important 
as is the development of a high-quality staff that can serve as a trusted sec-
retariat for a regional monetary and financial institution. It is easy to deride 
such institutions as bureaucratic boondoggles that waste scarce resources, 
but in fact the costs of fairly frequent meetings among senior officials and a 
moderate-sized secretariat are quite low compared with the prospective ben-
efits that can be generated. Many of these benefits will take time to be felt, so 
dramatic early relations should not be expected. Building respect, trust, and 
50. Several recent papers have dealt with lessons for Asia from the European experience; see, 
for example, Wyplosz (2001) and Eichengreen (2007a).
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cooperation is usually a slow process. More important than speed is atten-
tion to quality. It is better to have no secretariat at all than one that turns out 
defective work.
It is also important that efforts at greater regional cooperation do not cause 
the rest of the world to be neglected. Some believe that this was the case with 
Europe and the creation of the euro. Asia should be on guard against such 
development.
Strategies and Proposals for Monetary Cooperation in Asia
In general Asian officials have been quite wise in their choice of monetary 
and financial topics on which to work initially. The Chiang Mai Initiative 
(CMI) for short-term financing, the Asian Bond Fund, and market develop-
ment initiatives have created an important perception of progress. Generally 
it is easier to get an international agreement on financing than on adjustment 
issues because financing tends to carry lower political costs. Although the 
initial Chiang Mai arrangements have been followed by further agreement 
to expand and improve them, they still have never been used. This naturally 
raises the issue of whether more effort should be put into making them user 
friendly or whether, like the IMF’s never-used Contingent Credit Lines that 
was created after the Asian crisis, it will be more productive to put efforts 
elsewhere.
Likewise, one can question whether it is worth increasing efforts to get agree-
ment on the establishment of an official Asian currency unit (ACU) since 
this approach was not very successful in Europe. A key problem is political. 
Which currencies should be included in the basket that makes up the ACU, 
and what weights should they be given (Pontines and Rajan 2008)? As with 
the relative size of IMF quotas, various technical formulas can be used to 
give the weights. But that is just the problem. Many different formulas can be 
used, and one is not clearly superior to the others. As a result there is no rea-
sonable hope of depoliticizing the debate over weights. Many countries see 
their influence at stake, so, unless there is a clear agreement on the pecking 
order of countries’ influence, this type of topic is likely to be highly conten-
tious.
As the political science literature indicates, such problems are especially se-
vere when major transitions in power are under way (Grieco 1997; Mansfield 
and Milner 1997). Because this is clearly the case in Asia today with the 
economic rise of China, reform efforts should attempt to minimize the need 
for agreements that highlight issues where relative weighting is required. On 
this score bilateral swap lines score better than shares in a regional financing 
mechanism. Of course, such a multilateral regional facility would also have 
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advantages over networks of bilateral swaps. The two approaches might even 
be developed in parallel.
Korea’s recent swap agreements with China, Japan, and the United States 
need not undermine the usefulness of the recent agreement to multilateral-
ize the CMI for short-term financing. If the Chiang Mai agreements are not 
used in the near future, however, they will run a serious danger of fossilizing. 
Such issues cannot always be avoided, but, given the likely strong limits to 
the short-run benefits from establishing an official ACU, it would have been 
wiser to push for it early in the process of developing stronger international 
financial cooperation in Asia. Advocates also failed to do sufficient prepara-
tion to build up support before officially proposing the ACU. The result was 
that the ASEAN Plus Three ministers showed considerable lack of collective 
enthusiasm. Officially it was referred to a study group, but unofficially it was 
widely considered that the proposal was being effectively shelved for the 
present.
Another of the problems with the ACU proposals is that they vary a great 
deal in how the ACU is expected to be used. The major danger lies in using it 
as the basis for a system of collective exchange rate bands that more or less 
approximate the arrangements in the EMS. As was argued above, if such a re-
gime is not backed by effective monetary coordination, then it is likely to be 
highly crisis prone. When confronted with such arguments, advocates often 
back off to a position that what they want is a much more flexible system that 
would avoid the rigidities of past pegged-rate regimes.
Such more flexible arrangements should not be rejected out of hand. There is, 
however, a real question of whether a mix can be found that promotes a sub-
stantial reduction in exchange rate volatility without leading to the excessive 
rigidities that induce crises. The typical strategy has been to get agreements 
on exchange rate commitments and hope that sufficient monetary policy co-
ordination will follow. As will be discussed in the following chapter, this ap-
proach has all the hallmarks of the time-inconsistent strategies that front-load 
the political benefits and then generate greater longer-run costs in the form of 
higher inflation, crises, or both. And it is likely to be especially difficult for a 
group of countries at quite different stages of development.
Prompting greater monetary and financial cooperation in Asia is clearly go-
ing to be a long-term process. The process has generally gotten off to a good 
start with substantially increased communication and agreements such as the 
Asian Bond Fund initiative. These have not yet brought great benefits, but 
neither have they imposed substantial costs; and they have clearly helped 
provide focal points to keep up momentum.
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In such circumstances, it would be ill advised to attempt to negotiate agree-
ment on exchange rate regimes before considerable progress is made on 
coordinating monetary policies. In light of the historical evidence, it seems 
clear that, from a longer-term perspective, the coordination of exchange rate 
regimes should follow rather than lead a substantial increase in coordination 
of monetary policies.
This is not to argue against immediate efforts for short-run coordination of 
intervention and exchange rate policies in the face of particular shocks such 
as local currency and financial crises and the projected global recession. It is 
against proposals to create group regimes limiting exchange rate flexibility 
before substantial progress in monetary coordination is made.
Another lesson from recent theoretical analysis and experience is that, if, 
down the road, such regimes are being seriously contemplated, they are much 
more likely to work in a crisis-free manner if the conduct of both mone-
tary and exchange rate policy is given to independent central banks that are 
sufficiently insulated from short-run political pressures that they can take a 
longer-run perspective. Indeed, the case for such arrangements need not rest 
on the contribution to the stability of regional exchange rate regimes. Such 
arrangements should also speed progress in increasing international coopera-
tion on monetary and exchange rate policy responses to major shocks. Note 
that what is required is effective, not just formal, independence. Just how 
independent the BOK is in practice is not completely clear. This is also true 
for a number of other formally independent central banks in Asia.
A final comment on regional monetary and financial cooperation is that con-
siderable priority should be given to putting the CMI into use. The recent 
agreements to enlarge and multilateralize the agreements are useful, but lack 
of use of these financial arrangements over a prolonged period could send 
negative signals about their value. Some type of policy agreements can be 
useful even if they are never used. This was the case with the scarce-currency 
clause that Keynes and White negotiated at Bretton Woods. Although never 
used, its shadow likely prompted at least somewhat more cooperative behav-
ior on exchange rates.
With financing facilities, if there are no serious shocks, then their lack of 
use does not undermine their credibility. But it would be hard to argue that 
this is currently the case. In large part because it was ill designed, the IMF’s 
Contingent Credit Line set up after the Asian crisis was never used, and it 
died an inglorious death. The CMI does not suffer from the same design 
flaws, and it would be a shame to see it follow the same course. Making the 
CMI operational should be high on the list of short-run priorities for Asian 
monetary and financial cooperation. And the current global crisis provides a 
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perfect opportunity to make use of it in a way that does not impose a stigma 
on the borrowers. Korea is well placed to get the ball moving.
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9
Similarities and Differences between the 
1997–98 Crisis and the Current One
The year 2007 marked the 10th anniversary of the beginning of the Asian 
currency and financial crisis. International conferences were held with this 
theme, reexamining the causes of the crisis, the crisis policy responses, and 
steps taken to establish a safer financial environment. Few of us participating 
in such conferences realized that we were already in the beginning of what in 
2008 would become a full-fledged global financial crisis.
The origins of the current crisis in many ways look quite different from the 
Asian crisis. The epicenter of today’s crisis is the United States, not Thailand, 
and the problems were generated in what had generally been considered to 
be the most sophisticated centers of finance, not in less-developed ones going 
through the process of learning to cope with a newly deregulated environ-
ment. And certainly Korea is much better positioned to deal with the current 
crisis than it was in 1997.
1997–98 Korean Crisis Primarily Caused by Financial Problems, 
Not Exchange Rate Problems
Although many of the particulars are quite different, the root causes of the 
1997–98 Asian crisis and today’s crisis are amazingly similar. In each case 
the fundamental problem was one of perverse incentives and tendencies to-
ward herding by financial-market participants that resulted in excessive risk 
taking and overinvestment in particular areas. The widespread nature of these 
problems also explains why in both cases there was so much contagion from 
the epicenter to other markets and countries.
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At first look it seemed scarcely possible that problems in the subprime mort-
gage market in the United States could have such serious worldwide ramifica-
tions. The first explanation that comes to mind is that the resulting widespread 
contagion reflected serious psychological failures of market participants, 
who were irrationally panicking in the face of a market downturn. In the 
Asian crisis such a negative judgment on market behavior was widespread, 
especially while the crisis was in full force. Perhaps the most common initial 
interpretation of the spread of the crisis that originated in Thailand was that 
this was caused by irrational contagion. According to this view, Korea was an 
innocent victim, a proposition that was put forward by many outside Korea 
as well as within (Radelet and Sachs 1998).
Undoubtedly there was some truth to the stories of irrational panic, but the 
slowness with which the Asian crisis hit Korea and the even slower unfold-
ing of the current crisis suggest that much more than irrational panic was at 
work. Subsequent detailed analysis of the Asian crisis suggests that most of 
the flight from the won, the Indonesian rupiah, and several other Asian cur-
rencies was quite justified (Willett et al. 2005). Korea was following sound 
macroeconomic policies, and, although some economists argued that Korea’s 
de facto crawling peg exchange rate regime had led to overvaluation of the 
won, others argued that it might even have been slightly undervalued. In any 
event, it had not become clearly overvalued before the crisis as had the Thai 
baht. Inflation was low, and government finances looked solid. Thus, the con-
dition of these traditional fundamentals makes it is easy to see why so many 
initially argued that the flight from the won was unjustified.
Closer investigation, however, revealed serious problems in Korea’s financial 
sector. As was discussed in Chapter 3, regulation had not been carried out 
with sufficient focus on the risks involved, and prudential regulation had not 
been strengthened sufficiently. Connected banks felt that they had little in-
centive to monitor carefully the quality of their loans, and the increased com-
petition resulting from deregulation had greatly reduced the market value of 
some financial institutions, generating incentives for them to undertake risky 
loans to gamble for redemption (Dooley and Shin 2000). The use of high lev-
els of debt was pervasive among Korean corporations, and debt-equity ratios 
reached extraordinary levels.
On top of this, international liberalization had not followed the standard se-
quencing of decontrolling long-term capital flows before short-term ones. 
Consequently short-term foreign borrowing increased enormously. As in 
Thailand, Indonesia, and several other Asian countries, many Korean banks 
and businesses believed that they had an implicit government guarantee 
against a large depreciation of the currency; thus, foreign currency borrowing 
was for the most part unhedged. And various deficiencies in financial report-
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ing led to the government’s and the central bank’s serious underestimation of 
the level of the nation’s short-term foreign debt relative to its level of usable 
international reserves.
Deficiencies in Risk Analysis
On the supply side, international investors had become understandably en-
amored of the Asian miracle. This, combined with managerial incentives to 
follow the herd, led international investors to focus on the bright spots in 
the Asian economies and worry insufficiently about the weak spots. Add-
ing to this tendency was that the strengths of the Asian economies tended to 
lie largely in the macro areas where reasonably good statistics were readily 
available, while the weak spots were in the financial sectors where good data 
are hard to find and one needs on-the-ground observation not available on the 
computer screens in New York, London, and Frankfurt. Data on nonperform-
ing loans are available but are often unreliable and are much more helpful for 
ex post explanation than for giving ex ante warnings.
Risk management systems also failed. The first Basel agreement on inter-
national standards on bank capital had some serious deficiencies (as will be 
discussed below, so does the revised Basel II). When Korea became a mem-
ber of the OECD, this automatically put it in a much lower risk category for 
banks in countries following the Basel rules and contributed to the excessive 
inflow of capital into Korea. At the same time, the large international banks 
were placing increased reliance on quantitative models to manage their risk 
positions. While quite mathematically sophisticated in some respects, these 
value-at-risk models were surprisingly naive in others. They relied on rela-
tively short-run historical data to be manipulated by the sophisticated models. 
The old adage “garbage in, garbage out” applied with a vengeance.
In fact, these models do tend to be highly useful for managing risk during 
normal periods. But, as has been demonstrated again during the current glob-
al crisis, they are poor at giving early warning signals of the danger of crisis; 
neither do they do well for managing during a crisis. The reason for both 
types of poor performance is the same: historical correlations break down 
during crisis. A position that is well diversified with respect to the smaller 
fluctuations during good periods will often find that in a crisis a wide range 
of investments are behaving in a similar manner, hence the adage that during 
a crisis the only thing that goes up is the correlation among different invest-
ments.
With their backward-looking approach, such models are particularly inappro-
priate for judging risk under regimes of pegged exchange rates. An exchange 
rate that has varied little over several years also gives zero information about 
20335_SpcStd_Willett-N1-R1.indd   120 11/11/2009   4:02:30 PM
Similarities and Differences between the 1997–98 Crisis and the Current One  121
the probability that there will be a change in the peg in the future. For this 
question, much more detailed analysis of BOP trends and other factors is 
needed. Thus, the standard risk management models continued to signal 
safety while fundamental analysis saw increasing probabilities of devaluation 
of the Thai baht as 1997 progressed. The IMF as well as my students from 
Thailand had been warning for well over a year that the baht was in trouble, 
and an increasing number of international investors began pulling their mon-
ey out, but large segments of the market both in Thailand and abroad were 
caught by surprise in July 1997 when Thailand essentially ran out of reserves 
and the baht was floated.
Contagion Owing to Similar Problems in a Number of Countries 
and Markets
The reason that the Thai crisis spread so wildly throughout Asia was that 
the financial-sector problems and excessive unhedged foreign borrowing and 
other capital inflows that helped bring down the baht existed in a number of 
other Asian economies, including Korea. The Thai crisis served as a wake-up 
call to market participants to reevaluate their positions.51 Many foreign inves-
tors realized that they did not really know as much about the economies in 
which they were invested as they thought. The assumptions of many Asian 
businesses and financial institutions that there would be no major currency 
depreciation were called into doubt. The rational response to the realization 
that the world is really quite different from what had been thought—what I 
have called broken mental models (Willett 2000)—is to turn quite conserva-
tive until a better understanding of the new situation can be obtained. In Asia 
in 1997–98, the situation was not so much like an especially bad draw from 
a known probability distribution but rather a recognition that perceptions of 
the probability distribution had been seriously flawed. What had been seen as 
a situation of risk turned into one of uncertainty. Similarly in today’s crisis, 
much of the flight to safety is due to recognition that lenders and investors 
had fundamentally misjudged their situation.
There was panic, but most of it was quite rational. Certainly for institutions 
with large unhedged foreign debts, seeking to hedge these open positions 
was only prudent. Even where exchange rates were at roughly equilibrium 
levels before the crisis, the growing recognition of serious financial-sector 
problems generated by the wake-up call from Thailand would substantially 
reduce the levels of expected capital inflows. For countries with sizable cur-
rent account deficits, this would change an equilibrium exchange rate into a 
seriously overvalued one.
51.  The Mexican crises in 1994–95 also generated a wake-up call, but most large international 
investors concluded that Asia’s differences from Mexico were greater than the similarities. 
Thus, while flows to Latin America fell, those to Asia increased after the Mexican crisis.
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Korea’s slowly moving peg multiplied the problem by slowing adjustment 
and giving market participants greater incentives to run for the exits before 
the won depreciated further, but the peg was not the basic cause of the crisis 
in Korea. Although we tend to refer to the currency crisis as resulting from 
speculative attacks on the currency, it was in reality much more the result of 
efforts to limit prospective losses than of overt speculation for gain.
It is interesting that the initial contagion from the Thai crisis created only 
relatively mild ripple effects on Korea. The initial wake-ups were primarily 
by borrowers and investors from Thailand’s more immediate neighbors in 
Southeast Asia. Some market participants had begun to reallocate their posi-
tions, but there did not seem to be an immediate need for Korea to change its 
exchange rate policy. The wake-up call hit Korea with full force in October 
when its Northeast Asian neighbor Taiwan devalued. This stimulated a major 
run on Hong Kong, which the market judged to have a number of characteris-
tics similar to Taiwan. This run in turn stimulated the beginning of large out-
flows from Korea. Korea initially attempted to ride out the storm with only 
quite limited daily depreciations of the won, but this quickly proved to be 
unworkable, and the government wisely and relatively promptly abandoned 
its policy of pegging.
Role of IMF in First Crisis
The role of the IMF in the Asian crisis has been widely criticized and with 
some justification. In Indonesia the IMF program contained far too many 
conditions—over a hundred—although many of these were put in at the re-
quest of Indonesian officials rather than the IMF. The program with Korea 
was more focused but was still deeply unpopular. Indeed, in Korea it is com-
mon to refer to the crisis as the IMF crisis. This negative view of the IMF has 
lingered, and it is reported that this led to the Korean government to rebuff 
IMF overtures during the current crisis for Korea to make use of the new 
IMF short-term lending facility for countries that have been following good 
economic policies.
Undoubtedly, some of the hostility toward the IMF in Korea was generated 
by the IMF’s refusal to accept the view that Korea was an innocent victim in 
the 1997 crisis. And on this the IMF was right. But the current crisis is quite 
different. Today Korea and a large number of other emerging-market coun-
tries are much more the innocent victims.52
The continued resentment of the IMF in Korea is quite understandable, but 
a good case can be made for giving the IMF another chance. Its policy pro-
52.  This is not true of all crisis-hit emerging-market economies; for example, political instabil-
ity has been a major factor underlying the crisis in Ukraine.
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grams in Korea were not nearly as bad as strong critics (Furman and Stiglitz 
1998; Radelet and Sachs 1998) have maintained. A large part of their critique 
was based on the assumption that Korea’s main problem was unjustified con-
tagion. Were this correct, then the IMF program would have indeed been 
greatly flawed. But the problems in Korea’s financial sector turned out to be 
real (defenders of the IMF include Boorman et al. 2000; Mishkin 2006).
One of the IMF’s biggest problems was that its lending programs had not 
been sufficiently updated to deal with the new world of high capital mobility 
facing emerging-market economies (Bird 2003; Truman 2006; Willett 2006). 
The IMF’s basic approach had been developed when capital mobility was 
low and crisis conditions developed over a much longer time period. As capi-
tal mobility grew, some revisions to the IMF’s lending policies were made, 
but they were much too incremental. This left the IMF way behind the curve. 
Not only had the movement toward front-loading funding in the face of capi-
tal account crisis been much too modest, the amount of funding that the IMF 
had available had not kept up with the rapid growth of international trade and 
especially investment. In retrospect it is clear that, had the IMF been able to 
make much greater funding available quickly, much of the substantial over-
shooting of depreciation of the crisis-hit Asian currencies could have been 
avoided. In the absence of such funding the IMF’s strategy was to advocate 
monetary tightening to limit the extent of currency depreciation.
Critics such as Joseph Stiglitz (Furman and Stiglitz 1998) argued that this 
was essentially wrongheaded because in a financial crisis tightening monetary 
policy would increase bankruptcies and worsen the crisis. There is of course 
some truth to this criticism. The standard textbook recommendation during 
a currency crisis is to tighten monetary policy; but for a financial crisis, the 
standard prescription is to loosen monetary policy. Because the IMF’s tradi-
tional focus has been much more on currency than on financial crisis, it is not 
surprising that the institution went for the tight-money prescription. There is 
a genuine dilemma here for policy in a highly open economy, however. With 
large, unhedged foreign debts, depreciation also increases bankruptcy prob-
lems, and for some economies this may be a more powerful effect than would 
follow from the tight money needed to reduce the amount of depreciation. 
The best trade-off will vary substantially from one economy to another.
As long as a country has been following generally prudent monetary and fis-
cal policies, the best solution to this dilemma is to use heavy official purchas-
es in the foreign exchange market to limit the amount of overdepreciation of 
the currency and hence allow easier domestic monetary policy. Such a strat-
egy is unlikely to be successful when it is taken to the extreme of attempting 
to defend a fixed parity. The track record of IMF loans to try to maintain 
such pegs is quite poor (Bird and Willett 2007). Attempting to maintain a 
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peg increases the costs of exit and can greatly increase the amount of capital 
flowing out during a crisis. However, substantial intervention to limit large 
overdepreciation in the short run once a peg has been abandoned is a quite 
different matter.
In the 1997–98 crisis, Korea’s effective reserves were near zero, the current 
account deficit was substantial, and help on this front from the IMF was quite 
insufficient.53 Today the situation is quite different. There is no large current 
account deficit requiring net capital inflows to be financed, and Korea has a 
high level of owned reserves. In addition, along with several other leading 
emerging-market countries, Korea now has a $30 billion swap line with the 
Federal Reserve and has also negotiated substantial swap lines with China 
and Japan.
53.  Despite the large headline figures for the size of the IMF program, the amount of funding 
that could be used to defend the currency was actually quite small.
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Crisis Hits Korea
Korea’s Position Was Stronger Than Many Realized
It is interesting to note that, although the global dimensions of the current 
crisis came to dominate economic and financial developments in Korea by 
the later part of 2008, there had been considerable independence of financial 
behavior in Korea in the several preceding years. Consistent with the de-
coupling hypothesis, Korea’s stock market boomed through late 2007 while 
the U.S. markets fluctuated horizontally, and the Korean stock market index 
(KOSPI) began to fall well before there was general recognition that emerg-
ing markets would take a hard hit from the fallout from the subprime crisis. 
The fall of the won also started well before the crisis went global and seems 
to have been associated with the newly elected Korean government.
Figure 10-1 shows that the turnaround in the won began before strong global 
effects of the U.S. subprime crisis began to be felt in emerging-market coun-
tries. The new government clearly felt that the strength of the won was incon-
sistent with its policy objective of accelerating growth and began an effort to 
talk down the won. Although such jawboning is often ineffective, sometimes 
it is too effective, and this was the case with the won. The market began to 
lose confidence in the new government’s economic policies, and sentiment 
in the foreign exchange market did an about-face. The won began depreciat-
ing more rapidly than the government wanted to see and, as was discussed in 
Chapter 2, the general trend in official intervention in the foreign exchange 
market went from selling to buying the won.
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The reversal in the won may have contributed to the perception that Korea 
was the Asian country most vulnerable to financial contagion. Other factors 
contributing to this perception were the recent large expansion of short-term 
foreign bank debt, the high proportion of potentially reversible foreign own-
ership of portfolio equity, and the relatively high reliance of the Korean bank-
ing system on wholesale as opposed to deposit funding.
Indeed, one could draw some powerful and disturbing parallels between Ko-
rea and the United States. In both there had been falling rates of personal 
savings, increasing consumer debt, and rapidly rising housing prices. These 
analogies could be misleading, however, since the bubble elements in the 
Korean housing market were much weaker than in the United States and were 
not accompanied by the disastrous types of financing that developed in the 
United States (Cargill and Guerrero 2007; Cargill 2009). Especially impor-
tant was that the Korean financial system was much sounder than in 1997 and 
had seen relatively little involvement in the exotic new types of instruments 
that wreaked such havoc in the United States and Europe.
Derivatives and the KIKO Problem 
Yoonmin Kim is coauthor of this section.
The markets for forward transactions in the foreign exchange market have 
grown greatly. Although these are primarily of the plain vanilla variety that 
have caused relatively little complaint in the United States and Europe, they 
can be used to speculate as well as to hedge foreign exchange risk; some 
have expressed concern that the market for nondeliverable forwards has been 
a major source of pressure on the won during the current crisis (Kang 2009). 
As a part of the general international reevaluation of the oversight of deriva-
tives, the markets for forward exchange in developing and emerging-market 
countries should not be overlooked. It will be important, however, not to 
forget the important benefits they can bring in helping to reduce international 
currency risks.
The recent pressures on the won have been due only to a minor extent to 
Korean investments in asset-backed securities that have turned toxic. There 
has been a good deal of controversy in Korea, however, about another type of 
newly developed financial derivatives—currency option contracts known as 
knock-in knock-out (KIKO; Figure 10-2)—that were sold by both the local 
and foreign banks in Korea to many small- to medium-sized Korean export-
ers as insurance to prevent losses from the depreciation of the U.S. dollar (J. 
K. Kim 2008).
The instrument basically works as a hedging device against volatile currency 
markets to protect against possible losses from depreciation of the U.S. dol-
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lar. The U.S. dollar has, however, appreciated way beyond expectations, and 
many companies that contracted to repay debt in U.S. dollars to the foreign 
banks in such cases suffered from a drought of funds to repay them according 
to their contract agreements. It has been estimated that 97 firms lost $1.3 bil-
lion as of August 2008, and they filed a class action against 13 major foreign 
and domestic banks in early November 2008, claiming (J. K. Kim 2008) that 
“the currency options they hold are unfair and should be nullified amid the 
huge losses caused by the Korean won’s steep fall.”
Figure 10-2: Example of Knock-In Knock-Out (KIKO)
Source: Authors’ concept
Analyzing Capital Outflows
As financial conditions tightened in the industrial countries, there was a wide-
spread falling off and then a reversal of capital flows to emerging markets. 
The spread of the crisis generated a general flight from risk, and, because 
emerging markets are generally understood as falling into the risky category, 
a general pullback was to be expected. In addition, countries thought to be 
especially vulnerable because of a large current account deficit or heavily 
exposed financial sectors were especially hit. Iceland was perhaps the most 
dramatic case, to be replaced later by a number of central and eastern Euro-
pean countries.
Despite the widespread perception that Korea was especially vulnerable, a 
careful analysis suggests that it is not so obvious that this was true. Not only 
was Korea not running a large current account deficit (it was in surplus when 
the crisis started), it had amassed international reserves of some $260 billion, 
most of which were highly liquid. It had weathered the credit card crisis suc-
cessfully and, unlike in 1997, its financial system was basically sound. While 
it was not unreasonable to conclude that Korea was the most vulnerable of 
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the major emerging-market economies of Asia, on the basic facts it was not 
terribly vulnerable.
Perceptions are what count in market behavior, however, and many in the me-
dia and the markets seemed to focus much more on the negative aspects than 
the positive ones. Rumors that short-term debt will not be rolled over can 
quickly become self-fulfilling. It seems that almost any country that becomes 
heavily engaged with global financial markets can be subject to such prob-
lems. While I concur with Thomas Cargill (2009) that the claims of great vul-
nerability were themselves “greatly exaggerated,” they can be self-fulfilling. 
In situations of considerable uncertainty, individuals and corporations tend to 
protect themselves by being quite risk averse. There is an asymmetric payoff 
function. The private cost of pulling money out in case of a false alarm is 
much less than the cost of keeping it in a situation and having things go bad. 
Thus, there is a disconnect between private and social costs and benefits: the 
risk-averse private sector behavior can turn a mild crisis into a highly damag-
ing one. There is a classic collective action problem in such situations similar 
to the traditional problem of bank runs.
In the foreign exchange market this presents a strong case for considerable 
government intervention in the foreign exchange market to help offset or 
cushion the effects of such private sector behavior. This is one of the most im-
portant types of cases that economists who favor some type of international 
lender of last resort have in mind because this—unlike the situation with 
many financial institutions in the United States and Europe—seemed pretty 
clearly to be much more of a liquidity than a solvency type of crisis. Because 
Korea had already accumulated a high level of international reserves, the 
government did not really need to turn to international sources of liquid-
ity although the swap lines provided by the Federal Reserve and the central 
banks of China and Japan provided an extremely helpful boost to market 
confidence.
It is not clear what proportion of the capital outflows from Korea during the 
crisis was due to such excessive fears. It is quite understandable that some 
highly diversified investors with little particular knowledge of Korea would 
be influenced by such concerns, while well-informed actors would be more 
skeptical. Considerable amounts of the pullbacks from emerging markets 
were due primarily to the need to use these funds to offset losses and meet 
margin calls. In this regard institutions will tend to sell off their most liquid 
assets first. As a consequence, the high liquidity of the Korean stock market 
was in this situation a source of vulnerability.
Lowe-Lee (2009) reports that “foreign investors . . . began to doubt the health 
of a nation’s financial system” and “analysts began to doubt Korean banks’ 
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ability to acquire dollars to pay maturing external liabilities.” Given Korea’s 
huge foreign exchange reserves, the latter fear seems to have been quite far-
fetched unless there had been a deep loss of confidence in the government’s 
and the BOK’s abilities to manage the crisis. In any event, such fears fortu-
nately proved to be misplaced. In the wake of the dramatic intensification of 
the financial-market disruptions following the failure of Lehman Brothers, 
the U.S. government rescue of AIG, and the other events of September 2008, 
the government moved quite forcefully to help stabilize Korean markets. A 
$130 billion rescue package was announced, $100 billion of which was to 
guarantee up to $100 billion of foreign debt insured by Korean banks be-
tween 20 October 2008 and 30 June 2009. With its large foreign reserves, 
this guarantee was quite credible and greatly increased the ability of Korean 
banks to successfully roll over maturing borrowings. That many of the loans 
were from head offices to the Korean branches of large international banks 
was also important.
As shown in Table 10-1, at the end of 2008 foreign loans to Korea were still 
at more than $145 billion, falling by less than $20 billion from the peak end-
of-the-year value of more than $160 billion in 2007 and still well above the 
end of 2006 figure of $123 billion. The total of the other investment category 
shows no decline, with the levels increasing mostly from $243 billion at the 
end of 2007 to $250 billion at the end of 2008, roughly double the $123 bil-
lion of 2005. These, however, were the unusual years, with the 2008 figures 
not being out of line with the annual figures between 1998 and 2005. Foreign 
holdings of debt securities also fell only modestly to $127 billion at the end of 
2008, from $137 at the end of 2007 and still double the level of 2005.
Table 10-1: Foreign Investment into Korea, 2001–08
 in billions of U.S dollars 
Source: M. K. Kang, “Global Financial Crisis and Systemic Risks in the Korean Banking Sec-
tor,” Academic Paper Series (Korea Economic Institute) 4, no. 5 (2009).
The dramatic drop was in the value of foreign stock market holdings. While 
considerable commentary has focused on the outflow of foreign funds from 
the Korean stock market as a major cause of the strong downward pressure 
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on the won, the importance of these outflows has been greatly exaggerated. 
This has likely come largely from looking at the numbers for the dollar value 
of foreign holdings in the Korean stock market. These plummeted from $320 
billion at end of 2007 to only $125 billion at end of 2008, but the majority of 
this decline reflected declines in the KOSPI and the won, resulting in a huge 
drop in the dollar value of the Korean stock market. Actual outflows, while 
far from trivial, were much smaller.
As seen in Table 10-2, the net outflow of portfolio investment in 2008 was 
a little over $15 billion, down from the levels of the two preceding years of 
over $20 billion net outflows apiece. The years 2006 and 2007 had been dom-
inated by the huge increase in Korea’s portfolio investments abroad (Table 
10-3), stimulated in large part by the easing of restrictions. From end of 2005 
to end of 2007, Korean holdings of foreign bonds rose from $38 billion to 
$54 billion, and stock holdings rose from $14 billion to $105 billion. After 
running consistent surpluses from 2002 through 2007, Table 10-2 shows that 
the total financial account of the BOP turned strongly negative, from a sur-
plus of approximately $9.5 billion in 2007 to a deficit of $51 billion in 2008, 
a turnaround that was roughly matched by the use of international reserves. 
The net balance of other investments in the BOP for 2008 was –$10.6 bil-
lion, a relatively small deficit although quite a drop from the $40 billion plus 
surpluses of the two preceding years. In fact, in 2008 all of the categories 
turned negative, with the balance of financial derivatives also recording its 
first negative value since 2001, a substantial $14 billion. By the first quarter 
of 2009, although some outflows continued, the deficit in the overall financial 
account had fallen to less than $1 billion, so the worst of the financial part of 
the crisis appeared to be contained. For a variety of reasons discussed earlier, 
the outflows from Korea were especially large. Unlike the 1997 crisis, how-
ever, they were not large in relation to Korea’s much stronger international 
reserve position. This allowed the Korean government to respond much more 
strongly to the crisis than it had in 1997 and as a result has been able to cush-
ion the effects quite considerably (Cargill 2009).
The financing of international trade and of SMEs had been hit particularly 
hard around the globe, and the Korean economy’s heavy reliance on both 
made it especially important to deal with the credit crunches in both of these 
areas. The BOK responded promptly to inject both won and dollar liquidity 
into the markets, and it continued to reduce interest rates. The government also 
took action to provide funding for measures to deal with distressed assets and 
needs for capital increases at financial institutions (Lall and Eskesen 2009).
Confidence was also boosted by the announcement of the creation of a $30 
billion swap line with the Federal Reserve and subsequent arrangements 
with China and Japan. Given Korea’s substantial reserve position, such mea-
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sures should not have been needed, but, amid concerns by many that a re-
peat of 1997–98 might be in the offing, these had an important psychological 
impact.
Table 10-2: Balance of Financial Account in Korea 
1998–2009 (January–April), in billions of U.S dollars
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/.
Table 10-3: Korean Investment Abroad, Outstanding Claims of 
Residents, 2001–08, in billions of U.S dollars
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/.
At the time this is written—July 2009—financial conditions are still far from 
normal in Korea, the United States, and around much of the globe, but there 
is a strong sense that the worst of the credit crunch is past. Risk spreads on a 
wide range of financial instruments, while still elevated, have fallen substan-
tially from their heights in the last quarter of 2008, and the liquidity of many 
markets is increasing while volatility has fallen. Especially important for Ko-
rea is that the won appears to have turned the corner and in recent months has 
begun to recover some of its previous losses.
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From Financial- to Trade-Based Contagion
Financial developments tend to affect the real economy with a lag. Korea 
and most other emerging markets’ low levels of direct exposure to securi-
ties based on subprime loans led to initial expectations that these countries 
would be largely immune to the effects of the subprime crisis. This view has 
changed drastically, first as the credit crunch developed and then as effects 
on the real economy began to be felt. As a result of both the increased cost 
and reduced availability of trade financing and the recessions in the industrial 
countries, the exports of most Asian economies have taken major hits, and 
this has begun to spread to the broader economy. The current phase of global 
contagion is now operating most heavily for countries like Korea through 
the trade interdependence channel. As 2008 progressed, Korea’s growth rate 
dropped quarter by quarter until in the fourth quarter it turned negative.
A strong case can be made, however, that by mid-2009 the worst of the down-
turn is past. Reflecting this view in early July, the IMF upgraded its forecast 
for the Korean economy. Its GDP growth projections were raised from –4 
percent to –3 percent for 2009 and from +1.5 to +2.5 percent for 2010 (see 
also Lowe-Lee 2009). In Korea’s 2009 Article IV review, the forecast for 
2009 was raised further to –1.75 percent, reflecting expectations of a return 
to growth in the second half of the year (Lister 2009).
Strong Policy Responses
Projections for Korea’s resumed growth are due in no small measure to 
the strong policy actions taken by the government and the BOK. The gov-
ernment’s fiscal stimulus program has been substantial, approximately 2.1 
percent of GDP, and the BOK has drastically cut interest rates. Such strong 
variations in the 1997 crisis would likely have led to massive capital flight, 
but the substantial improvements during the past decade in the soundness of 
Korea’s financial system and its substantial reserve position allowed such 
stimulative policies to be undertaken without inducing unmanageable capital 
outflows.
Should More Reserves Have Been Used to Cushion the Crisis?
With hindsight, if one is looking for possible faults with generally quite suc-
cessful policy actions amid the crisis, a leading candidate would be whether 
more international reserves should have been sold to better cushion the ef-
fects of the fourth quarter capital outflows and reduce the magnitude of the 
fall of the won. Substantial reserve sales were undertaken, on the order of $60 
billion (see Figure 10-3), but this still left roughly $200 billion of reserves 
available.
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If my argument is correct that a substantial portion of the international finan-
cial outflows from Korea during the crisis was due to the repercussions of 
the financial crisis abroad and to the views that overstated the vulnerability 
of Korea to the crisis, then this presents one of the few sets of conditions 
where very large scale sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market 
is justified. In such a case even larger intervention could be appropriate. And 
under these conditions it would be likely to be effective if backed by strong 
government policies. The substantial appreciation of the won since February 
combined with a recoupment of more than $30 billion in reserves suggest that 
there is likely some truth in this analysis.
Legitimate questions can be raised about the effectiveness of sterilized inter-
ventions. They certainly have limited effectiveness for attempting to main-
tain a pegged rate in the face of large capital outflows. And among some of 
the major industrial countries international capital mobility may be so high 
that sterilized intervention will generally be ineffective except in the cases 
where internationally coordinated intervention can send policy signals that 
offset expectations if or when markets become temporarily thin and disor-
derly in the face of great uncertainty. For emerging-market economies with 
flexible rates, however, there should be scope for sterilized intervention to 
have effects in countering crisis situations, which bring uncertainty and rapid 
increases in risk aversion. How strong such effects are is the crucial question, 
and it is one that is exceptionally hard to investigate. In addition to the lack 
of publicly available information on intervention, our exchange rate models 
are far from precise enough to measure accurately the counterfactual of what 
would have happened in the absence of intervention.
Because much intervention is of the leaning-against-the-wind variety, inter-
vention will only slow, not halt or reverse, exchange rate movements. Thus, 
when looking at the continued climb of the won in the early and middle parts 
of this decade despite substantial continued intervention, it is easy to have 
concern that the intervention was largely ineffective. The relevant question, 
however, is how much more would the won have appreciated in the absence 
of the intervention. We can estimate this with exchange rate models, but we 
would find a wide range of results using different models, just as there has 
been recent controversy about the equilibrium value of China’s currency.
Furthermore, there are strong reasons to believe that exchange rate effects of 
a given sized intervention can vary greatly depending on the circumstances. 
Just as market commentators frequently point to perceived changes in the risk 
appetites of investors in stock markets, the effective short-run elasticities in 
foreign exchange markets are likely to vary greatly depending on such factors 
as the level of uncertainty in the market and the credibility of government and 
central bank officials. Although answers will not come easily, more atten-
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tion to the study of the effectiveness of foreign exchange market intervention 
should be an important topic for researchers both within and outside central 
banks and governments.
Dealing with Variability of Capital Flows
The current crisis provides another vivid example that international capital 
flows can be highly variable and that the causes of seizing up do not always 
have to do with developments in the recipient countries. One possible re-
sponse to this variability of capital flows is to impose tight controls, but this 
could impose substantial efficiency costs. Taxes or controls on large capi-
tal inflows are a more sensible approach, but many economists believe that 
strong prudential regulation is the best course of action (Eichengreen 1999). 
Traditional micro prudential rules have proven insufficient for controlling 
excessive expansion of credit and leverage. One desirable side effect of the 
current crisis has been its stimulus to the need for more attention to macro 
systemic risks rather than a focus on institution-by-institution analysis of bal-
ance sheets.
Financial institutions should certainly be required to maintain sufficient capi-
tal to guard against idiosyncratic shocks and the use of excessive leverage. 
But, if all institutions kept reserves sufficient to deal adequately with major 
systematic shocks, they would be able to engage in very little productive 
lending. There are tremendous economies of scale in using centralized re-
serves to deal with such major shocks, and the government is the natural 
collective entity to hold these reserves.54
A wise strategy is for governments to add to their international reserves a 
proportion of many types of capital inflows. Although sufficient analysis has 
not yet taken place to say just what this proportion should be and how it 
should vary across types of financial flows, this is an important topic for poli-
cy research, and ballpark estimates of reasonable proportions can be obtained 
from the type of analysis presented in Chapter 4. This reserve management 
approach by itself does not account for the social costs of reserve accumula-
tion. Thus, just as there is a strong case for requiring banks to contribute to 
the cost of accumulating funds to provide deposit insurance, there is a case 
for imposing moderate fees on capital involved to cover the costs of holding 
additional reserves. Whether such an approach would be efficient in practice 
is at present an open question, but it is one that deserves consideration.
54.  This argument extends to reserve pooling across countries as well; this is a function the 
IMF was designed to meet.
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11
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Korea’s Monetary Exchange Rate and Financial Strategies Are 
Basically Sound
Our analysis finds that the policies of inflation targeting and managed float-
ing have served Korea well. Despite some susceptibility to the inflationary 
pressures that were sweeping Asia during the middle of this decade, Korea’s 
overall inflation record since the 1997–98 crisis has been good. Exchange 
market pressures have at times complicated policymaking and justified of-
ficial intervention, so Korea has been wise to follow a managed float rather 
than the free float that some officials misleadingly still claim Korea to be 
following.
With hindsight one can second-guess some of the specifics of postcrisis inter-
vention policies. In my own judgment the BOK’s leaning-against-the-wind 
intervention was too strong in the latter part of the period of won appreciation 
and should have been stronger during the period of sharp depreciation of the 
won during the current crisis, but these are issues over which it is difficult to 
reach definitive judgments, especially as the events are happening.
Korea is sometimes charged with practicing mercantilist policies, but such 
charges do not hold up to careful analysis. Although Korea may have leaned 
too hard against the winds of appreciation, this is a far cry from beggar-thy-
neighbor policy; and, although it did have large reserve accumulations during 
most of this decade, these came much more from large capital inflows than 
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from a huge current account surplus. Korea has certainly not been a major 
contributor to the problem of global current account balances. Overall ex-
change market intervention policy has been reasonable.
Beliefs that the complications generated by varying exchange market pres-
sures would go away if Korea joined a common Asian currency are based 
on faulty analysis. Although some pressures would be eliminated, those that 
would remain could have much more damaging effects on the Korean econ-
omy, forcing it to adopt macroeconomic policies inappropriate for the needs 
of the economy. Of course, there would also be benefits from being in a large 
currency area. In aggregate countercyclical policies would be likely to be 
more powerful, and Korea would undoubtedly have faced less depreciation 
of the won. Given the widespread market perception that Korea was the Asian 
country most vulnerable to the crisis, however, this common external shock 
would have had asymmetric effects within Asia. Thus, Korea would have 
faced a combination of both a symmetric shock for which fixed exchange 
rates are particularly well suited and an asymmetric shock for which flexible 
rates are generally better. Overall, it is difficult to conclude whether during 
the crisis Korea would have been hurt less as a member of an Asian currency 
area or with its current managed float and independent monetary policy. What 
is incorrect is to argue that Korea would have been obviously better off dur-
ing the crisis if it had been a member of a broad currency area. The substan-
tial difficulties that have been facing many of the countries in the eurozone 
illustrate this point.55 
Taking a longer-run perspective, several recent studies have concluded that 
on some criteria the benefits for Korea would be greater than the costs. Typi-
cally, however, such studies have failed to give sufficient attention to the 
full, broader range of considerations that affect the total costs and benefits 
of joining a currency area. When these are taken into account, our analysis 
indicates that the case that Korea would benefit from joining a common Asian 
currency is quite weak. We show that some of the most important consider-
ations give conflicting signals. Although within Asia Korea trades most heav-
ily with China and Japan, its general pattern of macroeconomic correlations 
with these countries is considerably lower than with many Southeast Asian 
countries. This common monetary policy would not work well for all cur-
rency area members. Geopolitical considerations also greatly reduce the like-
lihood that a common Asian currency would be politically feasible even it if 
were economically desirable. While the European experience with economic 
integration has led some to think that the creation of the euro was the logical 
outcome of the integration process, we argue that it was in fact a rather low-
probability event generated by a particular set of geopolitical considerations 
55.  For opposing views on this issue in the European context, see Dougherty (2008, sec. B) 
and Economist (2008, 68).
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that no longer obtain in Europe. Given the historical rivalry between China 
and Japan, there is little realistic prospect of their joining an Asian currency 
area within the next decade or two, and creating such an area without them 
would lack much of its rationale.
We should not let grand schemes of monetary union stand in the way of 
taking less dramatic but more practical steps to increase Asian economic, 
monetary, and financial cooperation. The European experience does suggest 
that economic integration can be a powerful force for overcoming historical 
distrust among nations. There are many reasons to promote greater economic 
integration and cooperation within Asia that need not rely on a goal of mon-
etary union. It is particularly important to develop stronger institutions to 
help strengthen cooperation.
International capital flows can make life more difficult for policymakers try-
ing to choose optimal policies, but we find that they have not seriously under-
mined the BOK’s ability to implement effective monetary policy. Korea has 
made great strides since the 1997–98 crisis toward improving the soundness 
of its financial system, undertaking further liberalization in a more sensible 
manner, and strengthening prudential regulation and supervision. Much still 
needs to be done to continue to improve the efficiency of the operation of the 
financial system, especially in its international dimensions.56
Heavy engagement with the global economy imposes costs as well as ben-
efits, but there is little reason to believe that on balance the benefits do not 
greatly exceed the costs. The outward-oriented development strategies of Ko-
rea and many other Asian countries have been proved clearly superior to the 
inward-oriented policies that were often followed by others, but this does not 
suggest that exports should be artificially stimulated at the expense of the rest 
of the economy. Just as it is essential that the United States act to curb its re-
cent reliance on excessive consumption, Korea and a number of other Asian 
economies need to develop economies that are better balanced and that rely 
more strongly on domestic sources of growth.
Korea Is in a Much Stronger Position to Deal with the Current 
Crisis Than in 1997
In the 1997–98 crisis, the primary causes of the huge capital outflows were 
desires to reduce exposure to Korean financial assets and unhedged foreign 
currency liabilities and the inadequacy Korea’s of international reserve po-
sition. This shortage of international reserves combined with a substantial 
56.  See the series of reports prepared by the researchers of the Korea Institute of Finance 
(KIF); a summary is given in Researchers of the KIF (2008) and K. S. Kim (2008). See also the 
suggestions by Kang (2009).
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current account deficit sharply limited the government’s ability to adopt ex-
pansionary policies and also resulted in substantial overdepreciation of the 
won, which in turn led to greater financial losses. While the current govern-
ment’s initial management of the turnaround in the won left a good deal to 
be desired, recent policy actions have been sound and applied with a steadier 
hand. A considerable part of the recent capital outflows are motivated not 
by concerns about Korea but by the needs of foreign investors to repatriate 
funds to cover margin calls and losses on other investments. It is true that the 
Korean stock market had become overvalued as a part of the global bubble 
and has subsequently tumbled dramatically, but so have markets around the 
globe. Korea suffered more foreign exchange market pressure than other 
Asian currencies in large part because of the higher proportion of foreign 
investment in its stock market before the crisis and concerns about the rapid 
expansion of its short-term foreign debt in recent years. The outflows were 
large in absolute terms but not relative to the high level of reserves that Korea 
had accumulated.
In the current crisis Korea has been in a much better position to respond than 
in the 1997 crisis. Its financial system is much stronger, and its international 
liquidity position was far superior. Although it can be argued that short-term 
foreign borrowing by Korean banks was allowed to expand too fast in 2006 
and 2007, there were also reasons for having only limited concern about this 
development, especially given the very strong international reserve position 
that had been accumulated. While many standard types of calculations of 
reserve adequacy suggested that excessive international reserves had been 
accumulated by the middle of this decade, concerns about the high proportion 
of foreign ownership in the Korean stock market combined with this rapid 
buildup of short-term foreign debt and the large capital outflows by Korean 
residents stimulated by financial liberalization were sufficient to give rise to 
concerns among some market participants. These interacted with the poor 
execution of government policies to talk down the won to generate severe 
strains in the foreign exchange market before the effects of the U.S. subprime 
crisis began to spread to emerging markets. As a consequence of these fac-
tors, Korea became the most hard-hit country in Asia in terms of financial-
market disturbances.
The pattern of capital outflows during this crisis has differed substantially 
from the 1997 crisis, with stock market outflows in the current crisis greatly 
exceeding those in 1997 while short-term bank flows have remained fairly 
stable, providing some justification for the authorities’ relative lack of con-
cern about their buildup. It is interesting that the substantial outflows of for-
eign holdings of Korean stocks appear to have had as much to do with the 
relatively high liquidity of the Korean market as with dire concerns about the 
Korean economy. With the huge financial losses generated in the industrial 
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countries hit by the crisis, it is not surprising that those needing to repatriate 
capital would sell off their most liquid assets first. Thus, to some extent Ko-
rea was a victim of its very success in improving the liquidity of its financial 
markets.
On the bright side, the improved quality of Korea’s financial system and its 
large holdings of international reserves have allowed Korea to respond to 
this crisis with expansionary rather than contractionary monetary and fiscal 
policies and to make use of its swap lines and sales of international reserves 
to help reduce the decline of the won. In the 1997 crisis none of these options 
was really available. Thus, despite being seen as especially vulnerable by 
many financial-market participants, Korea has been in a much better position 
to respond to this crisis than it was in 1997.
This does not mean that the Korean economy has escaped considerable dam-
age, however. As with the other export-dependent Asian economies, the re-
cessions in the industrial countries have hit Korean exporters quite hard, and 
this in turn affects the overall economy. In addition, the freezing up of credit 
markets generated sharp increases in the cost and declines in the availability 
of trade finance, which has also contributed to falling volumes of international 
trade and increased difficulties of operation for the SMEs that account for so 
much of the Korean economy. Fortunately, financial markets have generally 
begun to function again, and the cost and availability of credit, while not back 
to precrisis levels, have improved substantially. Thus, there are good reasons 
to believe that the worst of the global financial crisis is past. The fall of the 
won has ended, and upward pressures have been sufficiently strong for Korea 
to begin to recoup some of the reserves sold at the height of the crisis.
The effects of the crisis on the real economies are continuing, however. Al-
though there are some grounds for optimism that as of midsummer 2009 
many economies are beginning, or are at least close to beginning, to turn 
around and Korea’s GDP has started to grow again, there is considerable dan-
ger that recoveries in many economies may be quite weak. A major source of 
concern is the lingering holes in the balance sheets of major financial institu-
tions in the industrial countries. While there has been considerable successful 
raising of capital and the U.S. stress tests have pronounced that none of the 
major U.S. financial institutions deserves to be classified as insolvent, many 
independent experts are much more pessimistic, suggesting that expected fu-
ture earnings will be far from sufficient to fill the true holes in many institu-
tions’ balance sheets. Japan in the 1990s and many other examples suggest 
that failures to fully clean up balance sheets lead to prolonged stagnation, and 
many experts are concerned that politics and “cognitive capture” have kept 
U.S. officials from facing up to the full costs of restoring the banking system 
to health.
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The situation in Europe is even worse, with a far lower proportion of likely 
losses having been acknowledged on the books of the banks. Thus, despite 
some large emerging-market economies such as China and India showing 
strong signs of recovery, the general climate for the growth of international 
trade appears likely to remain weak for a considerable time. If correct, this 
further increases the case for Korea and other export-dependent economies to 
further strengthen efforts to rebalance their economies.
A number of commentators have argued that the crisis supports concerns 
that Korea had become too open to global financial markets and had allowed 
“excessive” foreign investment in the Korean stock market and a dangerous 
buildup of short-term foreign debt by the Korean branches of international 
banks. Considerable concern has also been expressed about the role played 
by speculation in the market for nondeliverable forward exchange. Such con-
cerns deserve careful attention, but the best policy responses are not obvious. 
Large financial inflows do increase the risk of sudden stops and hence can 
impose an important systemic risk that would be difficult to capture by the 
standard prudential regulation of individual institutions.
This in principle can present a case for capital controls, but their well-known 
inefficiencies make it important to investigate whether better solutions can 
be found. In general there is a presumption in favor of tax rather than con-
trol measures to correct such negative externalities. While now abandoned, 
Chile’s “tax” system of required zero interest deposits lengthened the maturi-
ties of capital inflows a good bit without having much discouraging effect on 
total capital inflows. Thus, depending on one’s objectives, this experiment 
could be judged as a success or a failure. Whether or not direct measures are 
taken to discourage high levels of liquid financial inflows, it is clear that part 
of a sensible national risk management regime would be to use a portion of 
these inflows to increase international reserves. Obtaining better estimates 
of what such proportions should be is an important area for policy research. 
And, because such additional reserve accumulation is costly, a case can be 
made for imposing a fee on inflows to help cover these costs, but such an ap-
proach should not be adopted without careful study. Any such measures need 
to be taken within the context of a strong system of prudential oversight. Ko-
rea has made great strides in this area since the 1997 crisis, and its recent fail-
ures have been far less than those in the United States and Europe, but Korea 
has much to gain by being an active participant in the efforts now beginning 
to substantially reform financial regulation at the global level.
Reforming the Global Financial System
The current global crisis should put to rest any lingering beliefs that financial 
markets can always manage themselves. When doubts are raised about the 
20335_SpcStd_Willett-N1-R1.indd   142 11/11/2009   4:02:35 PM
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations  143
solvency of important counterparts in financial networks, the microeconomic 
incentives facing individual market participants can greatly magnify shocks. 
Thus, a relatively low proportion of bad assets or credit risks in the system 
can lead broad segments of financial markets to seize up, engage in runs 
on particular institutions and securities, or both. This is a key reason why 
financial systems need lenders of last resort to reduce the danger that broad 
segments of the financial system can implode under stress.
The existence of such lenders of last resort (or guarantors of last resort) in 
turn generates moral hazard. As financial systems grow in complexity, a 
growing number of institutions may become too big or too interconnected 
to fail. This in turn tends to reduce their incentives for careful risk manage-
ment. There is considerable disagreement about how important the various 
channels of moral-hazard influence have been in generating recent crises, but 
it is clear that the responses to the current global crisis will greatly increase 
the potential for moral hazard and contribute to future crises if adequate safe-
guards are not adopted. Such considerations provide a strong rationale for 
government regulations to limit excessive risk taking by institutions subject 
to such moral-hazard incentives. There is a clear need for a better system of 
resolution authority for large troubled financial institutions that allows tem-
porary government takeovers and imposes costs on managers and investors 
without completely disrupting the operation of the financial system. This will 
definitely not be an easy task, either technically or politically, but we are cur-
rently seeing the huge costs of not having such an effective regime.
In thinking about future reforms for financial regulations, several key issues 
come to mind. One is that, although there is a clear case for good regulation, 
actual regulation has often worked poorly. While deregulation has frequently 
been blamed for the U.S. crisis, a high proportion of the most serious prob-
lems developed in sectors that were still regulated. While Alan Greenspan’s 
degree of faith in the ability of the financial sector to police its own activities 
was clearly excessive, his skepticism about the effectiveness of traditional 
financial regulation was much better placed. We clearly need to adopt regula-
tory strategies where the regulators do not have to be much smarter than the 
private sector actors for regulations to work. This suggests placing greater 
reliance on crude but effective measures like capital and leverage ratios in-
stead of on more sophisticated measures that can more easily be gamed. It is 
also important to recognize that the perverse incentive structures that led to 
the widespread nature of the current crisis were far more pervasive than just 
those generated by moral hazard from potential government bailouts.
We need a new approach to financial regulation. Considerably more empha-
sis should be placed on evaluating the incentive structures within important 
financial institutions than on accessing the details of their complicated risk 
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management models. Where incentive structures are seriously out of balance, 
competitive pressures can make the situation worse rather than better, as in-
vestment managers and institutions feel compelled by their competitors to 
take on more risk to keep up current returns and market shares.57 Because 
financial risks are so hard to measure ex ante, proposals that a sizable por-
tion of compensation in the financial sector should be deferred for some time 
until a better appreciation of risks can be obtained have considerable merit. 
Introducing some degree of individual liability for damages generated by ex-
cessive risk taking may also be worth considering. The case for such liability 
is especially strong when government bailouts are required.
It is clear that prudential regulators need a great deal more information than 
has been available to them in the past. Some of the information about the 
positions of individual institutions should of course remain confidential, but 
considerably more transparency of public information is needed as well. 
Where to draw the balance on this issue will be an important issue for study. 
It is clear that in the United States and Europe both regulators and market 
discipline failed. We need to try to improve the operation of both—viewing 
them as complements not substitutes. The improvement of both will require 
better information as well as the provision of better incentives to make use 
of this information.
More attention clearly needs to be paid to the potential costs of financial in-
novations, and a better balance obtained between the benefits of the contin-
ued work for innovation and the danger that some innovations that provide 
substantial private benefits can also generate huge social costs. It is important 
to remember that the major cause of the global crisis was not financial lib-
eralization per se, but the failure of governments and regulatory agencies to 
provide proper oversight of this liberalization. In part because of liberaliza-
tion, the Korean financial system is far sounder today than before the crisis 
of 1997.
History makes clear that financial innovation, liberalization, and regulation 
can all be subject to substantial unintended consequences. These can never 
be entirely eliminated, but careful study prior to choosing and implementing 
policies can certainly reduce the incidence of such unintended consequences. 
Fortunately, for some time to come, too little rather than too much risk tak-
ing is likely to be the greater problem in most credit and financial markets. 
Thus, there is time to think through reforms carefully. But we must not let 
striving for perfection be the enemy of the good. If we do not begin to make 
progress now, the willingness of key actors in the political process to give the 
57.  Recent reports suggest that concerns with maintaining or increasing market share were 
major factors in the decisions of Citigroup and also Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to adopt 
riskier investment strategies.
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needed attention to these issues will begin to fade. This opportunity to sub-
stantially reform regulatory strategies should not be allowed to go to waste.
While the Group of 20 summit in November 2008 predictably failed to live 
up to the hype of a new Bretton Woods generated by some politicians, it was 
a worthwhile meeting. Perhaps its most important aspect was the choice of 
membership, with the inclusion of many important emerging-market nations 
rather than just the traditional industrial-country powers. The agreement that 
membership in the Financial Stability Board will be broadened to include 
countries such as Korea is an important accomplishment. Korea is well po-
sitioned to take a leading role in helping to chart new directions for global 
financial regulation. Also important in this respect will be helping to refocus 
attention more on macro prudential issues such as reducing the pro-cyclical 
nature of traditional capital adequacy regulations and dampening the conta-
gion effects generated by standard value-at-risk models.
As was discussed, the traditional approaches to both private sector risk mod-
eling and management and prudential regulation have focused primarily on 
individual institutions under the implicit assumption that at the macro level 
the financial system would continue to operate well and would not be sub-
stantially influenced by the developments in an individual institution. This 
independence assumption makes analysis much easier, but it fundamentally 
distorts reality. The new Basel II banking regulations, while making some 
improvements on Basel I, still fail to take such complex interdependence 
sufficiently into account. Recognition of this type of problem is increasing. 
It is imperative that prudential regulators and private sector risk managers 
pay greater attention to the lessons from the current crisis than they did from 
the crisis of 1997–98. Emerging-market countries such as Korea have dem-
onstrated that they did learn a great deal from the earlier crises and adjusted 
policies accordingly. Therefore, they should be in a strong position to take 
leadership in this effort.
It is also worth another major effort at reforming the IMF to help bring it 
more fully into the age of financial globalization.58 The IMF is a perplexing 
mix of typical bureaucratic inertia combined with an unusual ability to some-
times learn from past mistakes. In recent years, it had become largely side-
lined as an important global actor—with some justification, given its track 
record. The global nature of the current crisis highlights the positive role that 
a well-functioning IMF could play. Its new Short-Term Liquidity Facility is a 
much-needed step toward increasing its capacity to play a role more closely 
approximating a genuine international lender of last resort and is designed 
58.  For discussions of the needs for IMF reform and some thoughtful proposals, see Truman 
(2009); for recent discussions of the IMF’s role in global surveillance, see Bird and Willett 
(2007) and Goldstein and Lardy (2008).
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much better than its ill-fated predecessor, the Contingent Credit Lines ad-
opted after the Asian and Russian crises.
The IMF suffers, however, not only from bureaucratic problems but also 
from the heavy influence of major powers on its policies. Substantial reforms 
are needed to increase its legitimacy, and a key aspect of this is to give more 
effective power to emerging-market economies. Reports indicate that at the 
November 2008 summit many nations wanted to put the IMF more solidly 
in the center of the global financial system and provide it with the greater 
resources necessary to play such a role effectively, but the U.S. government 
was cool to these ideas. It is to be hoped that with a new administration in 
power in the United States such positions will be rethought.
Korea’s Pivotal Position for Reform
Korea is well positioned to begin a more positive engagement with the IMF, 
using its experiences with the IMF during the Asian crisis as a basis for taking 
leadership in promoting reforms. Its upcoming position as chair of the Group 
of 20 gives it increased potential to play this role and makes it especially 
important to discard blanket negative views of the IMF and put forward con-
structive proposals for its improvement. Korea should also continue leader-
ship in pushing for increased Asian monetary and financial cooperation. As 
was argued in Chapter 8, it should be recognized that this will be a long, 
slow process and is likely not to result in the dramatic developments like 
the creation of a common currency, but it can be highly valuable just the 
same. Korea should not let the grandeur of unrealistic discussion of Asian 
monetary union deflect attention from the slow process of developing institu-
tional frameworks to help facilitate regional monetary and financial coopera-
tion. Although the prospects for strengthening the Chiang Mai Initiative and 
bringing it into use are unclear, the development of a collectively financed 
Asian monetary and financial institute or secretariat that provides an inde-
pendent staff to help support the work of ASEAN Plus Three in these areas 
should be a high priority. For advocates of increased Asian monetary and 
financial cooperation, there is a rich agenda to pursue.
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Appendix A
Economic Estimates of Sterilization and 
Offset Coefficients for Korea
This appendix is coauthored with Alice Ouyang, who is the lead author.
Our estimates are based on Ouyang, Rajan, and Willett (2008); this model 
modifies the theoretical model developed by Brissimis, Gibson, and Tsaka-
lotos (2002), which derives both the balance of payments and the monetary 
reaction functions from explicit minimization of a simple loss function of the 
monetary authority, subject to a number of constraints that reflect the work-
ing of the economy. The estimated simultaneous equations are simplified as 
follows:59
The balance of payments function (equation 1a) consists of seven control 
variables, incorporating both push and pull factors. Push factors motivate 
capital to leave creditor countries in search of better returns. Pull factors mo-
tivate capital flows into specific recipient countries. The rationales for the 
inclusion of variables are as follows: A rise in the money multiplier for M2 
59.  Please refer to Table B-1 in Appendix B for the definitions of the variables.
(1a)
(1b)
20335_SpcStd_Willett-N1-R1.indd   147 11/11/2009   4:02:36 PM
148  The Global Crisis and Korea’s International Financial Policies
increases the domestic money and pushes the interest rate down, hence re-
ducing capital inflows. Higher inflation heightens concerns about currency 
depreciation, causing a reduction in capital inflows.60 Higher lagged real out-
put could worsen the current account (owing to the income effect), reducing 
foreign reserve accumulation. An expansionary fiscal policy (higher govern-
ment expenditure) will raise cyclical income and once again worsen the cur-
rent account.61 Foreign reserves will be decumulated because of a decrease in 
the current account if the real effective exchange rate (REER) is overvalued 
(price effect). A rise in either the change in foreign interest rates or in the ex-
pected exchange rate depreciation can also lead to capital withdrawals from 
the country. Finally, to limit exchange rate volatility, the central bank tends 
to buy or sell foreign reserves (that is, foreign exchange market intervention) 
when there is an excess supply of or demand for foreign currency, respec-
tively. The more volatile the exchange rate, the more heavily the central bank 
will intervene. Therefore, the expected sign for the interaction term should 
be negative.
The monetary policy function (equation 1b) consists of seven control vari-
ables in the monetary reaction function in addition to the change of net foreign 
assets. These control variables are considered important factors influencing 
monetary policy actions. The theoretical model suggests that the expected 
signs for these explanatory variables are negative, indicating that monetary 
authorities generally implement a contractionary monetary policy to defend 
a country’s currency and to adjust to a rise in inflation, the money multiplier, 
or the expected exchange rate depreciation. In addition, monetary authorities 
adopt an anticyclical monetary policy if they contract domestic credit when 
there is a rise in real GDP growth rate or fiscal deficit. However, we note 
that the expected sign for the fiscal spending should be positive if monetary 
authorities monetize a government’s fiscal deficit. Also, both an overvalued 
REER and higher exchange rate–adjusted foreign interest rates can cause a 
deficit in the balance of payments. Monetary authorities tend to implement 
a policy of high interest rates (that is, a contractionary monetary policy) to 
attract more capital inflows to reach external balance. Finally, to keep domes-
tic interest rates less volatile, the central bank will inject or withdraw funds 
from the market when the domestic money market is in deficit or in surplus, 
respectively. Again, the more volatile the domestic interest rate, the more 
60.  In addition, in practice, higher inflation could engender greater uncertainty, leading to 
reduced capital flows.
61.  Three caveats should be noted. One, it is important to consider the context of expansionary 
fiscal policy. If adopted in response to an economic downturn, the impact may not be similar to 
that in response to output above trend. Two, the focus here is on short-term rates; in most cir-
cumstances one would expect higher budget deficits to cause a rise in long-term interest rates. 
Three, it is also important to consider the impact of market expectations. If higher government 
expenditure is viewed as a sign of fiscal profligacy, this could lead to a rise in country risk 
premium and consequent capital flight.
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heavily the central bank will intervene. We also anticipated a negative sign 
for the interaction term.
Data and Definitions
The estimation is based on monthly data for the sample period from January 
1985 to October 2008. We divide the whole sample period into two sub-
samples: the precrisis period defined as January 1985 to June 1997 and the 
postcrisis period defined as July 1998 to October 2008. By comparing the dif-
ferent values of offset and sterilization coefficients in these two subsamples, 
we can ascertain how the extent of sterilization and degree of capital mobility 
for Korea have changed in the two periods. One of the difficulties in estimat-
ing the model is the development of proxies for exchange rate expectations, 
which are not directly observable.
There is no one best way to proxy these expectations, so we make use of 
several different methods that have been used in the literature. We are fortu-
nate that our estimates are not terribly sensitive to which proxy is used. One 
common assumption in the literature is that economic agents have unbiased 
foresight of future exchange rates. Thus, the actual nominal exchange rate 
at the next period is used to proxy the expected exchange rate for the next 
period. The two other most common assumptions are static expectations of 
future exchange rate and the use of three-month won-dollar forward rate as a 
predictor of the future spot rate. In other words, the current spot rate is used 
as the predictor of the future rate, as would occur if the exchange rate fol-
lowed a random walk.
Table B-1 in Appendix B summarizes the definitions and sources of the vari-
ous data used in the estimating equations. The relevant variables, such as the 
change in the “adjusted” DNFAt* and DNDAt* (where * denotes adjustments 
that are discussed in next section), are scaled by monetary base. To check 
for stationarity, we applied the standard unit root test using the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) to each of the variables and found them all to be sta-
tionary at the 10 percent level of significance for both the precrisis and post-
crisis periods, except the exchange rate–adjusted foreign interest rates with 
forward-looking expectations (see Table B-2 in Appendix B).62 We used the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) method to measure the trend of real output, govern-
ment expenditure, and inflation. In addition, we used the standard deviation 
of the within monthly change in the daily U.S. dollar bilateral exchange rate 
and short-term uncollateralized call rates to proxy the volatility of exchange 
rate and volatility of domestic interest rate, respectively.
62.  Siklos (2000) pointed out a similar problem with the Hungarian-German interest rate dif-
ferential and has argued that interest rates should not be difference stationary.
20335_SpcStd_Willett-N1-R1.indd   149 11/11/2009   4:02:36 PM
150  The Global Crisis and Korea’s International Financial Policies
Adjusting the Net Foreign Asset and Net Domestic Asset 
Figures
Since the changes of net foreign assets (NFAs) and net domestic assets 
(NDAs) are taken from monetary authorities’ balance sheets, we must be care-
ful of how monetary authorities report the revaluation effects derived from 
exchange rate fluctuations, interest earnings earned from foreign reserves ac-
cumulation, and loans from international organizations (such as International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank). It could cause a severe bias if we used 
the book values of NFAs and NDAs to conduct empirical research.
To correctly measure the change in NFAs and NDAs, we have to exclude 
the revaluation effect and interest earnings from the net foreign assets (that 
is, foreign assets minus foreign liabilities). Because the BOK’s investment 
portfolio is unknown and interest earnings are not usually considered as sig-
nificant as the revaluation effect, we assume that the interest earnings are not 
substantial and can be ignored for now. In addition, foreign assets include 
monetary gold and foreign exchange. To exclude monetary gold from the 
foreign assets, we use the product of foreign reserves denominated in the 
U.S. dollar and exchange rates (domestic currency divided by the U.S. dol-
lar) to proxy foreign assets. The net foreign assets without monetary gold are 
as follows:
NFAt = Rt x st - FLt
 
where Rt is the foreign reserves denominated in the U.S. dollar; and St is the 
exchange rate against the U.S. dollar.
Because the revaluation effect is the change of NFAs caused by exchange rate 
fluctuations, we measure the revaluation effect as follows:
Revaluation effect =  
Therefore, the revised change of net foreign assets = 
Since the revaluation effect can affect not only DNFAt* but also DNDAt*, we 
have to exclude the revaluation effect from DNDAt* as well. Therefore, the 
new DNDAt* is
                                                         Revaluation effect    
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DNFAt* and DNDAt* will be used as the dependent variables in equations (1a) 
and (1b), respectively.
Empirical Results for Korea
The two-stage least square method was used to estimate the simultaneous 
equation. Because of data limitations, the empirical results for the forward 
rate expectations are available for only the postcrisis period. The empirical 
results are presented in Table B-3 in Appendix B. The estimated precrisis 
offset coefficient is around 0.5, while the estimated sterilization coefficients 
range from 0.63 to 0.65.63 This suggests that Korea had a moderate degree of 
capital mobility before the crisis, and the BOK also undertook fairly substan-
tial high sterilization operations. After the crisis, while the estimated offset 
coefficient increased modestly to 0.68, the estimated sterilization coefficient 
increased substantially to around 1 under all the assumptions for proxying 
exchange rate expectations.
The estimated coefficients for the change in the money multiplier are consis-
tently negative and significant in both periods. Increases in inflation and real 
output above trend have consistently negative effects in both equations but 
are significant only before the crisis. The estimated coefficients for the gov-
ernment expenditure deviations from the trend are positive before the crisis, 
but turn negative after the crisis, indicating that the BOK tended to monetize 
the government expenditure before the crisis. However, they are insignificant 
for all the cases. The volatility term has the correct sign for the exchange rate 
and interest rate before the crisis but is statistically insignificant or turns posi-
tive in the postcrisis period. The other variables are statistically insignificant 
in both periods with inconsistent signs, except for the lagged change in the 
REER and the exchange rate–adjusted foreign interest rate in the monetary 
reaction function before the crisis.
In summary, Korea is estimated to have had a moderate degree of capital 
mobility in the precrises period, which increases moderately afterward. This 
is consistent with the impression that Korea has been gradually opening up its 
capital market in recent years, but that this has been partially offset on capi-
tal mobility by the dampening effect of greater exchange rate volatility. In 
addition, the empirical results show that Korea sterilized around 65 percent 
of capital inflows before the crisis, but it tended to aggressively sterilize the 
large amount of reserve accumulation during the postcrisis period.
Our empirical results are broadly consistent with the previous empirical stud-
ies of the topic. Kim (1990) and Joyce (1991) use ordinary least squares to 
estimate BOK’s monetary reaction function and find that Korea sterilized 
63.  We describe the estimated offset and sterilization coefficients in absolute value terms.
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approximately 63–76 percent of capital inflows during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Cavoli and Rajan (2006) apply this methodology and find that Korea fully 
sterilized capital inflows from 1990 to mid-1997. Moreno (1996), Takagi and 
Esaka (1999), Kim, Kim, and Wang (2004), and Oh (2005) use value-at-risk 
models to examine the extent of sterilization for Korea from the 1980s to 
the early 2000s. They all find that the BOK heavily sterilized the reserve ac-
cumulations during this period. Finally, G. Kim (1995) and Fry (1996) use 
simultaneous equations to estimate both offset and sterilization coefficients 
for Korea. G. Kim (1995) finds that the estimated offset coefficient is 0.35, 
indicating that Korea had relatively low capital mobility during the sample 
period from 1980 to 1994. Meanwhile, sterilization was around 0.76, sug-
gesting heavy sterilization. Fry (1996) used annual data from 1960 to 1991 
and found estimated offset and sterilization coefficients of 0.25 and 0.24, 
respectively, implying that Korea had relatively low capital mobility and ster-
ilization during this period.
Overall these results are consistent with the view that, as Korea reduced its 
controls on capital flows, its international financial integration grew more 
generally over time. Korea has faced substantial international capital mobil-
ity, but this has not been sufficiently great to undermine the ability of the 
BOK to sterilize capital flows efficiently when it desires.
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Table B-1: Definitions and Measurement of the Variables Used in 
Empirical Study
Notes: BIS = Bank for International Settlements; BOK = Bank of Korea; CEIC = CEIC data.
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Table B-2: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Roots Test for Korea: 
Precrisis and Postcrisis Periods
Source: Author’s estimations.
Notes: * = significant at more than 10 percent; ** = significant at more than 5 percent; *** = 
significant at more than 1 percent. The null hypothesis of ADF test is that H0: variable has a unit 
root.
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Table B-3: Estimated Simultaneous Equations for Korea 
January 1985–June 1997 and July 1998–October 2008
Source: Author’s estimations.
Notes: * = significant at more than 10 percent; ** = significant at more than 5 percent; *** = 
significant at more than 1 percent. The simultaneous equations are estimated by two-stage least 
squares (2SLS).
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